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Figure 1: CDA Governance Framework 
 
The essence of this Thesis is to articulate how the concept and practice of 
Community Development Agreement (CDA) may be engaged as an 
instrument of local governance and community sustainability in or across 
Nigeria’s natural resource sectors. This Thesis posits that CDA practice can 
be a strategic tool for local socio-economic growth and sustainable 
community development in Nigeria if properly regulated and implemented. 
The foundation for this argument is that Nigeria’s Minerals and Mining Act 
(MMA) of 2007 imposes a compulsory CDA regime.  That is, the MMA 
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requires companies involved in any form of mining activity to conclude a CDA 
with the host community prior to commencement of business. Prior to the 
MMA’s adoption, a system or regime of legally binding agreements between 
extractive industry companies and local communities was unknown to 
Nigeria’s legal system. However, nearly a decade since the MMA’s 
enactment, no single agreement is known to have been negotiated pursuant 
to this requirement. 
The MMA defines the purposes, scope, and legal framework for the 
negotiation and implementation of the CDA process. The core purposes of 
this process are to “ensure the transfer of social and economic benefits to the 
community,” and to secure “the sustainability of such community.”1  While the 
aspirations are notable and the CDA scope reasonably lucid, the MMA does 
not appropriately articulate or establish a competent framework for the 
implementation of the stated purposes. Consequently, the structure created in 
the MMA for the implementation of its CDA agenda is unlikely to result in the 
fulfilment of the law’s stated objectives.  
The basis for this conclusion is that the framework established in the MMA 
suggests a CDA process which is a pivot for local governance in resource 
project areas. However, the framework instituted falls short in outlining how 
this local governance objective could function appropriately within the CDA 
                                                          
1
 The Nigerian National Assembly, Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, 2007, sec. 116 (1), 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/nig92382.pdf. 
2
 World Bank. 2011. Briefing note 1: Community development in the Lao mining sector. Proceedings. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/09/16434464/briefing-note-1-community-
development-lao-mining-sector, P2.  
3
 Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Indigenous Land Use Agreement Policy 
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process generally known to be private arrangements between industry and 
communities. 
In order to appreciate the issues involved in CDA practice, it is necessary to 
study and learn from more experienced jurisdictions such as Australia and 
Canada. Having recourse to these countries’ practices enables one to 
compare practices and to understand the operating frameworks for the Mining 
Agreement/Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA) and Impact and Benefits 
Agreement (IBA), respectively. The following lessons can be drawn from the 
experiences of these two countries: 
 The ILUA and IBA arrangements were not imposed by statute and 
operate as purely private agreements; 
 The practice has become the norm, or the standard practice within 
these countries’ extractive industries;  
 The purpose and scope of agreements are determined entirely by 
parties; 
 There is no specific law or prescriptive policy guidance specifically 
directed at the community agreement process; 
 The community agreement practice developed or evolved from the 
formal legal process for the recognition and protection of native title 




 Acknowledgement and respect for native title or aboriginal rights and 
title, and the protection of aboriginal culture and heritage are some of 
the important achievements of the agreement-making process; and  
 Some of the major challenges of the process include the general lack 
of effective Benefit Management Systems, poor agreement 
implementation and monitoring procedures, and a resourcing and 
funding handicap. 
Drawing from the experiences of these jurisdictions, it was apparent that for 
the purposes or the objectives established for Nigeria’s CDA process to be 
realisable, certain structures must be created. Thus, the central issue for the 
consideration of this work was to identify the essential requirements 
necessary to administer the Nigerian CDA process as an instrument of social 
and economic growth and community sustainability. The central question 
underlying the research undertaken for this Thesis is the following:  
• How can the concept and practice of CDA in mining and petroleum 
industries be a vehicle for fostering sustainability and development in 
project areas?  
  
Also, to address the problem posed by this research and to answer the 
research question, the concept of community sustainability was selected as 
the analytical framework or perspective. As a result, the analyses of this topic 
will be from the prism of community sustainability, which has been derived 
from the basic ideas of sustainable development. 
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This work finds that the concept and practice of CDA can be an instrument of 
social and economic development and community sustainability in resource 
project areas, provided the following conditions exist: 
a. A CDA specific policy and legal framework; 
b. An effective Benefit Management System; 
c. Key supporting Institutions; 
d. Strategically-developed local capacity, resourcing, and funding; and 
e. Proper CDA implementation and monitoring procedures. 
 
This work concludes that for the Nigerian CDA process to effectively function 
as an instrument for local governance in project areas and to be able to 
ensure strategic local development and community sustainability, these 




















The central point of this work is the concept of Community Development 
Agreement (CDA) as an instrument for strategic community development and 
community sustainability within the Nigerian legal system. The work contends 
that the concept of CDAs, if redesigned or reshaped, could be a strategic, 
tailor-made instrument for achieving the development and sustainability 
 This Chapter introduces the topic and the scope of the 
research undertaken for this work. 
 It sets out the influence of section 116 of Nigeria’s 
Minerals and Mining Act 2007 in framing the research 
topic. 
 It sets out the main research question and two subsidiary 
questions. 
 It defines the research methodology. 
 It highlights Community Sustainability as the research 
Framework. 




needs of communities within the context of exploration and development of 
mineral resources.  
CDAs are traditionally used in many jurisdictions as the preferred 
mechanisms for securing the consent and support of landowners, indigenous 
people, host communities, and groups that could (or are likely to) be 
adversely affected by a proposed oil and gas or mining project.2 Following 
this notion of the utility of the CDA arrangement, benefits packages are often 
offered to the adversely impacted as an incentive or inducement in exchange 
for an undertaking to support a proposed resource extraction project, or to 
refrain from opposing it.  
Further to this traditional purpose of the CDA process, Nigeria seeks to 
expand the uses of the CDA arrangement to address salient matters so as to 
ensure that natural resources development becomes more beneficial to host 
communities as well as securing community sustainability. This Thesis will, 
using the lessons of the field studies and the extant CDA provisions in the 
MMA as foundation, examine how Nigeria can realise her CDA process-
driven objectives for host communities. 
 
Standing on the existing knowledge about the benefits of the CDA concept, 
this work will argue that keeping communities quiet and peaceful is only one 
                                                          
2
 World Bank. 2011. Briefing note 1: Community development in the Lao mining sector. Proceedings. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/09/16434464/briefing-note-1-community-
development-lao-mining-sector, P2.  
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aspect of what can be achieved through the CDA arrangement. If properly 
conceptualized and systematically implemented, the CDA arrangement could 
be a means or catalyst for sustainability and strategic community 
development, especially within the context of mining or oil and gas 
exploration and development projects. This position is supported by recent 
policy documents and/or legislations from CDA-practicing jurisdictions, which 
suggest that the CDA process possesses an inherent potential for addressing 
many of the sustainability and development challenges in communities or 
areas where mining or oil and gas projects are located.3 Thus, this work 
makes the case for CDA as a tool for local governance, and as a catalyst for 
promoting resource extraction whilst ensuring that local challenges are 
systematically isolated and addressed.  
 
1.1 Section 116, Nigeria’s MMA  
This research was instigated or provoked by the interesting provision 
contained in section 116 of the MMA. It provides that:  
“(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Holder of a Mining Lease, 
Small Scale Mining Lease or Quarry Lease shall prior to the commencement 
of any development activity within the lease area, conclude with the host 
community where the operations are to be conducted an agreement referred 
                                                          
3
 Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Indigenous Land Use Agreement Policy 






to as a Community Development Agreement or other such agreement that will 
ensure the transfer of social and economic benefits to the community” 
“(2) The Community Development Agreement shall contain undertakings with 
respect to the social and economic contributions that the project will make to 
the sustainability of such community.” 
The foregoing provisions seek to designate CDA as a framework for 
community governance and setting specific objectives intended to be 
achieved. The direct approach employed by this legislation to expressly and 
mandatorily obligate mining companies to negotiate CDAs is not only 
groundbreaking, but also indicative of a resolve to assimilate a contemporary 
tool towards addressing energy project-induced community challenges. In 
other words, the concept and practice of CDA is generally alien to Nigeria’s 
history and constitutional order. Thus, it became necessary to closely 
examine the MMA and to identify what structure has been established within 
the MMA that can competently deliver the lofty outcomes outlined therein. A 
detailed assessment of the MMA revealed the legislation may not have 
sufficiently articulated the critical legal, policy and institutional infrastructures 
necessary to achieve the stated objectives. 
Following this assessment, this research adopted a common sense approach, 
which was to consider existing CDA regimes by examining the Australian and 
Canadian Community Agreement/Mining Agreement and Impact and Benefit 
Agreement Frameworks respectively. The choice of these two jurisdictions 
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was informed by their status as pioneer jurisdictions in relation to CDA 
practice. Thus, studying how the CDA process operates or functions in those 
jurisdictions was to provide the author with a better perspective on CDA 
practice and on the basis of that study to determine or assess the possibility 
of engaging the CDA arrangement as an instrument for local governance 
towards community sustainability and development in Nigeria’s mineral 
sector.  
 
1.1.1 CDA: Meaning 
A CDA is defined as “any negotiated agreement between industry and 
communities agreeing how these communities will access development 
initiatives”.4 CDAs are used across the extractive industries and, in particular, 
mining and oil and gas. The underlying consideration for the use of CDAs is 
that they provide unique mechanisms for, inter alia, balancing or managing 
the various contending interests usually at play in a project environment.5 
 
1.2 Essence of CDAs 
Historically, the primary purpose of any CDA arrangement is to enable the 
parties (project proponents and communities or community-based entities) 
                                                          
4
 Sunrita Sarkar et al., ‘Mining Community Development Agreements – Practical Experiences 
and Field Studies’ (The World Bank, 2010), p2, http://www.sdsg.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/CDA-Report-FINAL.pdf. 
5 Ibid., P2. 
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through contractual relations to manage or address specific issues which are 
of particular interest to them that are likely to be adversely impacted by the 
proposed project.6 So, mineral rights are not ordinarily allocated or transferred 
through CDAs.7 In other words, the existence of a CDA is not tantamount to 
an assertion of mineral title by a community or a challenge on the legal right 
of the State in relation to any mineral deposit.8 In fact, CDAs routinely 
acknowledge that ownership, management and control of resources rights 
may reside in someone else –usually the State. Also, CDAs do not dispute 
that a holder of mineral title may freely dispose or deal with such title as 
deemed appropriate.9   
The proposition of the CDA concept is that resource ownership, management 
and/or development occurs in a community of rights and/or legally protected 
interests.10 Thus, resource management and indeed resource development 
projects should be carried out in a way which is not injurious to the interests 
                                                          
6
 Barry Barton, ‘Underlying Concepts and Theoretical Issues in Public Participation in Resources 
Development’, in Human Rights in Natural Resources Development Public Participation in the 
Sustainable Development of Mining and Energy Resources (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
100–103. 
7
 Aidan Davy, ‘Community Development Agreements & Mining: Aidan Davy, Director An Industry 
Perspective’ (ICMM, 2011), 17–18, http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/presentation-
MCDA-Aidan-Davy.pdf. 
8
 David Brereton and Peter Forbes, ‘Monitoring the Impact Of Mining on Local Communities: A 
Hunter Valley Case Study’ (The Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, CSRM, 2004), 5–7, 
http://www.csrm.uq.edu.au/docs/Hunter_Valley.pdf. 
9
 Barton, ‘Underlying Concepts and Theoretical Issues in Public Participation in Resources 
Development’, pp77–122. 
10
 Ibid, P100 
7 
 
of those who are connected to the locus of such activity.11 In other words, it 
supposes an acknowledgement of the diversities of interests and rights, 
which need to be, accommodated one way or another for the benefit of every 
interest or right holder.12 A community’s entitlement to CDA negotiation is 
normally connected to ownership or possessory rights over land or proprietary 
interests pertaining to land and the likelihood of being impacted by activities 
related to exploration and production of petroleum or solid minerals. 13 
 
1.3 Background Problem 
The concept and practice of community agreements is rapidly gaining 
prominence in many jurisdictions as the mechanism of choice for managing 
community-related challenges in mining as well as in oil and gas exploration 
and exploitation contexts.14 
 
                                                          
11
 Chika Amanze-Nwachuku, ‘Niger Delta: Chevron Lists Gains of GMoU Model’, Thisday, 2011, p1, 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/niger-delta-chevron-lists-gains-of-gmou-model/97381/; 
Brereton and Forbes, ‘Monitoring the Impact Of Mining on Local Communities: A Hunter Valley Case 
Study’, 3. 
12
 Linda Carroli, ‘Community Benefits Agreements: Grounding Equitable Development in Community 
Negotiation’ (Flytrap, 2009), p1, http://flytrapper.yolasite.com/community_benefits.php. 
13
 Janet Keeping, ‘The Legal and Constitutional Basis for Benefits Agreements: A Summary’, Undated, 
pp1 & 2, http://www.carc.org/pubs/v25no4/3.htm. 
14
 Julian Gross, Greg LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, ‘Community Benefits Agreement1s: Making 
Development Projects Accountable’ (Good Jobs First & California Partnership for Working Families, 




Figure 2: Research Background Matrix 
Resource extraction activities, particularly in mining and petroleum, are 
pivotal components of most national economies due to their tremendous 
contributions to both the country concerned and world economy.15 At the 
same time, resource extraction activities are known to be associated with 
some adverse consequences on those that live and work within project areas, 
particularly the poor that dwell in villages in and around such activities.16 
Central to these concerns are challenges such as social and economic 
                                                          
15
 Thomas Isaac and Anthony Knox, ‘Canadian Aboriginal Law: Creating Certainty in Resource 
Development’ (Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence, 2011), 7, 
http://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=3144  Or 
http://www.mccarthy.ca/pubs/resource_development.pdf. 
16
 Ibid., 8–10. 
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displacements, and the degradation of the environment.17 Other challenges 
that equally arise in relation to resource projects include adverse influences 
on prevailing local culture and beliefs arising from alien lifestyles of foreign 
workers, and resource-projects-induced intra or inter community conflict.18  
The realities of these adverse impacts compound the problem of inequality in 
the distribution of resource revenues. As a result, the impact of resource 
revenues is mostly felt in the urban centres and capital cities, while those who 
bear the negative effects of those projects rarely benefit.  This state of affairs 
exists both in developed and developing countries, except that the 
circumstances of the developing countries create particularly dire social and 
economic climates for rural dwellers.  
The effect of this situation in many jurisdictions is that resource development 
activities often occur in a hostile environment as a result of opposition from 
communities and other interest groups.19  
                                                          
17
 Gary McMahon and Felix Remy, ‘Large Mines and the Community: Socioeconomic and 
Environmental Effects in Latin America, Canada, and Spain’ (World Bank, 2001), 3–9, 
http://www.idrc.ca/EN/Resources/Publications/Pages/IDRCBookDetails.aspx?PublicationID=247. 
18
 Ibid., pp3–9. 
19














It is in this context that community agreements have emerged as preeminent 
mechanisms for securing the consent and support of potentially impacted 
groups so as to avoid or minimize the risk of disrupting project activities. Due 
to the growing acceptance of the concept of CDAs as useful instruments for 
managing these issues, many countries are embracing the practice. Some 
countries including Nigeria and Papua New Guinea (PNG) have, in their 
mining legislations, imposed on proponents the obligation to conclude CDAs 
with affected communities.  
Another important issue that is relevant to the background problem of this 
work is the notion of agreement-based consent or support for resource 
projects and the expectation that those agreements help to facilitate cordial, 
conflict-free interactions between the industry and the operating environment. 












Figure 3: CDAs Key Focus Areas 
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extractive industries receive or enjoy a better or the active cooperation of their 
host communities where those relationships are governed by written 
agreements? 20   
Put differently, does the existence of agreement-based community consent 
and support always translate into more cordial and cooperative relations 
between proponents and their host communities? 21 
Also, in more matured CDA jurisdictions like Australia and Canada, CDA 
payments to communities have progressively increased to tens and hundreds 
of thousands of dollars annually thereby raising concerns relating to the 
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 Abba Kolo, ‘Dispute Settlement and Sustainable Development of Natural Resources in Africa’, in 
Natural Resource Investment and Africa’s Development (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 2011), pp49–71. 
21
 The frequent use of Impact and Benefit Agreements, IBAs, in Canada is seen or perceived 
to recognize that ‘historic resource extraction practices are no longer acceptable’. See: Fidler, 
Courtney and Hitch, Michael in ‘Impact and Benefit Agreements: A Contentious Issue for 
Environmental and Aboriginal Justice,’ Environmental Journal Vol. 35 (2) (2007) (PP.50,54, 
56-58, & 62) 
22
 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, ‘Understanding Corporate-Aboriginal Agreements on Mineral 
Development: A Conceptual Framework’, in Earth Matters: Indigenous People, the Extractive 
Industries, and Corporate Responsibility (Sheffield, England: Greeanleaf Publishing Limited, 2008), 77, 
http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/10072/23185/53386_1.pdf?sequence=1; C. 
O’Faircheallaigh, ‘Aboriginal-Mining Company Contractual Agreements in Australia and Canada: 
Implications for Political Autonomy and Community Development’, Canadian Journal of Development 
Studies 30, no. 1–2 (2010): 71–73. 
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1.4. CDA: Land Access and Title  
 
Figure 4: CDA Context Matrix 
A 2011 World-Bank-sponsored report, ‘Good Practice Notes on Community 
Development Agreements,’ notes that generally CDAs exist or operate in 
three different contexts;23  
(I) where governments impose on developers’ a specific obligation to 
negotiate and sign CDAs; (ii) where a law requires developers seeking 
access to indigenous or community lands to negotiate the conditions of 
access or use; and (iii) where there have been significant conflicts involving 
developers and local communities.24 These contexts are summarised in the 
following paragraphs.  
                                                          
23
 David Brereton, John Owen, and Julie Kim, ‘Good Practice Notes on Community Development 




 Ibid., p4. 
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1.4.1 CDA: Legal Obligation  
The first scenario is where a national law, perhaps in the areas of mining or 
petroleum imposes specific obligations on developers to negotiate and enter 
into CDAs with the relevant local or aboriginal community.25 PNG, Mongolia 
and Nigeria are examples of such countries. In PNG, the mining law26 
includes provisions both for the compensation of affected persons and for the 
negotiation and execution of Compensation Agreements, or CAs27.  
Section 154 of the PNG Mining Act provides that “the holder of a tenement is 
liable to pay compensation28 in respect of his entry or occupation of land the 
subject of the tenement for purposes of exploration or mining or operations 
ancillary to mining, to landholders for all loss or damage suffered or foreseen 
to be suffered by them from the exploration or mining or ancillary 
operations.”29  The law further states that a holder of a mining lease shall not 
enter or occupy any land, the subject of the tenement, for the purpose of 
mining, until an agreement has been made with landholders and registered 
pursuant to Section 156 (6) of the Act.30 The mining leaseholder is required, 
                                                          
25
 Ibid, P 4 
26
 Independent State of Papua New Guinea The Parliament, Mining Act 1992 (Consolidated to No 49 
of 2000), 1992, http://www.mra.gov.pg/Portals/2/Publications/MINING_ACT%201992.pdf. 
27
 See Sections 154 & 156 
28
 The scope of  matters to which compensation relates includes deprivation of possession or 
use the natural surface of land, damage to land surface, severance of land of a landholder, 
loss of earning, improvements, disruption of agricultural activities and social disruption. See 
Section 154 subsection (2) (a-h). 
29
 Ibid, See Section 154 (1) 
30
 Ibid, see Section 155 
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after the terms of a Compensation Agreement (CA) have been agreed but 
before execution, to submit a copy of the agreement to the “Chief Warden,”31 
who may approve the terms or recommend amendments to the parties before 
approval is given.32  In contrast to the Canadian Impact and Benefit 
Agreements (IBAs) regime, the PNG Mining Act provisions for CAs have 
national application, stipulate the scope of agreements, envision a clearer 
role for government, identify the basis and binding-ness33 of CAs, as well as 
the dispute resolution process.  
Similarly, the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act34 `2007 impose a duty on 
mining companies to conclude community agreements with a certain group in 
the area where their project is located. It stipulates that mining leaseholders 
should conclude with the “host communities” within the project area an 
agreement known as “Community Development Agreement” or other such 
agreements that will ensure the transfer of social and economic benefits prior 
to commencement of development activity.35 The scope of the agreement 
covers social and economic benefits and the need to ensure “sustainability of 
                                                          
31
 The office of Chief Warden is established by Section 16 (3) of the Act and has the 
responsibilities such as are assigned to him/her by the Director, who is the administrative 
head of the department of mines. See also Section 10 which establishes the office of the 
Director. 
32
 Ibid, see subsections 2, 3, 4, 5, & 6 of Section 156. 
33
 Ibid, Section 159 
34
 The Nigerian National Assembly, Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, Section 116. 
35
 Ibid, see Section 116. 
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such community”.36  Additionally, Section 125 stipulates that a lessee shall 
pay compensation to the owners or occupiers of land or persons having 
interest in land for injuries suffered and damage arising from pollution.  
 
1.4.2 CDA: Land Access and Title 
The second instance is where the prevailing legal regime requires developers 
seeking or desiring access to indigenous lands to negotiate the conditions of 
such access with the original custodians of those lands.37 A regime-based 
CDA context exists where there is no specific legislation requiring or 
mandating the negotiation of CDA but a different set of legal obligations 
fortuitously provides the environment or context for their negotiation.  Thus, in 
Australia and Canada for example, there is generally no law or regulation 
recognised as the positive legal foundation for making mining agreements in 
those countries. As entrenched as CDAs (otherwise known as mining 
agreements or impact and benefit agreements) are in Australia and Canada, 
they are the casual and unintentional consequences of the Aboriginal land 
right systems or laws.     
In Australia, the regime is based on the Native Titles Act, which is in turn 
precipitated by the landmark judicial decision in Mabo (No.2) v Queensland.38  
                                                          
36
 Ibid, see Section 116 (1), (2) & (3) 
37
 Brereton, Owen, and Kim, ‘Good Practice Notes on Community Development Agreements: Final 
Report’, 4. 
38




The Act provides the basis for recognised Traditional Owners’ to negotiate 
conditions for land use.39 In Canada, aboriginal benefits agreements are of 
two kinds: Exploration Agreements and IBAs. These agreements constitute 
part of the process for the participation of Canadian aborigines or First 
Nations.40 This class of Canadians have been recognised to have special or 
sui generis legal rights and entitlement over land and minerals by virtue of 
First Nation Treaties affirmed by Section 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act.41  
This section of the Constitution Act imposes a constitutional duty on the 
federal and provincial governments to consult with aborigines on matters 
which may affect them.42   
 
1.4.2.1. Famed Benefits of CDAs 
Fidler and Hitch have expressed the view that the Canadian IBA practice 
has greater ability to manage localized aboriginal concerns and needs and to 
foster mutually-beneficial relationships between signatories.43  They outlined 
the features of IBAs as follows:  
 Confidential; 
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 C. Fidler and M. Hitch, ‘Impact and Benefit Agreements: A Contentious Issue for 
Environment and Aboriginal Justice’, Environments 35, no. 2 (2007): pp49–69. 
43




 Covering socio-economic and biophysical concerns arising from 
resource development;  
 Not compulsory in most cases, yet a de facto requirement;44 and  
 Required by most Land Claims Agreements.45  
 
They equally outlined some of the challenges facing the process to include 
poor articulation, regulation and implementation; the nature of IBAs as 
bilateral agreements, confidentiality, the absence of a clear role for 
government, and their bulging scope and contents.46   
However, Steven Kennett in “Issues and Options for a Policy on IBAs” notes 
the absence of clear policy and legal frameworks,47 and points out those 
procedural and substantive parameters for the operation of IBAs constitute an 
                                                          
44
 Courtney Fidler and Michael Hitch, ‘Used and Abused: Negotiated Agreements’ (Rethinking 
Extractive Industry: Regulation, Dispossession and Emerging Claims Conference, York 
University, Toronto: York University, 2009), pp2 & 6, 
http://www.yorku.ca/cerlac/EI/papers/FIDLER_Hitch.pdf. 
45
 Fidler and Hitch, ‘Impact and Benefit Agreements: A Contentious Issue for Environment 
and Aboriginal Justice’, p50. 
46
 Ibid, pp 58, 59, 64, & 66 
47
 Note that there are many regional legislations and agreements in Canada which mandate 
IBAs and they include: Article 26 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA), the 
Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA), the Yukon Oil and Gas Benefits Regime created under 
section 68 of Yukon Oil and Gas Act, and the Northern Saskatchewan Benefits Regime. See 
PP 6, 9, 23, 25, & 26; Also Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act create a Federal Oil and Gas 
Benefits Regime but what seems to be lacking is a harmonising federal policy and legal 
framework on IBAs. 
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important setback for the process in Canada.48  IBAs are treated as private 
agreements and are confidential.  
Fidler and Hitch opine that this attribute could create new problems long-
term because of transparency issues, the absence of a monitoring procedure 
in some agreements and the need to accommodate broader public interests 
because even adjacent aboriginal communities outside the impact areas 
usually do not feature in the agreements.49  Also, they note that the current 
state of IBAs undermines environmental assessment processes, and can 
potentially threaten long-term environmental and aboriginal justice in 
Canada.50  So, the current issues on IBAs include enforceability51 of IBAs, the 
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 See PP 51 & 58; In another publication,  Fidler and Hitch  notes that due to vacuum 
created by lack of a firm Crown’s role in IBAs, government’s responsibilities are being 
delegated to developers, resulting in the blurring of the originally distinct objectives of the IBA 
process and environmental regulations, as well as the Crown’s duty to consult aboriginal 
people. For this see: FIDLER, C. & HITCH, M., supra, note 65 P 6 
50
 Ibid, PP 52 & 66; They also contended that the Crown’s absence in the IBA process 
neglects Section 35 of the Constitution of Canada, affirmed by the Canadian Supreme Court 
which say that it is the legal duty of the Crown to promote reconciliation of aboriginal and 
non-aboriginal interests; For the challenges facing the application of environmental 
regulations and IBAs, see: FIDLER, C.:(2008) Aboriginal Participation in Mineral 
Development: Environmental Assessment and Impact and Benefit Agreements. The Faculty 
of Graduate Studies (Mining Engineering). Vancouver, The University of British Columbia. 
(PP 23-26) 
51
 Carmen Diges, ‘Sticks and Bones: Is Your IBA Working? Amending and Enforcing Impacts 
and Benefits Agreements’ (McMillan LLP, 2008), pp2 & 3, 
http://www.mcmillan.ca/upload/publication/CDiges_Sticks-and-Bones_0208.pdf However, 
opinions remains divided as to whether or not IBAs are enforceable through out Canada. 
Some commentators such as Fidler and Hitch, in ‘Impact and Benefits Agreements: A 
contentious Issue for Environmental and Aboriginal Justice’, supra, suggests that although 
the validity of IBAs are yet to be tested in court, the agreements are binding and enforceable. 
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role of government in the agreement process, appropriate legal and policy 
frameworks and the relationship between the IBA process and other 
regulatory instruments, especially environmental regulation. In another World 
Bank report, James Otto suggests the direction of the debate on CDAs when 
he says that “legislative requirements for CDAs are still rare but increasingly 
governments are considering legislation that would define when such an 
agreement is required and what subject matter such an agreement can 
address.”52  Furthermore, while there is a strong concern that a legislated 
CDA process could lead to abdication of governmental responsibilities, some 
also fear that an unregulated IBA process may potentially result in 
exploitation of less educated and largely uninformed rural dwellers by savvy 
and shrew corporate parties.53  
 
1.4.3 CDA: Environmental Conflict Resolution 
The third context, identified in the 2011 World Bank report, in which CDAs 
have been used is in countries where there have been significant resource 
                                                                                                                                                                     
However, they did not say whether enforceability would be premised on the listed regional 
legislations and Agreements stipulating IBA negotiation or some other legal basis. See PP 53 
& 59; 
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 Sarkar et al., ‘Mining Community Development Agreements – Practical Experiences and 
Field Studies’, p17. 
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project-related conflicts involving proponents and local communities, including 
Nigeria, Chile, Peru54 and the Philippines.5556 In other words, the mining or 
petroleum industry resorts to entering into agreements with belligerent 
communities so as to forestall obstructive behaviours capable of undermining 
proposed or ongoing mineral projects. Thus, CDAs are deployed in this 
context to get hostile or potentially hostile groups in a project area on board 
by persuading them to support the particular E & P activities.  
From the foregoing it is obvious that community agreements, often couched in 
different terms,57 are emerging as important voluntary and/or regulatory 
instruments for solving the challenges of resource development by both 
national governments and resource developers.58 In some countries, CDAs 
are used as community engagement or citizens’ participation tool. In others, 
they have acquired a more expansive usage and have been engaged for 
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 Christian Aid, ‘Unearthing the Truth: Mining in Peru’ (Tintaya: Christian Aid, 2005), pp16–
19, http://www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/unearthing_the_truth.pdf. 
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 Emery Brusset et al., ‘Community Development and Local Conflict: A Resource Document 
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local social and economic development and resource benefits distribution 
within areas where resource projects are located.  
Also, CDAs serve as a mechanism for driving community consultations before 
and during resource development, as well as environmental monitoring 
processes. CDAs have their origin in voluntary corporate practice as part of 
Corporate Social Responsibility of business enterprises in the natural 
resource development industries.59   
In Canada, for instance, the content of IBAs has evolved significantly and 
now covers issues such as employment, training, economic development and 
business opportunities, social, cultural and community support, financial 
payment, equity participation, environmental and cultural resources 
protection.60  They are generally negotiated as private agreements between 
local or aboriginal people and resource development companies for access to 
land.  
The legal and regulatory basis for such agreements varies depending on land 
ownership. Three categories of surface and subsurface land ownership are 
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 ADITR Australian Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, ‘Community 
Engagement and Development Handbook’ (Australian Department of Industry, Tourism and 
Resources, 2006), 
http://www.minerals.org.au/file_upload/files/resources/enduring_value/CED.pdf Also, Fidler 
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model whereby proponents complete IBAs to minimize risk and potential downstream project 
delays… and in doing so, improve relationships with local residents and enhance their 
business reputation’. See P57. 
60
 Kennett, ‘Issues and Options for a Policy on Impact and Benefits Agreements’, pp33–49. 
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relevant to the agreements. The first instance is where a land claim 
agreement has been settled establishing aboriginal ownership of both surface 
and subsurface lands in specific portions of settlement areas. This category of 
title provides absolute scope for aborigines to dictate the terms and 
conditions for land use and mineral development, including requirement for 
IBAs. The second scenario is where aboriginal title may be limited to land 
surface only, with sub-surface rights remaining with the Crown. A title holder 
of sub-surface mineral interest has a right to have access to land for 
development but must negotiate access to land surface with owners of 
surface rights. The third scenario is where both surface and sub-surface lands 
are owned by the Crown in the majority of settlement areas or areas where 
land claims have not been settled. Here, the influence of aboriginal settlers is 
reduced, but some form of involvement, especially through notification and 
consultation prior to issuing approvals, is typically required.61  
Furthermore, the unique context for IBAs in the Northern territory of Nunavut 
deserves a special mention.  The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) 
which settled land claims disputes between the government of Canada and 
the Inuit specifically imposes a duty to conclude an IBA. Article 26 of the 
NLCA contains detailed provisions requiring IBAs in Northern Canada. The 
NLCA provides for oversight of the IBA regime by the Minister of Department 
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, or DIAND. Originally, IBAs were 
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seen as private agreements with the government as a passive observer; but 
that changed with BHP’s Ekati diamond mine, where the Minister of DIAND 
seems to have turned the tide by a statement that “satisfactory progress” on 
IBA negotiations within a certain timeframe was expected, and by supporting 
this requirement with a threat to withhold final approvals.62     However, such 
official support for IBAs was seen as an ad hoc intervention and has triggered 
calls by commentators that government should take a position by formulating 
a formal IBA policy in Canada.63   
Australia has also witnessed a growing influence of mining agreements in 
resource development areas involving indigenous people and project 
proponents. Until 1992, no legal instruments, legislative, judicial or 
constitutional, existed which recognised inherent indigenous rights in 
Australia.  Indigenous Australians were able to negotiate mining agreement or 
ILUA only where specific legislative enactments created a statutory right to 
negotiate, or where individual mining companies decided that it was politically 
advisable or opportune to negotiate and enter into such agreements.64 Such 
agreements cover royalty payment, employment, training, business 
development projects, protection of cultural heritage, participation in 
environmental management, and in some cases, equity participation.  
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One of the contentious issues in recent mining agreements has been 
indigenous participation in project management.  O'Faircheallaigh notes that 
the indigenous peoples’ view is that their interest in environmental 
management, employment, and cultural heritage protection can be achieved 
only with some degree of indigenous peoples’ participation in project 
management.65 Many project developers have resisted this call, while few 
have shown willingness to accommodate indigenous people in the decision-
making process on issues affecting their interests while retaining control on 
issues such as production levels and investment timing. Some IBAs have 
provided for a joint management committee involving indigenous people 
based on equal representation.66 
Also, multinational corporations in the oil and gas sector are borrowing from 
this practice and are developing mechanisms for corporate-community 
engagement, particularly in Africa. In Nigeria, the International Oil 
Companies, (IOCs), particularly Chevron67 and Shell,68 have from 2005 
adopted a policy to negotiate a ‘Global Memorandum of Understanding, or 
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GMOU, towards similar objectives.69 Although the legal basis for such 
agreements is being questioned, local communities consider the agreements 
as forming the basis for legally enforceable rights.70 
In Nigeria, CDAs appear to have acquired the endorsement of natural 
resource managers, making negotiation and conclusion of CDAs part of 
resource development plans’ approvals.71 Thus, the national parliament went 
a step beyond existing practice and enacted a law requiring leaseholders to 
negotiate and conclude CDAs with communities prior to commencement of 
business.72 Also, the Petroleum Industry Bill appears ready to follow a similar 
path taken by the establishment of the Petroleum Producing Host Community 
Fund (PPHCF or the Fund) “for every mining lease”.  The functions of the 
Fund are (1) to hold 10% equity participation interest for communities within 
every Petroleum Mining Lease, or PML, and (2) to allocate funds to each 
community based on criteria laid down in section 170.73  
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1.5. Research Problem 
 
Figure 5: Research Problem  
The principal problem addressed in this work can be broken down into the 
following: 
(i) Cross-continental proliferation of CDAs as all-purpose instruments 
for solving community-level problems in the extractive industries;74 
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(ii) Huge cash components of modern CDAs in the face of patent local 
incapacity and regulatory guidance;75 and 
(iii) Variation in CDA outcomes. 
The principal task for this work is therefore how to frame the CDA process to 
enable it to deliver on its inherent promise. 
The reality in many countries is that most communities tend to resist or 
oppose mineral development activities by engaging in conduct aimed at 
undermining those projects. As a result, the challenge of reducing or 
preventing incidences of adverse community actions against extractive 
industries activities became the main concern of CDA practice in all practicing 
jurisdictions. Hence, CDAs and other instruments for local participation in 
resource development have come in handy for the industry as measured and 
more predictable methods of (I) gauging potential local community-related 
risks to a project and the likely risk-mitigation measures; and (ii) gaining the 
consent and support of host communities. 
However, this work will argue that if properly conceptualized and 
systematically implemented, CDAs can be strategic mechanisms for creating, 
engendering or fostering extractive industry-induced community development 
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and community sustainability. This can be the case for countries where CDA 
practice is entrenched, as well as for those seeking to establish frameworks 
for CDA practice, particularly Nigeria. This proposition is supported by some 
allusions in some recent documents relating to the utility of CDAs.  Here are 
some examples. 
In Australia, the “ILUA Policy Principles,” which is a document produced by 
the Attorney General’s Department of the Australian Government, allude to 
the potential benefit of the community agreements process when it states 
that: 
“Native title agreements can materially contribute to closing the gap 
between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians through the 
provision of practical benefits, while serving the interests of both 
indigenous communities and Commonwealth entities…”76 
Similarly, the aims of the CDA process as espoused by the Nigerian Minerals 
and Mining Act 2007 include to “…ensure the transfer of social and economic 
benefits to the community,” and that energy projects contribute to “the 
sustainability of such community.”77   
                                                          
76
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In the course of this work, particularly during the field study exercise in 
Canada and Australia, it emerged clearly that: 
(i) These community development and sustainability ideas are still 
being conceptualised; and  
(ii) There is practically no specific structure in place to ensure that the 
agreement process is able to deliver these outcomes.  
In the case of Nigeria, there is an additional handicap in that there is a near 
absolute lack of stakeholder understanding of the existence of the CDA 
provision in the Act, and the enormous potential inherent in the process. As a 
result, no serious thought seems to have been given to how to achieve these 
lofty objectives through careful and systematic implementation. This situation 
has to change in order to ensure that the positive attributes often associated 
with CDAs can be unleashed in and around project areas. Thus a critical 
aspect of the research problem is to uncover, as well as attempt to 
conceptualise, the idea of sustainability and community development within 
the context of energy project activities.   
 
 1.5.1 The Risk Management Argument for CDA 
CDAs have acquired some prominence in many jurisdictions as the pivotal 
instruments for managing the various risks which actions by host or affected 
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communities may pose to energy projects.78 Thus, in all jurisdictions where 
the CDA process is being engaged, it is the desire to obtain local/indigenous 
support for energy project79 and the cover that such support procures for the 
success of energy projects that constitute the main driving force for the 
proliferation of CDAs.80 Sustainability and community development are tertiary 
considerations and tangential to this core purpose.81 
In these countries, energy projects broadly face certain community-related 
risks which include:82 
I) Lack of necessary approvals; 
II) Community opposition to a project or any part of it; 
III) Conflict or other disruptive behaviour 
IV) Delay in project commencement; 
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1.5.1.1. CDA risk Matrix 
 
Figure 6 CDA Risk Matrix 
 
Thus, CDAs have become useful mechanisms for proactively addressing 
these issues, which can potentially hinder or delay mining or oil and gas 
projects.83 In all CDA-practicing jurisdictions, the recognition of indigenous or 
communal land rights or such other special connection to land is always the 
foundation for the influence that host or indigenous communities exact over 
energy projects located within their area.  
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1.5.1.2 Specific Adverse Project Impacts and CDAs 
 
Figure 7: Project Impact Matrix  
Resource development projects such as in mining and petroleum come with 
certain negative impacts for society,84 particularly those members of society 
that are resident or work within or around project areas.85 Some of the 
common adverse impacts of mining and petroleum operations include the 
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degradation of the marine and land surfaces by polluting agents.86 One of the 
immediate consequences of resource-extraction-induced environmental 
degradation is the entrenchment and/or exacerbation of poverty in the area 
affected.87 This happens where land and marine resources, the primary 
sources of local sustenance, become polluted or are rendered sterile or 
infertile. 
Another adverse effect often experienced by host communities is the 
impairment of pre-existing social and cultural cohesion problems such as lack 
of housing and other basic infrastructure, uneven spread of benefits and 
costs from the projects, and prostitution.88 Also, the clash of cultures often 
occasioned by limited cultural awareness of the local environment by migrant 
workers sometimes evokes strong resentment of some members of the host 
communities.89 Similarly, the inability (real or perceived) of governments to 
address these concerns through the normal apparatuses, together with the 
problem of limited access to legal remedies, further fuel local resentments 
and exacerbate conflict between local communities and other stakeholders.90 
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Additionally, by the very character of resource projects, particularly their low 
spin–off effects on the economy of a host state, negative impacts of 
development in mining, and oil and gas often outweigh any potential benefits 
for the local population who actually suffer the negative effects.91  This 
circumstance makes sustainability of both the local population and their 
economic circumstances a crucial element of the extractive industries’ legal 
framework. A calculated infusion of elements of local sustainability and 
community development will ensure that resource projects progress in less 
volatile environments and will also secure the rights of all strata of society to 
pursue social and economic aspirations permissible under the law.92 
 
1.6. Thesis Proposition 
The central thesis of this work is that CDAs, if appropriately articulated within 
the framework of law and policy and strategically implemented, have the 
potential to facilitate sustainability and development of local, host or 
indigenous communities within project areas in Nigeria. The current 
perception and application of CDAs in many jurisdictions is based on the risk-
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mitigation or management perspective. However, this work argues that the 
inherent mechanisms of CDAs make the CDA process eminently suitable for 
creating, facilitating and promoting sustainability and development in energy 
project areas. 
 
1.7 Research Question 
This research will address a main question and two subsidiary questions. The 
main research question is:  
(1) How can the concept and practice of CDA in mining and petroleum 
industries be a vehicle for fostering sustainability and development in project 
areas?  
This main question is followed by two subsidiary questions: 
(1.1) how can sustainability and development be contextualized within the 
framework of mining and petroleum extraction activities in Nigeria? 
(1.2) how can or in what areas can law and policy facilitate CDAs as tools for 







1.8 Analytical Framework: Community Sustainability and 
Development  
The analytical prism for this work is the principle of community sustainability 
and development which is derived from the general principle of sustainable 
development. The analytical framework as conceptualised in this work will be 
applied in the context of mining and petroleum project development and the 
situation and circumstances of local or host communities, particularly in 
Nigeria. The conceptualisation of CDAs into one or more analytical or 
theoretical frameworks is a critical aspect of this work and is important for 
several reasons.  
First, the concept and practice of CDA currently exist in many jurisdictions 
and is associated with a number of advantages. However, as currently 
understood and applied, CDA practice lacks any coherent and consistent 
framework that is able to test outcomes against assumptions and/or 
expectations.  
Second, CDAs have become tools in the hand of individual stakeholders 
(project proponents, community groups and governments) for satisfying 
narrow, insular and often short-sighted interests of each party. Furthermore, 
these narrow interests are sometimes satisfied in ways that undermine the 
contiguous interests of other parties.  
Third, land right Acts and mineral legislations in many jurisdictions 
increasingly include CDA requirements and some widely-cast goals or targets 
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that are expected from the CDA process.93 Where they exist, these objects or 
goals set in the law to be achieved under the CDA process often reveal an 
apparent lack of understanding or conveniently ignoring what can, in reality, 
be achieved under such an arrangement. Also, there is an apparent lack of 
interest or courage to institute the necessary structures needed for a more 
effective and efficient CDA process. This research will focus on filling these 
gaps by proposing some essential ingredients of a constructive and effectual 
CDA process.  
 
1.8.1 Community Sustainability and Development: A conceptual Framework 
 
Figure 8: Community Sustainability Framework 
 
The concept of Sustainable Development (SD) from which sustainability 
derives is renowned for its amorphous nature. Furthermore, the exact 
meaning and character of SD remains contested. With this problem in mind, 
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the meaning and characterisation of sustainable development in this work 
must be construed within the particular context of quintessential local or host 
communities in mining or petroleum-dependent countries.  
Sustainability relates to two central areas of the extractive industry activities. 
The first pertains to the sustainability of those likely to be adversely affected 
by an energy project. In other words, natural resource development 
operations should aid or improve the social and economic conditions of the 
local communities around such operations, but not otherwise. Sustainability at 
this level has two broad components: 
(i) Resource extraction activities must, as much as possible, avoid, 
reduce or minimize the degradation of the vital support systems 
upon which the social, economic and environmental wellbeing 
depend. As a result, resource development should be exploited 
without damaging or destroying the ecosystem of the area. 
(ii) The beneficiation process must be designed and implemented to 
cater for both the present and the future needs of the beneficiaries94   
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The second conceptual pillar of sustainability pertains to the security and 
continued viability of the extractive industry itself. The logic here is that 
community conflict arising from local opposition to resource exploration and 
exploitation is harmful to the extractive industry.95 It creates tension in the 
industry and causes price instability. Also, such conflict tends to make the 
extractive industries unattractive for investors.96  
 
Development: - Concepts such as sustainability and development are 
inherently difficult to define in isolation. However, in the context of mineral 
exploration and development in predominantly rural communities, 
sustainability and development relate to ways in which resource exploration 
and production activities can be leveraged towards a sustained improvement 
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in the social and economic conditions of the inhabitants of those 
communities. Such leveraging could occur in these two key areas: 
(i) Human capacity development: Efforts towards human capacity 
enhancement cover resourcing, education, training, 
entrepreneurship, jobs and improving local wealth-creation 
capacity. These items take care of both short and long term needs 
of community people. 
(ii) Local infrastructural development: This level of development takes 
care of needs for quality access roads, schools, hospitals, staffing, 
capital, business tools and business support. 
Thus, the CDA process can be designed to increase its deliverables (such as 
facilitating local sustainability and development) in addition to serving as a 
tool for securing a community’s consent and support for a natural resource 
project. . This Thesis will examine a possible framework that will enable the 
CDA process to serve or facilitate the realisation of additional purposes.  
1.8.2 Use of Terminology 
Sustainability or Community Sustainability is used in this Thesis to denote the 
imperative for the resource-development operations to incorporate social 
investment strategies which facilitate the continuous advancement of the host 
local communities socially, economically and environmental.  Community 
Sustainability as used in this Thesis is inspired by the concept of sustainable 
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development.97 As a concept, sustainable development appeared in the 1987 
Brundtland Commission report which defined it as ‘development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’.98 Other authors have defined99 
sustainable development differently, but the general import of the definitions 
emphasises a system of human activity geared towards balancing current and 
future developmental needs with the need to preserve the biophysical 
environment upon which all human aspirations depend.  
1.8.3 Theoretical Framework 
This Thesis adopts the concept of Community Sustainability in the 
development of energy projects as the theoretical perspective for the 
research undertaken by this Thesis. Sustainability100 is defined as “an idea 
that refers to the continuity of human societies and nature,” while 
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 Dr. Abba Kolo defined it broadly to mean a “development path that meets people’s needs in 
a way that social, economic and environmental stock on which that development depends is 
not depleted in the process”. See Botchway, Francis N., Natural Resource Investment and 
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development in this context may be described as the progressive social and 
economic advancement in human activities which affects nature and the 
environment.101  
There are two aspects of sustainability that will be addressed. The first aspect 
is of sustainability in the process of resource development, beginning with 
project planning and ending with decommissioning in a manner that 
guarantees strict observance of rules and regulations, industry ethics and 
best practices. The aim is to anticipate and proactively deal with the adverse 
impacts of project development to the environment, which is one major 
contributor to local conflict.  
The second aspect of sustainability is that all steps necessary are taken to 
ensure that people or communities that may be physically, socially and 
economically impacted participate in the first level of sustainability described 
above and mechanisms are put in place to rehabilitate them. This will be 
possible if the natural environment is kept free from degradation and 
therefore able continue to sustain those dependent on it socially and 
economically. Additionally, public or private sector social-investment 
programmes are structured to address current needs and also to facilitate 
sustainable future for communities.   
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This work notes that that the world, particularly developing economies, faces 
two difficult options in relation to the pursuit of social and economic 
development. The first is to continue with the present approach towards 
development perceived to lack the principle of sustainability, and to continue 
to threaten the ecosystems; the second option is to accept poverty by 
refraining from development. Sustainable Development is credited with 
providing a real possibility for a third option: the choice for both developed 
and developing countries to pursue development in a manner that blends 
social, economic and environmental sustainability into development needs of 
the present generation.102  
1.8.4 Origin and Status of Sustainable Development 
SD is an emerging but well known principle of International Law found 
mainly in non-binding –as well as a few binding –international instruments. 
The binding instruments include the 1968 African Convention on the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, the 1982 African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights, and the 2005 United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC).  
 
The non-binding instruments include the 1987 Brundtland Commission 
Report,103 the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development104, Agenda 
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for the 21st century 1992,105 the 1999 United Nations Global Impact,106 the 
1999 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance107, and the Millennium 
Summit, 2000.108 However, despite the increasing recognition of SD as an 
emerging principle of International Law, its normative character is still a 
subject of some debate.109   
 
1.9. Research Justification 
There are many justifications for this work and its perspective in relation to 
CDAs. Firstly, the idea and practice of CDA is increasingly proliferated, with 
more countries willing to formally and informally incorporate the practice into 
the minerals sector.110 In some of these countries, there appears to be a 
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presumption that the introduction or application of CDA will mysteriously, 
automatically or by its own nature lead to the resolution of some of the age-
long host community-centred problems (which have been highlighted earlier) 
associated with resource development as they relates to communities.111 How 
justified is this assumption? Is there any factual basis to suggest that merely 
negotiating CDAs has succeeded in resolving any of the stated problems, or 
are there additional steps which must be taken so as to make these 
agreements more meaningful or target-oriented? This work aims to address 
such issues and to resolve these questions one way or another. 
Secondly, the cash component from these agreements has risen 
geometrically from a few thousands of dollars when the practice began to 
tens of millions of dollars annually.112 Due to this high volume of cash within 
the CDA process, it has become imperative to begin to consider the need for 
setting certain parameters and clearly articulated goals for the process. Such 
parameters have to be directed towards some thematic areas which include 
establishing suitable implementation and monitoring governance options for 
CDAs 
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Thirdly, the administration of various aspects of the CDA process has come 
under serious scrutiny for the perceived lack of transparency, incapacity of 
key actors, and inconsistency of outcomes.113 As a result, calls have been 
made mainly in government quarters for the introduction of some kind of 
regulatory guidance into the process.114 Furthermore, some have even 
questioned the usefulness of the process, calling for the CDA arrangement to 
be abrogated.115 This third point raises the question as to what the real 
problems are. Is there something wrong with the idea of community 
agreements or is the issue that of poor articulation of the real issues and/or 
what is needed to make the CDA process more effective and responsive to 
the uniqueness of different project areas?  
Fourthly, underlying much CDA literature is the assumption that the CDA 
process has the potential to help adversely-impacted communities and 
people to overcome many of the energy project-induced social-economic and 
environmental challenges.116 In reality, CDA process possesses enormous 
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potentials but those potentials must be harnessed before they can be 
realised. This work aims to fill this void. 
 
1.10. Research Methodology 
This work adopts a combination of methodologies such as desktop review of 
primary and secondary sources, and a comparative research method. 
Desktop review of secondary sources entails online information gathering on 
the current thinking on CDA’s from sources such as reports from the World 
Bank, World Economic Forum, Public Policy Forum ICMM, IFC, and IPIECA, 
and academic journal articles. 
The primary and secondary sources used in the research undertaken for this 
Thesis include national legislation such as the MMA, and CDAs.  
The Comparative research method employs the doctrinal and the empirical 
approach. The doctrinal approach will provide a systematic exposition of 
applicable rules, legislations, and publicly available CDAs or enabling the 
practice of community agreements.117 Also, a careful analyses of extant rules, 
legislations and CDAs will be done identifying possible gaps in the rules, laws 
or the CDA which will eventually lead to a proposal for a more systematic 
approach to CDAs in achieving community sustainability and development.118  
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The comparative approach will analyse the different CDA frameworks existing 
in Australia, and Canada, respectively and will apply lessons learned to the 
evolving Nigerian CDA process. The main aim of the comparative study is to 
analyse existing CDA practice in these jurisdictions, to understand what the 
legal and policy frameworks or drivers are, if any, and to assess or appraise 
the CDA implementation by comparing expectations with outcomes. 
Furthermore, this work will look to identify best practices from existing 
practices in the relevant jurisdictions. It is hoped that these steps will deepen 
knowledge on the current CDA practice, thereby exposing possible 
challenges, and suggesting ways to making the CDA process a tool for 
sustainability and community development.  While generally acknowledging 
the obvious danger involved in transporting concepts and practices from one 
country into another (especially where developed and developing countries 
are involved), it is submitted that in relation to the specific nature of this 
research, there is no significant danger to the integrity of this work. The basis 
for this submission is that, except for differences in regulatory competence, 
the nature and effects of mining and petroleum activities are generally the 
same in every jurisdiction. Secondly, the experience from the different field 
studies shows that the situation and circumstances of indigenous people in 
developed countries such as Canada and Australia are essentially similar 
(relative to the quality of live and living conditions of the wider society in those 
nations) to that of local communities in developing countries.119     
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In the empirical approach, data, first-hand information and personal 
observations of this researcher obtained from study visits to Australia and 
Canada will be used to answer the question of this research. During the field 
studies, this researcher met with, discussed and interviewed about 30 highly-
placed and knowledgeable individuals from diverse backgrounds. They 
include senior government officials, a Principal Policy Officer, Land, 
Approvals, and Native Title Unit, Managers in the Department of Mines and 
Petroleum, representatives of indigenous people, officers of Aboriginal 
Corporations, legal experts who have been involved in major CDA 
negotiations and implementations, judicial officers who have presided over 
CDA-related matters, and corporate executives including General Manager-
Communities at Rio Tinto Iron Ore in Australia.  
Noting that there are many high quality studies120 on the subject of community 
agreements covering the case study countries, the aim of conducting an 
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independent field study was to test the findings and conclusions of existing 
research reports against the researcher’s own results. Such an approach 
provides a richer repertoire of information on the basis of which deductions 
can conveniently be made.  
 
1.11. Research Limitation 
Just like many research projects of this nature, this work is constrained by a 
number of limitations. Firstly, most CDAs are confidential and therefore not 
publicly available, as a result, this work did not profit from the potentially 
useful information contained in those agreements which are not in the public 
domain. Nevertheless, this work benefited from information and knowledge 
from over fifty major CDAs (including some State contracts in Australia with a 
community development or community benefit component) from Australia and 
Canada studied in the course of this research. Secondly, owing to time 
constraints, financial constraints and the size of the field study jurisdictions, 
interview samples were taken from only two States/Regions in each 
jurisdiction. Thirdly, while this acknowledges that the CDA process can and 
has been adapted to multiple uses, the scope of this work is restricted to 
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CDAs as tools for sustainability and community development within the 
context of extractive industries and project areas. 
 
1.12. Summary  
In summary, this introductory Chapter has achieved the following: 
 It introduced the topic of the research and defined its scope; 
 It set out the research problem and research questions in a concise 
manner; 
 It explained the research framework within the context of extractive 
industry activity in mining and petroleum; 
 It defined the conceptual and theoretical framework for the research; 
and 













Chapter Two: Analytical Framework:  
Community Sustainability  
 
2.  An Introduction 
“Sustainability is the global project that must preoccupy us as a 
civilization and species. Part of this challenge is to ensure the transition 
to sustainability is an inclusive and shared endeavour. We know change 
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This Chapter: 
 Defines the meaning of community sustainability 
within the broad meaning of sustainable 
development (SD) 
 Examines the perceived controversy surrounding 
SD 
 Views SD as an emerging principle of 
International law 
 Explains the reason for the choice of community 
sustainability as the analytical framework 
 Justifies the relationship between the CDA 
process and community sustainability 
 Posits that this research could potentially be 
useful in operationalising Prof John Ruggie’s 




What then is Community Sustainability within the meaning of this research 
topic and the extractive industry operations? That will be the core focus of this 
Chapter.   
2.1.1. SD: Definitions 
Sustainability has been defined to mean a “requirement of our generation to 
manage the resource base such that the average quality of life that we 
ensure ourselves can potentially be shared by all future generations.”122 One 
major weakness of this definition lies in the suggestion or presumption that 
the present generation will accurately predict the choices and quality of life 
that the future generations that will be acceptable to that generation. 
However, the sustainability argument is not just about making decisions for 
future generations or arrogating to the present generation the visionary 
wisdom of pre-empting the choices that the next generations will ultimately 
make.123 It equally contemplates a notion of distributive justice, trust, 
accountability and prudence in administering nature’s best resource base.124 It 
is in this sense that sustainability will be used in this work. 
The concept of community sustainability is taken from the principle of 
sustainable development as articulated in the Brundtland Commission of 
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1987. The Commission defined SD as “development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs”.125  The meaning and content of SD has been the subject of 
many scholarly writing and therefore will not be rehashed in this Thesis 
except as will be necessary to explore the concept of community 
sustainability.   
The United Kingdom’s (UK) National Strategy for Sustainable Development in 
2000 defined SD as economic and social development that meets the needs 
of the current generation without undermining the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs.126 But for the reference to the words ‘economic’ and 
‘social’ qualifying development, the UK government’s understanding of SD 
follows the Brundtland example which sees meeting ‘needs’ as the essence 
of development. In a 2005 revised strategy report, the government of the UK 
clarified that the “goal of sustainable development is to enable all people 
throughout the world to satisfy their basic needs and enjoy a better quality of 
life, without compromising the quality of life of future generations.”127 
Furthermore, the UK strategy contains two SD’s guiding principles, which are: 
(1) living within environmental limits; (2) ensuring a strong, healthy, and just 
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society. These guiding principles are further broken down into three sub-
principles, which are: (I) achieving a sustainable economy; (ii) promoting good 
governance; and (iii) using sound science responsibly.128 A key element of the 
UK government’s Sustainable Development Strategy 2005 is that it targets 
the preventive approach to SD rather than ‘putting things right later’.129 
The international Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, (ICLEI), offers a 
slightly different perspective to SD. ICLEI views SD as a process which 
‘delivers basic environmental, social and economic services to all residents of 
a community without threatening the viability of the natural, built and social 
systems upon which the delivery of these services depends’. 130 The apparent 
interest of ICLEI which can be gleaned from this definition is conservation. 
Lastly, the United States (US) Department of Energy sees SD as a strategy 
by which communities seek economic development approaches that also 
benefit the local environment and quality of life.131 It further states that SD has 
become an ‘important guide to many communities that have discovered that 
traditional approaches to planning and development are creating, rather than 
solving societal and environmental problems’.132 This definition leans towards 
SD as a principle that demands a review of extant social and economic 
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policies, project planning and implementation, so as to avoid inequities which 
can exist within societies and between generations. Thus, this definition 
embraces SD as encompassing both inter and intra-generational dimension. 
One thing is noteworthy from these definitions of SD-these definitions capture 
the diverse dimensions and perspectives of the subject. 
 
2.2. Analytical Framework: Important Clarification 
It is essential to immediately define what nature’s resource base is or what 
ecosystem services are within the context of this work. The human ecosystem 
comprises land, air space, and river or water which jointly provides a number 
of services significant to human survival.133The natural ecosystems perform 
crucial life-supporting services upon which human existence depends.134 
Ecosystem services are ways by which the human environment produces 
resources (such as clean water, uncontaminated air; trees, plantations and 
forests with their diverse life support services. In other words, ecosystem 
services relate or refer to the “benefit of nature to households, communities, 
and economies.”135  
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Thus ecosystem resources comprise the earth’s resources such as land and 
watercourses or rivers, and they provide ecosystem services needed for the 
survival of communities around resource extraction areas. So, in dealing with 
resources of the ecosystem whether in relation to mining or petroleum, the 
decisions and choices of decision makers and key industry actors are crucial 
to the quest for community sustainability in at least two senses.  
Firstly, what is the impact of these decisions and choices made in the course 
of exploration and production of petroleum or solid minerals on the earth’s 
resource? The state of environmental resource base is important for 
community sustainability because in that section of society, livelihood almost 
entirely depends on them. They are essential to the survival of the local 
people in terms of being the source of social and economic sustenance and 
wellbeing.  
Secondly, this relates to the impact or effects of the application and/or 
distribution of resource-based revenue on local communities who bear the 
direct adverse consequences of extractive industries activities. 
Thus, while this work acknowledges that minerals constitute another level of 
the earth’s resources and that petroleum and solid minerals are mined from 
beneath the earth surface or from under the seabed, this research will not 
chime in the debate bothering on sustainable utilisation or extraction of 
minerals. Rather, the central concern will focus on how mineral resources are 
extracted and decisions made as to who gets what (out resource revenue) 
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and how. These considerations have implications for the ecosystem and 
community sustainability. This will be demonstrated throughout in this work. 
 
2.2.1 Community Sustainability and the Extractive Sectors 
Within the context of this research, community sustainability would require 
that measures be put in place to secure the ecosystem and ecosystem 
services from the adverse impact of resource development, and incorporating 
necessary mechanisms in policies, laws and practices so as to prevent, 
control or remedy the impact of natural resources development.136  Also, to 
build on this by framing benefit-sharing undertakings to cater for the present 
and future needs of communities. This could happen in the following ways. 
Firstly, the environment dimension to community sustainability emphasises 
that resource development projects need to safeguard the environment and 
the stock of nature’s resources (non-mineral resources in particular), to 
protect life-support systems and biodiversity. The purpose will be to preserve 
the support systems (the ecosystem) upon which meaningful human 
existence depends.137 This is crucial not only because of the need to preserve 
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the environment in a near pristine state but also to ensure that those essential 
stocks of nature continue to retain their life-supporting capacities.  
Secondly, the social dimension underscores the fact that resource 
development can be made sustainable in social and cultural terms. This will 
require a fair or equitable distribution of benefits and costs of resource 
development intra-generationally, making sure that all relevant actors, 
including local communities affected by resource projects, participate actively 
in decision-making through appropriate mechanisms (in this case CDAs) 
suitable for effective and strategic engagement.138  
Thirdly, the economic dimension to community sustainability139 is not only 
constricted to ensuring that a measure of benefits is strategically retained in 
local communities hosting or adjourning development projects. It also means 
to secure that basic means of livelihood essential for communities’ survival 
and development140 are not destroyed or sequestrated through the 
degradation of the environment by other factors.141  
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Acknowledging that resource development activities may lead to some form 
of social and economic displacements142 of local communities, it is crucial to 
take these possibilities into account, thereby ensuring that economic and 
social sustainability of individuals and communities is assured through 
deliberate design of all stakeholders involved.143 This is the essence of this 
work. That is, to try and frame how the CDA process can serve as an 
instrument of sustainability and development for communities. 
 
2.3. Linking CDAs and SD 
The CDA mechanism or the CDA process is a particularly useful tool in that it 
could be a strategic engagement tool that brings together key stakeholders in 
the resource extraction process towards addressing mineral extraction-related 
matters. Such matters often include creating the right atmosphere for 
minerals exploration and development to occur, enabling community 
participation in resource extraction activities, benefit sharing, environment 
protection and social and economic inclusion strategies which are of keen 
interest to stakeholders both individually and collectively.144  
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One of the practical essence of CDAs is to procure a stable and predictable 
business climate for energy sector proponents to operate while securing the 
revenue interest of the State through the prevention, reduction and/or 
management incidences of local conflict, which tends to hamper E & P 
(exploration and production) operations.145 Thus, the CDA process also 
ensures that environmental and socio-economic concerns of communities are 
taken into account in project-planning and implementation.146 This work will 
demonstrate in Chapter 6, how the CDA process must additionally ensure 
that any system established to share resource development-related benefits 
with local communities is strategic in approach, encapsulating benefits which 
have short, medium and longer term imports for the continued viability of the 
communities concerned. This is where sustainability comes into the CDA 
process.  
Hitherto, these stakeholders have been content that the CDA process 
appears to satisfy their immediate or short term goals which are often 
parochial and self-serving. 
Thus, the sustainability framework adopted by this work is designed to project 
a bigger picture which all stakeholders could aspire to achieving while at the 
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same time meeting their short and medium term goals. The question is: why 
sustainability as the governing idea?  
This Thesis submits that the need for sustainable outcomes in host 
communities is the overriding challenge, or at least one of the key challenges, 
facing governments and the extractive industries around the world. 
Furthermore, this challenge has gained extra urgency in recent years in 
international investment policy and rule-making actions/advocacy.147 One 
prominent example is the work of Professor John Ruggie which was initiated 
at the highest level of the United Nations.148 
 
2.4. Sustainability, CDAs and the Ruggie Framework  
The contribution that this work intends to make would further the central aim 
of the recently completed work by John Ruggie as Special Representative to 
the UN Secretary General (UN SRSG). Ruggie’s work addresses business 
and human rights in relation to the international responsibilities of 
multinational corporations, as well as the obligations of capital importing 
States.149  
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The scope of Ruggie’s mandate was to “identify and clarify standards of 
corporate responsibility and accountability for transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises with regards to human rights150” A major highpoint 
of this effort by the UN’s Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is the growing 
recognition in International Law that Foreign Direct Investment does not 
always lead to socio-economic development of host states. As a result of 
which it has become imperative to re-examine the role and responsibilities of 
transnational corporations, especially in developing countries. 
Previously, International Law has unduly focused on the protection of foreign 
investments through the formulation of many legal tools, such as national 
treatment and fair and equitable treatment without corresponding obligations, 
especially while operating within a weak regulatory environment.151 But some 
consensus is now beginning to emerge in International Law on the need to 
encourage stronger control of the activities of corporations.152 
An important import of the emerging international consensus on corporate 
responsibility and accountability is the increased acknowledgement that most 
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host states, in addition to having weak legal and institutional frameworks, 
have been poor at managing and reconciling the competing need for foreign 
investment with the necessity for effective and efficient regulations of 
corporations.153 However, there are divergent views on the shape this attempt 
to introduce greater control aimed at regulating corporations should take. 
Some favour prescriptive principles of international law driven by enforcement 
mechanisms.154 While others support expanding international regimes 
horizontally by further clarification and progressive codification of states’ 
duties to protect human rights against corporate violations.155 John Ruggie 
favours the latter approach for the reason that any imposition of direct 
obligations on transnational corporations may by itself further weaken 
governance capabilities of the affected developing countries 156. 
Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the UN mandate on corporate-
responsibility and accountability covers the broad areas of business and 
human rights and includes criminal violations and labour issues. It does not 
particularly relate to the peculiar problems of mining or oil and gas 
companies’ operations in developing countries.  
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In pursuit of this mandate, John Ruggie introduced a framework generally 
referred to as the “Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework” (PRR 
Framework) and its Guiding Principles.157  The Framework, which was 
unanimously adopted by the UN Human Rights Council on June 16 2011,158 
seeks to provide the authoritative focal point necessary for galvanised action 
towards greater corporate responsibility and accountability of multinational 
corporations.159  This Framework anchors on three pillars:  
i) The State’s duty to protect against human rights violations by third 
parties, including violations by business enterprises, through 
appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudication;  
ii) Corporate responsibility to respect human rights, by due diligence 
to avoid rights infringements; and  
iii) The need for greater access to effective remedies by victims of 
rights violations by businesses.160    
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In other words, the Framework notes that direct imposition of human rights 
obligations on corporations may blur the respective roles of States and 
Corporations. The Framework recommends that States should retain the 
obligation to protect their citizens against human rights violations by third 
parties, including corporations, as well as, ensure effective remedies for rights 
violations within their borders.  
Under the Framework, corporations operating within national boundaries 
have a responsibility to respect human rights, by due diligence to avoid 
infringements. Thus, States must hold all entities, human or juridical, 
accountable in cases of rights infringements and must provide greater access 
for effective remedies by victims.  
Importantly, the PRR framework is designed for the prevention and the 
remediation of rights violations. The first two pillars are pre-emptive tools to 
prevent occurrences which are adverse or inimical to the ecosystem and the 
host people and communities, while the last pillar is designed to redress 
wrongs or unpreventable violations. These two purposes are exactly what the 
CDA process can achieve if properly designed and implemented.  
Again, the Framework is couched in very broad terms to cover general 
breaches of human rights, civil and criminal, by business enterprises. Also, 
the Guiding Principles are general in nature and fail to articulate specific 




2.4.1 Linking the Ruggie’s Framework and the CDA Process 
The CDA process can be made a vital instrument of proactive action by host 
states in meeting their obligation to protect human rights as envisaged under 
the PRR Framework. For countries with actual incidences, or which may be at 
risk of right abuses in their extractive sectors, a carefully designed CDA 
process may hold the key to preventive action.  
One of the main sources of conflict in the resource extraction context is the 
limited local knowledge of proponents in the places they operate. The 
engagement mechanism of CDAs can educate and sensitize both the 
proponents and the locals about the things that are likely to cause friction. If 
carefully designed and implemented, the unique advantage of the CDA 
process is that it contains inherent mechanism for proactive, preventive, and 
even continuing collaborative action. This mechanism can assist towards 
protecting against rights infringement by prior identification and isolation of 
potential rights violations, as well as, providing for ways to prevent, mitigate, 
or to effectively remedy infringements. 
 Thus, the CDA engagement mechanism helps the parties to identify potential 
rights and interests that could be at play. Also, it will educate them on all 
potential sources of concern for any of the parties which will then be 
addressed. 
In other words, the CDA process, if well designed and implemented, is able to 




Furthermore, for corporations, the first point in respecting human rights must 
start with understanding or learning directly from the affected people what 
those rights are in the context of individual locations and cultures within which 
they function. Here, respecting human rights is not restricted to fundamental 
rights or to those universally-recognised rights. It may encompass such other 
‘rights’ or entitlements which a people may possess by virtue of their unique 
culture or religious beliefs and practices, although not yet considered as such 
by established norms.161 These must be understood first before they can be 
accorded the necessary respect by corporations. CDA inherent mechanisms 
offer a unique opportunity for that learning and education to occur. For 
example, most CDAs in Australia and Canada contain clauses which require 
mineral company workers to undertake cultural lessons on the indigenous 
people of the project area.162 The purpose is for them to gain traditional and 
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cultural education relating to the beliefs and practices of the indigenous 
people of that area. 163 
In this way, corporations and their workers get to understand the rights that 
should be respected, and so proactively circumvent potentials for bigger or 
greater rights violations. 
Lastly, CDA processes often have their own remedy framework which 
manages pre-contract disputes. More so, a good CDA framework must 
provide, either in the agreement or through some form of regulation, a post-
agreement remedy framework. The essence is to provide parties with a 
system for accessing remedies in a way that is effective and less technical. 
This satisfies the second “R” pillar in Ruggie’s PRR Framework. 
Thus, the hope is that the present research can be strategically useful to the 
PRR Framework in terms of providing a localised alternative enforcement 
mechanism that can be both proactive and reactive in managing extractive 




This Chapter has established the following: 





 The definition, nature, and context in which community sustainability, 
the analytical framework of this research is perceived or interpreted in 
this work; 
 SD as presently constituted, represents an idea concept or principle 
that may be captured or objectively defined and characterised within 
specific contexts and which principal goal is to promote the ecosystem 
so it can continue to provide ecosystem services. As a result, SD 
continues to be a concept or principle which many institutions and 
governments consider to be relevant to development. Also, it is 
regularly being adopted in legal and policy documents of key 
organisations, institutions and governments around the world; 
 SD or the particular concept of community sustainability is the typical 
framework or prism for analysing the topic of this research; and 
 SD or sustainability is a promising emerging principle of International 
Law. 
 The Ruggie PRR framework is both a preventive and remediation 
framework and therefore can be operationalized or implemented 
through a structured CDA process like the structure proposed in 
Chapter 6.  
 Lastly, this Chapter demonstrated how the kind of CDA process 
proposed in this work is relevant to the emerging global scheme to 
establish a framework for holding state and non-state actors more 
accountable for rights violations. 
71 
 
Chapter Three: What is Community 
Development Agreement?  
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
                                         Chapter Highlights 













The negotiation of contractual agreements involving Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal communities, resource developers, and in certain cases, the state, 
is now seen within the extractive industries context as standard practice in 
certain jurisdictions.164 Canada and Australia are clear examples of 
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This Chapter discusses the following: 
 It defines the meaning Community Development 
Agreement; 
 It discusses the Community Development Agreement 
as a concept; 
 It describes the nature, features, scope of, and reasons 
Community Development Agreement has become 
prevalent in Jurisdictions; 
 It examines the general features of Community 
Development Agreements in Canada and Australia, 
drawing possible lesson for the Nigerian model; 
 It provides a critical analyses of the Nigerian Minerals 
and Mining Act Community Development provisions; 
and 
 It analyses the various implications of Community 




jurisdictions where this practice is entrenched.165 On the one hand, Nigeria, 
apparently motivated by a set of different circumstances, seeks to statutorily 
incorporate the CDA practice in its mineral sector.166 Other developing 
economies such as Papua New Guinea and Ghana, among others, have one 
form of community benefits agreement regime or another.167  
This widespread engagement of the CDA instrument in different jurisdictions, 
and under varied circumstances, suggests the CDA instrument to be valuable 
or beneficial to those that use it. Thus, this Chapter explores the concept and 
practice of CDA with a view to understanding why it has acquired such wide 
acceptance, and reviews the nature and scope of such agreements. 
   
3.1.1 Background Statement 
CDAs are sometimes tripartite agreements involving the government, 
community groups and a developer. Also, they can be negotiated between 
the national or regional government (acting on behalf of communities) and a 
developer or proponent.168  
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In CDAs, the word “Community” may, inter alia, be defined by a political 
boundary, a geographic area, a residential area, or a definable land space 
around a mining lease area.169  Similarly, the phrase “community of people” 
refers to an aggregation of people dwelling or otherwise connected to a 
defined land area and who qualify to share in the benefits and obligations 
under CDAs.170 From the above, a ‘Community of people’ as used in the CDA 
context is generally defined in two ways, which often overlap. The first 
consists of a group of individuals who reside within or are connected to a land 
area adjacent to, or affected by a resource project. In this case, the level and 
nature of impact may vary from one person to another and this may be taken 
into account in determining the level of benefits which an individual or group 
may be entitled to. In the second sense, ‘community of people’ is used in 
relation to Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples and relates to people who 
share economic, social and cultural ties, by reason of their connection with an 
area of land or water impacted by a resource project. In this Thesis, the terms 
“community” and “community of people” will be used to refer to people or 
groups that reside adjacent to, or are impacted by a resource project.171 
Furthermore, this Chapter will examine the criteria which have been used in 
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existing CDAs to determine who qualifies to share in the benefits and 
obligations created under a CDA. 
Another term requiring definition is “Community Development”. Community 
Development as used in CDAs is a highly variable term and depends on the 
particular circumstances of the qualifying community. Community 
Development practitioners’ definition of the term indicates that “community 
Development” should promote the capacity of every community member to 
meaningfully influence the decisions that affect their existence; engage 
members of the community towards learning and understanding community 
issues; as well as strive to enhance the governance capacity of community 
members.172  Similarly, others consider “Community Development” as efforts 
towards empowerment, transformation, and participation of the poorest and 
most marginalized people in their own development, including improving or 
strengthening capacity to demand better services and transparency from 
government and other relevant stakeholders.173 In this Thesis, “Community 
Development” refers to engagement with an adversely (potentially or actually) 
affected community of people towards facilitating their participation in 
decision-making relating to risks and opportunities they face; proposed action 
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for their own development, and empowerment for sustainable or continuing 
existence. 
 
3.2. CDA Context: Land Access and Title 
3.2.1 Concept  
From the different contexts in which community agreements are permitted or 
practiced, a concept is beginning to emerge. That concept is to the effect that 
where a right or interest is likely or in danger of being affected by the action of 
another, then the holders of that right or interest should be engaged, 
consulted and be given an opportunity to participate meaningfully and to 
contribute in the decision-making process and share in the benefits accruing 
from such action. In other words, the CDA process functions to acknowledge 
or recognize rights or interests which a group has by virtue of some special or 
historical connection to a place or territory. 
 
3.2.2 Contexts 
Historically, contractual agreements between private sector resource 
companies and indigenous people and/or local communities were 
unprecedented in mineral resource development. Nevertheless, the 
phenomenon continues to gain ground and widespread application. Nigeria 
(among other countries) has gone a step further by statutorily imposing CDA 
negotiations prior to commencement of mineral development.  
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This section will examine the different contexts in which the CDA practice is 
known to operate. Similarly, it will consider the various drivers or triggers 
which have necessitated CDA practice within each of these contexts. 
 
3.2.2.1 Legal Obligation 
The first context in which CDAs arise is where a State’s mineral law or other 
national legislation has imposed an obligation on companies that are desirous 
of obtaining licenses to prospect, explore, develop or mine mineral resources, 
to negotiate CDAs with qualifying communities or groups. Nigeria, by virtue of 
section 116 of the 2007 Mining and Minerals Act, falls within this context. 
Other countries that have followed this approach include Papua New Guinea 
(PNG)174 and Mongolia. 
 
3.2.2.2 Land Access and Title 
The second context for CDA application exists mainly in countries with 
indigenous populations such as Canada and Australia, among others. In 
these countries, although no statute is known to have imposed the obligation 
on companies to negotiate CDAs, some peculiar factors in their political and 
legal evolution encourage such agreements.175 The First Nation status of 
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indigenous people vests them with title claim to their ancestral territory.176 In 
Canada and Australia, for example, indigenous landownership claims 
(aboriginal rights and title or native title) have led to many indigenous Land 
Use Agreements, (ILUA) and Land Settlement Agreements in which the state 
has recognized indigenous land titles in certain indigenous/Aboriginal 
communities.177 However, it is important to note that CDAs cannot confer land 
or native title to an Aboriginal community where none exists ab initio.178 In 
other words, a developer may negotiate a CDA with an indigenous 
community or group although title to the land subject to resource 
development does not reside with that indigenous group.179 In this case, a 
CDA may constitute some form of recognition of that connection with land or 
a community’s proximity to a mineral project.180 
In Australia, for instance, Section 29 of the Native Title Act, 1993 gave 
recognition to indigenous people or Traditional Owners. This recognition 
entitles them to the ‘right to negotiate’ procedure in relation to a future act 
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proposed on traditional land. In Canada, Section 35 of the 1982 Federal 
Constitution “recognized and affirmed” certain First Nation treaties and rights. 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of this provision is that it 
imposes a duty on the Crown to consult with, and accommodate indigenous 
concerns with respect to developments in which Aboriginal rights or interests 
may be affected.181 These legal and political peculiarities are seen, not as 
grounding the legal basis, but to have provided the platform for the 
negotiation of community agreements.182  
 
3.2.2.3Environmental Conflict Resolution 
The third context for CDAs is found in countries where there have been 
significant conflict involving resource developers and local communities,183 
and CDAs were negotiated in an attempt to resolve current or prevent future 
conflicts.184  For instance, the Tintaya Dialogue Table was established to 
provide a forum for addressing grievances of local indigenous people around 
the Tintaya Copper Mine185 located in the highlands of Peru, where some 
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campesinos (the local indigenous people) were resettled with very little 
compensation and without serious consultation.186 This led to community 
discontent. Grievances were premised on the land acquisition process 
adopted by the authorities, the treatment of community members, and 
pollution of the environment.187 Another example is Nigeria’s Niger Delta, 
which has experienced serious conflict for many decades now.188 
Agreements have been negotiated in an effort to resolve persistent conflicts 
in the Niger Delta.189 In some parts of the Delta, oil companies operating in the 
region are, from time to time, being forced to declare force majeure because 
of incessant community disputes.190 Community disputes in the Delta region 
are attributed to allegations of social and economic subjugation arising from 
project-related displacement, environmental degradation and the proverbial 
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poverty in the midst of plenty.191 For example, Shell Nigeria Limited has not 
been able to operate some of its fields in Ogoni land dating back to 1993 due 
to unresolved community grievances.192  
Similar examples of resource development-based conflict exist particularly in 
mineral resource-dependent emerging economies, compelling stakeholders 
to rethink existing industry-community relations strategies.193 As a result of the 
foregoing, Industry-community engagement in the shape of CDAs has 
become prominent for relationship cultivation and beneficiation, particularly in 
countries with a history of conflicts relating to resource projects. 
 
3.2.3 Origin/Evolution of CDAs in Resource Extraction  
The origin or the evolution of CDAs within the extractive industries’ activities 
may be gleaned from the various contexts in jurisdictions where 
industry/community contracts are practiced. From the literature, CDA practice 
has been traced to the emergence of another industry-led practice –
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), particularly in non-indigenous 
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communities.194 In the Newmont’s Ahafo community agreements, one of the 
major drivers for Newmont’s decision to voluntarily negotiate community 
agreements with the Ahafo community was the company’s commitment to 
communities where they operate.195   
In response to the criticisms of poor industry practice, neglect of the operating 
environment, human rights abuses, and local poverty arising from abdication 
of governmental duties, resource developers in the extractive industries have 
tried both to improve the quality of their operations, as well as to contribute 
towards poverty alleviation in local communities.196 These causes are often 
achieved through the CSR policy of each company.  However, the impact of 
voluntary CSR practices of resource companies (particularly in developing 
countries) has been a mixed bag.197 Some of the criticisms against CSR 
practices in many places cite poor CSR policy articulation, inconsistent 
implementations and the fact that it is voluntary and often excludes the local 
beneficiaries in decision-making.198   
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In countries with indigenous population, agreement-making involving 
communities and industry is often one of the incidences of the special status 
of indigenous people in those countries.199 That is, it is a way to recognise and 
accommodate inherent rights and interests of the affected indigenous people 
in relation to their ancestral homeland. 
 
3.2.4 Why CDAs Are Negotiated 
Although the content and practice of community agreements differ between 
countries, the purpose or the reasons why they are negotiated are fairly 
similar.200 An analysis of the existing literature reveals that the drivers of 
community agreements in different countries are dependent on the 
peculiarities of each country.201 These peculiar features could be the legal 
and political history of a country and internal political dynamics. The following 
drivers, which are not exhaustive but merely reflect analyses of the most 
important drivers, can be distilled from various countries’ practices regarding 
CDAs:202 
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 Community Sustainability in Resource Development Process: 
Sustainability of affected local communities remains a major concern 
for the extractive sectors’ operators.203 Host states, affected 
communities, and leading resource companies are increasingly 
focusing on improving the understanding of socio-economic impacts 
(negative or positive) of resource development. More importantly, 
there is an increasing focus on how the state, affected community and 
companies could synergise towards achieving better outcomes for 
communities.   
 Community Engagement: Another important driver for CDAs is the 
need to bridge the communication or relationship gap which often 
exists between communities and the extractive industries.204 Many 
research reports205 note the lack of active and sustained interaction, 
education or information-sharing between the private sector and local 
communities as a key contributor to industry-community conflicts in 
                                                          
203
 Anglo American, ‘SEAT TOOLBOX: Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox Version3-An Overview’ 
(Anglo American, 2012), pp6–15, http://www.angloamerican.com/~/media/Files/A/Anglo-American-
Plc/development/SEAT-v3-overview-21-06-12.pdf. 
204
 Dike, HCOCAs and Security of Investments in Oil and Gas Industry, pp32–34. 
205
 International Council on Mining and Metal & GlobeScan, 2014 ICMM Stakeholder Perception 
Study: Tracking Progress (London: ICMM, 2014), 25–27, http://www.icmm.com/document/8615; 
Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, ‘Community Benefits Agreements: Making Development Projects 
Accountable’, 3–5; Sarkar et al., ‘Mining Community Development Agreements – Practical 
Experiences and Field Studies’, 10–11. 
84 
 
many jurisdictions.206 This is more particularly so in developing 
countries.207 Thus, it may be useful to ask:  why should a resource 
developer negotiate with local or Aboriginal groups or communities? 
Put differently, in the absence of any legal requirement, what is the 
incentive for a resource developer in committing to a long-drawn and 
potentially expensive engagement process with community groups?  
Answers to these questions are best explained by the four contexts 
described earlier in this Chapter.  Similarly, regime-based 
requirements for complying with aboriginal rights and title often 
compel corporations, and even the State to engage with affected 
indigenous people. Canada and Australia are examples of this. In 
Canada, the duty on the State to consult and accommodate is usually 
the trigger for engagement with indigenous people. Similarly, the 
engagement of indigenous Australians in the resource development 
context pivots on the landmark decision in the Mabo Case.208  In this 
case, the Meriam people of Australia’s Murray Island sought a 
declaratory relief affirming that they are entitled to the Murray Island 
as owners, possessors, occupiers and persons entitled to use and 
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enjoy the Island.209 The action was brought by the Meriam people 
challenging the power of the Government of Queensland to extinguish 
the native title210 of the Meriam people over the Murray Island. The 
Court held for the Plaintiffs stating that “…Native Title to land survived 
the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty and radical title. The rights and 
privileges conferred by native title were unaffected by the Crown’s 
acquisition of radical title but acquisition of sovereignty exposed 
Native Title to extinguishment by a valid exercise of sovereign power 
inconsistent with the continued right to enjoy native title”.211 This 
decision of the full Federal Court of Australia changed the attitude of 
the Commonwealth in relation to the way indigenous people are 
treated.212 Following this judgement, the Commonwealth Parliament 
enacted the 1993 Native Title Act, which affirmed existing titles and 
established a process for dealing with native title rights of indigenous 
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Australians.213  Among other things, it provided for the procedure for 
the recognition and protection of native title as well as how 
governments and other parties who may want to deal with traditional 
land should proceed as it relates to potential native title issues.214  
 Conflict reduction or prevention: It was stated earlier that conflicts 
and the need to reduce or prevent their occurrence constitute one of 
the contexts for the use of CDAs in certain countries. Community 
agreements are becoming increasingly attractive to stakeholders in 
the extractive industries because they have mechanisms that are 
useful for cultivating and nurturing industry/community partnerships. 
Community agreements ‘lock parties in’ to some specific undertakings 
and prescribe steps or options available to parties for resolving 
grievances.215 The possibility of avoiding surprises and being able to 
predict how an aggrieved party (especially a community party) may 
react to disputes is important for companies.216  
 Project Impact and beneficiation: Another factor that has 
contributed to the prevalence of community agreements is the 
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disparity in impact and benefit accruals. The norm is for the economic 
gains of large-scale resource development projects to accrue at the 
national or sub-national level.217 This is normally in the form of taxes, 
export revenues and economic linkages to other sectors of the 
economy, usually in state capitals and urban centres.218  On the other 
hand, communities and groups who actually bear the direct impact of 
resource development often derive little (if compared with the usual 
adverse impacts) to no real benefits from the project.219 This situation, 
as noted in earlier Chapters, is a major cause of the angst and 
disenchantment felt by host communities against resource 
development around their communities.220 This problem raises the 
issue of governance and revenue sharing, which is a legal or 
constitutional issue in many countries. So, private contracts like 
community agreements may be ill-suited to address such a sensitive 
matter. Nevertheless, a developer who operates in any of the first 
three contexts discussed above is usually confronted with a scenario 
in which the realities on the ground at a given operating environment 
foist on it a fait accompli.  It is considered a fait accompli because in 
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most jurisdictions mineral rights and land rights are not vested in the 
state.221 Thus, a developer is required to negotiate conditions of 
access to land. In indigenous communities, the stakes are slightly 
higher because of the requirements of various regimes such as the 
need to consult and accommodate the affected First Nations. This 
necessarily requires that prior free and informed consent of the 
affected First Nations is sought and obtained by the state. However, 
this duty is usually delegated to project proponents.222 Also, endemic 
poverty among rural populations, coupled with governance issues put 
considerable pressure on resource developers to act one way or the 
other. Thus, in some developing countries, resource developers play 
the role of proxy-governments.223 CDAs have therefore become 
vehicles for dealing with these challenges.224 
 Managing Value-based Conflict: In addition to benefits, mitigation of 
adverse impacts of resource projects is an issue which both a 
resource developer and potentially impacted communities are 
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concerned about.225 However, differences in value systems 
sometimes come in the way of a project.226  For local and indigenous 
communities, the protection of the environment, especially sacred and 
religious sites, is often paramount, outweighing any desire for 
improvement in social and economic conditions of rural areas.227 
Conflict usually arises where the state or a resource developer does 
not share similar values and proceeds to grant development licenses 
or exercises rights granted under the license without the concurrence 
of affected communities.228 The Argyle diamond project in Kimberley, 
Australia is a good example. Initial development of this project in the 
early 1980s led to the destruction of major Aboriginal sites, but 
created few benefits for the affected people.229 The result was 
frequent conflict around the project, which lasted for almost two 
decades.230  The negotiation of a comprehensive community 
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agreement for the second phase of the project in 2002-2004 improved 
relations between the company and the affected communities in the 
Kimberley area.231 In this CDA, further destruction of Aboriginal sites 
was avoided, and local environmental knowledge of those impacted 
was incorporated into the project’s environmental management plan.232 
 Intergenerational considerations: Stakeholders (particularly the 
state and affected communities) are increasingly becoming conscious 
of the reality that mineral resources are finite. Therefore, the challenge 
for them is to ensure the protection and preservation of critical local 
social and economic superstructures on which the survival of the rural 
dwellers depend.  Failure to anticipate this possibility often leaves the 
state and adversely-affected people with the hydra-headed challenge 
of rectifying all known and yet to be understood social and 
environmental damage resulting from resource development 
activity.233 The CDA process is, therefore, one way of facilitating 
resource development while at the same time articulating associated 
risks and providing a framework for more structured remedial 
action.234 Although not usually the case, one of the central arguments 
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of this Thesis is CDAs should not only deal with benefits for the 
present generation but also reflect concerns for the future of 
communities and the need to begin the process of preparing for the 
inevitability of a life without minerals.  
 Local Capacity for Action: The growing capacity of local 
communities to mobilize themselves for action may also be a factor.235 
Advancement in technology has made it possible for information 
relating to practices around the world to be easily accessible.236 So, 
communities’ chances to communicate freely and frequently have 
increased. Also, affected local communities are becoming aware of 
practices in different parts of the world and are agitating and 
mobilizing both amongst themselves and the civil society.237 All of 
these factors increase the capacity which communities have to 
oppose or disrupt development projects where they think that their 
interests are not adequately served by the projects.238 Similarly, where 
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they believe that engaging with developers can produce positive 
outcomes, communities’ can effectively negotiate and lend their 
support to projects.239 
 External Scrutiny of Corporations: Corporations in the extractive 
industries have come under increased pressure because of 
allegations of rights abuses and poor industrial practices.240 As a 
result, more companies are readily looking of how to adapt their 
operations and corporate policies to minimize some of the adverse 
effects of resource project while advancing local benefits in 
communities.241 In many cases, negative publicity arising from 
perceived or alleged corporate malfeasance is potentially damaging to 
the corporate image.242 Externally, the civil society aligns actively with 
local communities to put pressure on resource developers to either 
review certain decisions or to improve on business practices that are 
thought to be harmful or damaging to lives or the environment.243 Also, 
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domestic and international legal systems use political or legal 
processes in an effort to influence corporate behaviour. Thus, more 
countries are incorporating community agreement obligations into their 
minerals legislations. At the international level, Prof. John Ruggie’s 
Respect, Protect, and Remedy Framework is the most current and 
best example of the increasing global effort aimed at influencing 
corporate behaviour by galvanising the instruments of the international 
legal system.  
 Local Support: Lastly, resource developers’ desire to secure local 
support is one of the incentives for negotiating community agreements 
even where no legal obligation exists.244 In this situation, a developer 
propelled by commercial instincts and the need to procure a friendly 
environment, analyses the local area and may conclude that seeking 
and obtaining local support through agreement-making is in the best 
interest of the company.245  
 
3.2.5 Identifying a Community Party to CDAs: Challenges      
Within the context of resource development, resource companies, the state 
(in certain cases), and the relevant community group are the usual parties to 
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CDAs.246 While a resource company and the state party are easily 
identifiable, determining who the community party is in relation to specific 
projects always requires some effort. And as shall be seen in Chapter Four, 
this is a most problematic aspect of CDAs requiring a clearer or better 
framework that will make it less onerous for the other parties to easily identify 
which community group to negotiate a CDA with.  
This point is important because for a process which results in binding 
agreements, the consequences of negotiating agreements with the wrong 
parties may be significant. 247 In civil cases, identifying the right persons to be 
made a Claimant or Defendant, respectively, is vital to the eventual outcome 
of the negotiation or action. For example, the parties to an action are relevant 
in determining which court or tribunal may have jurisdiction to hear and 
determine a case.248 Also, it could determine whether the court can proceed 
to hear the case as brought, and where the wrong person is made a party, 
the court may decline jurisdiction to proceed with a case. Lessons in Chapter 
Four clearly captured this difficulty and highlighted how vital the role of courts 
and special tribunals are in quickly resolving the problem. 
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Thus, for Nigeria, this is an area that was not sufficiently addressed. The 
current provision dealt with the issue by empowering the Minister of Mine, in 
the case of a dispute, to determine who the appropriate community should 
be. It is unlikely that this administrative approach will ensure speedy 
resolution of potential disputes with the finality and judicial authority that is 
necessary in such cases. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the following two criteria are adopted as a 
default mechanism: the ‘impact’ and ‘landownership/aboriginal title criteria. 
The Project Impact Method (PIM) may cover more groups than landowners, 
native title holders and those having an interest in land around the project 
area. Here, a developer relies on its expert knowledge of the proposed 
project and their technical abilities to estimate the potential zone of impact. 
People who come within that projected zone of project impact are then 
considered potential parties to CDA negotiations.   
 
3.2.5.1 Community Identification under the 2007 Minerals and Mining Act 
 This 2007 MMA’s provisions on CDA are found in Sections 116, 117 and 
125. But Sections 116 and 125 are the two relevant sections. Section 116 (1) 
provides that: “Subject to the provisions of this section, the Holder of a Mining 
Lease, Small Scale Mining Lease or Quarry Lease shall prior to the 
commencement of any development activity within the lease area, conclude 
with the host community where the operations are to be conducted an 
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agreement referred to as a Community Development Agreement or other 
such agreement that will ensure the transfer of social and economic benefits 
to the community”.249   
On the other hand, Section 125 stipulates that: “A licensee or lessee shall pay 
compensation to the owner or occupier- (a) whose land or interest in the 
land is injuriously affected by the exercise of the rights conferred by the 
licence or lease, for any such injurious effect not otherwise made good; and 
(b) who suffers damages as a result of pollution of any source of water, used 
for domestic and other purposes, as a consequences of the exploration or 
operations in any work connected with the property, for any such damage not 
otherwise made good.”250 
Although Section 116 does not make a specific reference to how a qualifying 
community may be identified, certain phrases are indicative of which 
community the Act considers a party for the purposes of CDAs. Relevant 
phrases such as “within the lease area” and “the host community where the 
operations are to be conducted” suggest that the Act considers communities 
located within or adjacent to the license area as potential parties. The 
wording of Section 116 is expansive enough to accommodate landowners, 
persons having an interest in land and all other residents of the lease area.  
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To the extent that one of the main aims is to distribute project-induced social 
and economic benefits to as many people as possible, then this scope of 
potential parties is a good thing. However, the questions become: how wide 
or narrow can the mining lease area be construed by a project proponent? 
Are communities outside the mining lease area, but who may be adversely 
affected by development activity, to be excluded from negotiation? What level 
of impact is sufficient to qualify a community or a group to be made a party?  
The Act defines “Mining Lease Area” in Section 164 as “an area subject to a 
Mining Lease Area”.  Answers to these questions are not found in Sections 
116, 164, or any other provision of the MMA. Limiting participation in the 
community agreement process to landowners or people with interest in land, 
to the exclusion of others impacted by a project, in some other ways may 
create conflicts in communities. Finding the appropriate balance is a difficult 
task. However, the role of legislation is to provide some clarity without being 
overly rigid.  
Similarly, section 125 requires compensation for an “owner or occupier” 
whose land, or interest in law is injuriously affected, or who suffers damage 
as a result of pollution of water sources. The phrase “owner or occupier” is 
undefined by Section 164 of the MMA. However, Section 125 (b) appears to 
provide a clearer view of potential community parties to CDAs under the 
MMA. Sub-section (b) of Section 125 imposes an obligation on leaseholders 
to compensate those who are adversely impacted by a project who are not 
landowners. It suffices that they are holders of interest in land either by way 
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of leasehold or mere occupation. Thus, Section 125 is construed to mean that 
potential parties to CDAs under the MMA includes occupiers, landowners, 
holders of interest in land acquired for development purposes, or holders of 
lands adjacent to the acquired land area who are adversely affected by 
development activities in the Mining Lease Area.  
3.2.5.2 Conflicting Provisions 
Reading sections 116 and 125 in isolation, the provisions appear straight 
forward. But when read cumulatively, the two sections appear to be 
conflicting in one significant way. For example, section 116 (1) quoted above 
refers to “host community” while section 125 mentions “owner or occupier”. 
Although these phrases are undefined in the MMA, they seem to be referring 
to two different classes of people.251 Members of the class referred to as “host 
community” do not have to be owners or occupiers of land but an “owner or 
occupier” may also be a member of the “host community.” In a litigious 
society like Nigeria, confusion created by this kind of ambiguity could be a 
recurring source of court cases which is not bad in itself as long as the cases 
do not frustrate or unduly delay the commencement of mineral projects. More 
so, the absence of any threshold which may trigger broader or certain kinds 
of beneficiation may expose less lucrative projects to undue financial burdens 
or poison a potentially worthy concept. 
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3.2.5.3. Mining Regulations: Ancillary Provisions 
Paragraph 13 of the Draft Minerals and Mining Regulations (available on the 
official website of Nigeria’s Ministry of Mines and Steel Development), made 
pursuant to the 2007 MMA made additional useful provisions. 
Sub-paragraphs (1) & (2) of Paragraph 13 stipulate that as a precondition for 
proper interaction with host communities, a leaseholder shall “identify the 
leaders of the community who must be persons who are known, and 
recognized by their people and who can exercise a reasonable degree of 
control over them”. The above Paragraph introduces other potential parties or 
at least, representatives of “host community” or “owner or occupier towards 
CDA negotiations. That is, the mentioning of community leaders who are 
known and are able to exercise a reasonable degree of control over the 
members of that community.  Similarly, Paragraph 139 of the Regulations 
provides the most lucid definition and direction on parties. Paragraph 139 (2) 
(a) provides that “the host community” within the meaning of Section 116 shall 
be the community where the mineral title area is located or the 
community closest to it.  Additionally, sub-paragraph (b) provides that 
“where the host community is for any reason not easily ascertainable, a report 
shall be made to the minister who shall in consultation with the State 
Government, the State Mineral Resources and Environmental Management 
Committee and other relevant State or Federal Government Agencies 
determine which is the host community”. 
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This additional provision notwithstanding, the extent to which a proponent 
may be required to go in seeking out a potential “host community” remains 
unclear. However, considering how particularly difficult this issue is around 
the world, any limitation in the above provisions is fairly understandable.   
Borrowing from practices in the case study jurisdictions, and as will be further 
discussed in Chapter Four, there is no error-free way of getting around this 
problem. This issue of community party identification remains pivotal in those 
jurisdictions despite their years of practical experience. However, what is 
different between theirs and the approach prescribed by these Nigerian 
legislations is that the courts in those jurisdictions are directly involved in 
resolving disputes as soon as they arise.  This approach is preferable 
because any dispute arising is quickly and most often swiftly addressed by 
competent judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals. A process involving the Minister 
and other Federal and State government functionaries is likely to be long, 
tenuous and unlikely to resolve the issue with finality. And for a novel 
framework within the context of a complex and sometimes volatile sector such 
as the extractive industry, the assurance of a competent and authoritative 
dispute resolution framework boosts investors’ confidence and engenders 






3.2.5.4. The Petroleum Industry Bill 2012 
In Nigeria’s petroleum industry, there are no analogous provisions to the one 
contained in the 2007 MMA.  The MMA is not applicable to the Petroleum 
Industry. “Minerals” or “Mineral Resources”  is defined by Section 164 of the 
MMA to mean “any substance whether in solid, liquid, or gaseous form 
occurring in or on the earth, formed by or subjected to geological processes 
including occurrences or deposits of rocks, coal, bed gases, bituminous 
shales, tar sands, any substances that may be extracted from coal, shale or 
tar sands, mineral water, and mineral components in tailings and waste piles, 
but [to] the exclusion of Petroleum and waters without mineral content”.  
 
Clearly, petroleum is expressly excluded. It may suffice to say that the issue 
of the coverage of Sections 116, 117, 118, and 125 will remain unclear until 
their application is judicially tested and determined.  
In the meantime, there is a Bill presently being considered at the Nigerian 
National Assembly which may materially alter the status in the petroleum 
industry. It is a Bill for an Act for the regulation of Nigeria’s petroleum sector 
and other related matters. The Bill does not contain a clear CDA obligation 
like the MMA, but has provisions that are suggestive of some sort of 
community agreement.   Section 116 of the Petroleum Industry Bill 2012 
proposes the establishment of a Petroleum Host Community Fund, (PHCF).252 
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By Section 118 (1), the PHCF shall receive ten percent of net-profit from 
“every upstream petroleum producing company” for the benefit of 
communities. Section 117 defines the qualifying ‘community’ as “the 
communities within the petroleum producing area”. Furthermore, Section 296 
requires the holder of petroleum exploration, prospecting or mining lease to 
pay adequate compensation for disturbance of the land surface or other rights 
of an owner or lawful occupier of any land which is subject to a petroleum 
license. Remarkably, Section 297 requires resource developers to publish the 
criteria used for the allocation of community development projects and other 
social investment initiatives within their respective areas of operation. One 
may then infer that the PIB proposes to formally introduce a form of 
community agreement in the Nigerian petroleum sector.  
This inference is clearly justified by the provision of section 297 of that Bill.  
Otherwise, the question will then arise whether there can be a legal obligation 
to report the doing of an act without an obligation to do the act in issue? Is it 
safe to conclude, based on the wording of Section 297, that there is clear 
legal backing to the already existing Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
arrangement in the Nigerian oil and gas sector? These are some of the 
relevant questions for which answers are expected to be provided as soon as 
the Bill becomes an Act. Nevertheless, what is clearly emerging is a trend 




3.2.5.5 The Nigerian Petroleum Sector’s Global Memorandum of 
Understanding (GMoU) Process 
The following discussion on the GMoU arrangement in the Nigerian petroleum 
industry is based on secondary sources, i.e. articles, reports, and company 
documents that explain the nature and content of GMoUs. Many unsuccessful 
attempts were made (including a field study visit to Nigeria) to obtain copies 
of the existing GMoUs.  The GMoU process was instituted in 2004/2005 and 
2006 by Chevron Nigeria Limited, and Shell Production Development 
Company of Nigeria (Shell), respectively. The GMoUs are non-binding 
agreements and they replaced the old system that involved MoUs.253   
According to Dumabo, Chevron’s General Manager, Policy, Government and 
Public Affairs, the GMoU was established to stimulate sustainable 
development of communities around Chevron’s areas of operations.254 
The GMoU administration process involves the creation of development 
councils with members drawn from “community residents, while Chevron, 
NGOs, representatives of state governments and government agencies like 
the Niger Delta Development Commission are supposed to provide the 
needed funding and capacity building support for the community-driven 
initiative.”255  Community projects are funded by these International Oil 
Companies (IOC) through the development councils. The scope of the 
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community projects undertaken through the GMoU arrangement include 
roads, cottage hospitals, scholarships, schools, housing, and the provision of 
electricity.256 Although Dumabo asserts that the GMoU arrangement is a 
community driven process, the level of the communities’ involvement in the 
decision-making regarding the selection of projects to be executed could not 
be verified from other sources. Also, Dumabo states that the main focus of 
the GMoU process is “stimulating sustainable development of communities 
around Chevron‘s areas of operations”. However, this statement of purpose 
fails to disclose: 
i) Chevron’s conception of sustainable community development 
within the context of the Niger Delta; 
ii) Who makes the decision on how community development can be 
made sustainable, as well as, how such a decision is made; and 
iii) What the elements of sustainability are in relation to community 
development. 
On the other hand, Shell considers its GMoU process a new way of working 
with communities because the process prioritises “…placing emphasis on 
more transparent and accountable processes, regular communication with 
the grassroots, sustainability and conflict prevention.”257 According Shell’s 
account of how the GMoU process functions: 
                                                          
256
 Ibid. 
257 Shell Companies in Nigeria, ‘Shell in Nigeria: Global Memorandum of Understanding’, 1. 
Furthermore, this document states that “…By the end of 2012, SPDC had signed 
agreements with 33 GMoU clusters, covering 349 communities, about 35% of the local 
105 
 
“A GMoU is a written statement between SPDC and a group (or cluster) of 
several communities. Clusters are based on local government or 
clan/historical affinity lines as advised by the relevant state government. The 
governing structures are well defined, with a 10-person Community Trust, a 
CDB (Cluster Development Board) and a Steering Committee chaired by the 
state government. The CDB functions as the main supervisory and 
administrative organ, ensuring implementation of projects and setting out 
plans and programmes. …The GMOU enables representatives of and local 
governments, SPDC, non-profit organisations (such as development NGOs) 
to come together under the auspices of the CDB as the governing body. 
Under the terms of the GMoUs, the communities decide the development 
they want while SPDC, on behalf of its joint venture partners, provides secure 
funding for five years, ensuring that the communities have stable and reliable 
financing as they undertake the implementation of their community 
development plans. SPDC also provides access to development experts to 
oversee project implementation and build the capacity of the CDBs to grow 
into functional community development foundations. This system replaces the 
previous approach whereby SPDC agreed to hundreds of separate 
                                                                                                                                                                     
communities around our business operations in the delta. In 2012, a total of 723 projects 
were successfully completed through GMoUs (including specific project-GMoUs). To date, 
the cumulative total funding for GMoU projects and programmes is over $117 million (with 
over $30 million in 2012 alone). Nine of the 33 Cluster Development Boards (CDB) have 




development projects with individual communities and managed them directly 
and separately…”258 
One of the advantages of this approach (which is, in a way, similar to the 
Area Agreement arrangement used in Australia) is that the GMoU process 
has engendered a sense of ownership as the communities are responsible for 
implementing their own projects.259 However, these positive accounts of 
corporate responsibility through the GMoU process seem to be in contrast 
with the sobering realities in the Niger Delta and the number of successful 
claims against Shell.260 In fact, there are several allegations ranging from 
refusal to implement GMoU promises to selective implementation.261  
 
3.2.5.6. The Qualified versus the Affected  
In addition to the foregoing, it is useful to highlight the distinction which is 
often made between ‘qualified’ and ‘affected’ communities in many 
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jurisdictions.262   The phrase ‘affected community’ refers to any group which is 
adversely affected in some significant way by a resource development 
project.263 Conversely, the term ‘qualified community’ has a more restrictive 
meaning. It is used to describe groups who are formally represented in the 
contractual process and which are defined as the intended beneficiaries 
under CDA arrangements.  In most agreements, affected communities are 
also qualified communities. That is, every community adversely impacted in 
any significant way is deemed qualified to participate in the agreement-
making process. In the Argyle Diamond Mine in North West Australia, only 
Aboriginal people who have a traditional connection with the mine area are 
covered in the Participation Agreement.264 Non-Aboriginal residents of the 
area are excluded regardless of the degree of impact that they suffer as a 
result of project activities. This connection to land approach is common in 
Australia, Canada, and Melanesia and is said to reflect formal and/or 
customary law in these societies.265 
For countries such as Canada and Australia, this approach is both 
understandable and reasonable for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is the 
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unique element that the practice is prominent within Aboriginal communities 
and operates in relation to land held subject to native title or aboriginal title. 
Secondly, there is the existence of a reasonably established regime and a 
robust legal system supporting the CDA process. Third, non-indigenous 
members of these societies have not and are unlikely to demand participation 
in the CDA process. 
 However, for a country such as Nigeria, it is recommended that flexibility 
should be the key in any given case. Whatever regulatory framework that is in 
place must permit a certain degree of flexibility, allowing a developer the 
discretion to expand the coverage of potential participation where necessary. 
The reason for this latitude is that the most important incentive for developers 
in these agreements is to secure a reasonable degree of predictability in the 
operating environment by gaining the support and consent of a wider group, 
especially groups that are significantly affected by their activities. Significant 
effect/impact is relative and is a matter which may be defined through 
regulatory guidance. Achieving this goal requires some flexibility and 
inclusiveness. Taking this approach can obviate or reduce the possibility of 
engendering rivalry and conflict in communities, therefore undermining the 
long-term interest of developers, which is stability. At the same time, the rules 
must be clear enough to excluded groups and communities who do not fall 
within any of the two prisms suggested earlier in this Chapter.  
Thus, this work supports a combination of the impact principle and connection 
to land principle. But allocation of benefits could be made to vary, depending 
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on the extent to which a person or group is impacted by a project. That is, an 
efficient system must balance the extent or degree of burden with accruable 
benefits.  
3.3. List of Possible Scope of Negotiation 
The content of CDAs varies depending on a number of factors. These factors 
include the nature and size of the project, the needs of the contracting local or 
indigenous community, and the capacity and bargaining powers of the 
contracting parties.266 However, there are common items across most 
agreements. These items are: 
 Parties; 
 Employment; 
 Access to business opportunity; 
 Education and training; 
 Access to mine site; 
 Revenue sharing; 
 Equity stake for local interests; 
 CDA revenue management; 
                                                          
266
 Kanaga Dharmananda SC, Senior Counsel at Fountain Chambers, An Expert Assessment of the 
Community Agreement Process from Industry and Community Perspectives, Face to Face Oral 
Interview, Perth, Australia, 12 April 2013, pp 9–10, (Interview Notes File with Author); Allan Donovan, 
History, Evolution and Current Status of Impact and Benefit Agreement, Face to Face Oral Interview, 
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, 17 October 2013, (Interview Notes File with Author); Bruce 
McIvor, Introduction to the IBA Process in Canada, Face to Face Oral Interview, Vancouver, British 
Columbia, Canada, 15 October 2013, (Interview Notes File with Author); AU Participant No.11, Is 
There a Role for Law in the Community Agreement Process Apart from Ancillary Provisions Under the 




 Use of mine infrastructure; 
 Consent and support; 
 Future transfer of infrastructure; 
 Community participation in environment management and closure; 
 Promotion of positive social impact; 
 Review period; 
 Legal validity; 
 Monitoring and enforcement; 
 Dispute resolution mechanism, among others. 
 
3.3.1 Commencement of Engagement and Negotiation 
The obvious starting point in industry-community relations is for the parties to 
meet themselves and to start talking about what the proponent’s purpose in 
the community is, how a community may be affected and what they are 
prepared to do to scale down the adverse effects of the operations. This 
process is generally known as community engagement. The best practice is 
that community engagement should begin very early, and remain constant 
and consistent throughout the duration of the project.  
What is early enough could depend on individual circumstances. But, it is 
always advisable to start immediately after a proponent wins the right to 
prospect, explore or develop minerals.267 It is bad for community engagement 
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if tension or a grievance is allowed to ensue before the process kicks in.268 
Furthermore, information provided by the proponent and the state (where 
appropriate), must be timely, accurate and relevant.269 
Lastly, the current trend is that this engagement should be accompanied by 
some form of agreement. In the case of CDAs under the 2007 MMA, this 
early engagement must end with an agreement prior to commencement of 
business.270  
 
3.3.1.1 Resourcing Community Engagement 
Negotiating with community interests may sometimes be a long, expensive 
and difficult even for large mining or oil and gas companies. For junior 
companies, it could be more challenging as they may not have the resource 
to oversee negotiations which may sometimes be long drawn, contentious, 
and costly. Parties must take this into account and make allowance for it. 
Again, for CDAs under the MMA where there is no requirement for good faith 
negotiation, how long should negotiation last if parties are unable to conclude 
an agreement? Section 116 (4) of the MMA provides that the failure to 
conclude an agreement be referred to the Minister if the proponent is ready to 
start business but no agreement has been signed. It is suggested that a clear 
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and unambiguous time frame similar to section 35 of NTA should be adopted 
instead. Also, the appropriate authority should be a court of competent 
jurisdiction or a tribunal with powers to inquire into all aspects of the dispute.  
The MMA’s approach of vesting the Minister with all dispute resolution is 
inappropriate for this kind of arrangement. The Minister will always be a party 
with interest in the object of the agreement and is likely to favour any of the 
parties. The best practice would be to assign dispute resolution responsibility 
to courts and tribunals with the requisite skills and training to resolve disputes 
with finality and to set needed precedents.  
 
3.4. Benchmarking CDAs 
The subject of CDA benchmarking should be very important for discerning 
stakeholders, and this also touches on this Thesis’ Research Problem. But 
benchmarking the performances of existing agreements is not yet a common 
practice.271 Benchmarking CDAs is concerned with how outcomes are 
assessed. Some of the criteria which this work identifies from current practice 
towards assessment of agreement outcomes include the following. 
 
3.4.1.1Community participation  
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The concept of community participation relates to whether the CDA process 
has given communities greater access to the decision-making process in 
relation to the things that communities care about. Considering the situation 
of communities in the past, the CDA process has tremendously improved the 
positions of many communities, particularly the indigenous people.272  
 
3.4.1.2. Improved Industry-Community Relations 
Another highpoint based on current indicators is that the CDA process has 
improved relations between the industry and the communities where they 
operate.273 This achievement means that cases of resource-project-induced 
violence have significantly reduced. This view is largely shared by all sides in 
Australia and Canada.274   
 
3.4.1.3. Acknowledgement of Aboriginal Rights and Title 
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Canadian and Australian indigenous people see the legal requirement for 
obtaining their consent and support through the consultation and 
accommodation of FNs and the right to negotiate procedures as an 
unequivocal acknowledgement of their traditional title over ancestral 
territories.275 
 
3.4.1.4. Community Beneficiation 
In this area of the process, benchmarking outcomes are nearly non-
existent.276  
The reason is simply because there is no prior indication as to purpose or 
strategic expectation of what a successful CDA outcome is.277 Is it the fact that 
communities now earn significant incomes from CDAs? Or is it the promise of 
employment or contracting opportunities? It is hard to call. Consequently, this 
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is where the strategic approach taken by this Thesis comes in. The main 
thesis is that CDAs should be engaged as tools for community governance 
from the perspective of sustainability and strategic community development. 
 
3.5. Three Pillars of CDAs 
From a conceptual basis, the practice of CDAs is motivated or characterised 
by three main elements or attributes, herein referred to as the three pillars of 
CDAs. These three pillars are: Consultation, Partnership, and Participation.278 
 
3.5.1 Consultation 
Consultation here means a procedure for assessing public opinion about a 
plan or major development proposal, or in the case of a planning application, 
the means of facilitating the involvement of those affected by the proposed 
activity.279 The subject of consultation has been generally discussed earlier as 
one of the key procedural steps leading up to an agreement.280 In relation to 
indigenous people, statute or case law may provide criteria for consultation. 
This is case the in Canada and Australia. In all other cases, a consultation or 
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engagement process must provide information that meets the criteria of 
timeliness and relevance.  
3.5.2. Partnership 
Also, one of the concepts behind the CDAs process is that of the idea of 
stakeholders partnering one with another to achieve shared goals and to 
protect a common interest. There is mutual appreciation and respect for 
individual undertakings, and where the proposed project goes ahead and 
succeeds, every stakeholder benefits accordingly.281  
 
3.5.3 Participation 
The third pillar of CDAs is participation. The purpose of participation in the 
CDA process is to seek and obtain the Prior free and informed consent of the 
relevant community amongst other purposes. That is, participation of local or 
Aboriginal communities in the resource development processes.282 
Participation occurs through a number of ways, including participation in 
decision-making process and bearing some social and environmental costs 
as well as sharing in the benefits of resource development occurring in their 
communities or around them.283 Thus, CDAs are often aimed at facilitating 
participation through the provision of structures through which communities’ 
partner with the industry in resource development.  
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3.5.4 Other Components 
Another attribute or characteristic of CDAs is that they generally represent 
negotiated arrangements. Thus, CDAs are bilateral (and sometimes tripartite 
where they involve the State) contractual relationships between the industry 
and community interests.  
 
3.6. CDAs: Implications 
The subject of the broad implications of community agreements is important 
but rarely discussed. This part of this work examines what these implications 
are from the perspective of each stakeholder and from the State point of view 
as well. Generally, CDA may be a good thing for the minerals industry that 
should be encouraged, but the fact remains that there is always a 
counterfactual argument or position to virtually anything. Where the 
implications are known, actors in the CDA process should consider what can 
be improved upon for the process to work better and any area that needs 
strengthening will be strengthened so as to guard against potential risks. 
 
3.6.1.1. Positive Implications 
So far, this Thesis demonstrates that CDAs could offer clear and substantial 
benefits for participating local/Aboriginal groups. For instance, it was shown 
that they can provide local or Aboriginal groups and communities with access 
to streams of income through royalty or other payments.284 That is, vide 
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CDAs, benefiting communities now may have a degree of financial autonomy 
which can help them to fund social projects that the Government is unable to 
provide funding for.285 This autonomy from the state could allow communities 
to set their own priorities rather than subordinating these priorities to that of 
the state as a condition for accessing public financing. Secondly, in the longer 
term, they can provide avenues for communities to access investable capital, 
which for some communities could be applied for future uses. Three, CDAs 
additionally offer preferential access to employment opportunities, training 
and business development for community members. The Argyle Diamond 
mine is a good example. Here, Aboriginal people accounted for less than 5% 
of the workforce when negotiations for an agreement commenced with 
Aboriginal representatives in 2001.286 Recent accounts state that the 
representation of Aboriginal people in the workforce has increased to 20% 
and income for Aboriginal people is estimated at about A$9,000,000 
annually.287  Fourth, for the industry party, it is at least an acceptable 
assurance of certainty and a stable operating environment.288 Finally, CDAs 
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enable proactive community involvement, on a continuing basis, towards the 
management of cultural, social and environmental effects of resource 
exploitation. In this regard, communities take a leading role in defining, 
identifying and protecting sacred sites; cultural heritage; participating in 
environmental management regimes; and in decision-making regarding 
project expansion and decommissioning.289 
 
3.6.1.2. Potential Risks 
Conversely, these agreements also have ramifications beyond the legal 
relationship which they beget between the parties. This must be fully 
understood and catered for in order to maximize their contribution to 
sustainability and community development. In broad terms, potential risks 
include: (I) subrogation of government leadership and responsibilities; (ii) the 
creation of non-sustainable life style and development projects; and (iii) the 
promotion of mob rule. These implications may be viewed from the 
perspectives of the community, the developer, and the state, respectively. 
 
3.6.1.2.1. Community 
Apart from opting to negotiate a community agreement, there are other 
avenues through which community grievances or concerns may be ventilated. 
So, when a community takes a decision to sign a CDA, it must understand 
                                                          
289
 O’Faircheallaigh and Ali, Earth Matters, p77. 
120 
 
that by signing a binding agreement, it may have waived the right to another 
course of conduct which may otherwise have been available. 
Therefore, for a local community or Aboriginal group, the relevant question is 
whether CDAs provide them with the best option for advancing their interests. 
This question is useful because, in the absence of any contract, interested or 
potentially affected members of any community may in theory be able to take 
advantage of extant judicial and regulatory systems connected with project 
approval and resource management to address local concerns.290  This 
involves taking advantage of rights available to the public generally or rights 
arising from ownership or use of property to challenge perceived violations of 
rights. In the case of Aboriginal groups, it means using judicial and regulatory 
instruments to protect and advance whatever interest that they claim to 
possess.291 For example, an interested community may institute a legal 
proceeding to oppose or challenge the grant of project approvals by the state.  
Furthermore, it has been suggested that interest groups or communities can, 
in one way or another, influence state-Investor contracts with a view to 
incorporating or accommodating local interests.292 However, the practicality of 
this suggestion is doubtful because negotiations are usually in private and 
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only announced after an agreement is signed. Thus, it is most unlikely that 
remote communities will have notice of pending State Agreement.  
Additionally, an affected community could form a broader coalition with civil 
societies or other interest groups in relation to a proposed project. But when 
that community binds itself to an agreement with a developer, these rights are 
usually limited or significantly constrained.293  
Many CDAs contain specific provisions that commit the indigenous or 
community party to either a positive act, such as supporting a proposed 
project, or to a negative act of refraining from opposing the project during EA 
or other regulatory proceedings.294  For example, a resource developer in 
Canada utilized a similar undertaking by an Aboriginal group to argue that 
Aboriginal signatories to a CDA were estopped from raising objections to the 
grant of a water license necessary for the expansion of the project.295 
Furthermore, a community’s contractual agreements with industry could have 
society-wide implications, especially in relation to citizens-state relations. In 
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countries with indigenous populations such as Canada and Australia, the 
special relationship between the state and indigenous people is sometimes 
legally and constitutionally defined. Such special legal and constitutional 
protections are usually unavailable to non-indigenous communities.  
It has been established in this work that community-industry agreements have 
the potential to influence how a community (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) 
relates with its government. Community agreements tend to create a new tier 
of local administration in which rights and duties are created and revenues 
are generated to finance some basic local amenities and other community 
projects. In fact, that is one important implication of using the CDA process as 
an instrument of local governance. As a result, a degree of local self-
governance and self-determination, perhaps un-contemplated by the 
Constitution, is introduced into local administration without appropriate 
safeguards or checks and balances mechanisms.296  
This situation is one of the justifications for this Thesis’ argument for a 
regulated CDA process which is believed should be able to address these 
risks. In the case of Nigeria which legislated the CDA process, the foregoing 
issues appear not to have been addressed in the MMA. Clearly, the concept 
behind how that legislation framed the CDA process was just to institute a 
system of community beneficiation.  But for the CDA process to achieve the 
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objectives set by the MMA, such a CDA process must be as system of local 
governance. The requirements of such a CDA process will be unveiled in 
Chapter Six. 
 
3.6.1.2.2 Resource Developer 
For resource developers, the implications include the potential for delay in 
project commencement; assumption of the role of a surrogate government; 
increased cost of doing business. Also, there is an additional problem of 
ascertaining what the options available to them in the case of breach of 
contract by the community party will be in specific cases.  Where a CDA 
approach puts private sector companies into a situation where they often take 
on responsibilities traditionally reserved for governments, then that could 
sometimes (at least theoretically) have some adverse social, and even 
security implications for the wider society.297  
Importantly, CDA based obligations add significantly to the cost of doing 
business.298 Although some companies seem comfortable with the current 
approach, some other fear that the current system might eventually create a 
hostile environment for businesses.299  
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As good as the CDA concept is, stakeholders must appreciate that it will not 
be in the interests of anyone concerned if the process imposes excessive 
costs on private sector companies. Some might argue that most stakeholders 
understand this point and there are also instances in some jurisdictions to 
support that some communities appreciate the danger.300 On the hands, some 
have also argued that some proponents are not doing enough, in terms of 
demonstrating genuine commitment towards addressing the adverse 
consequences of their activities.301 
Nevertheless, the first argument remains germane because in very deprived 
communities where local people are hungry for development, it is not unlikely 
that the CDA process could be seen as a life time opportunity for a sudden 
transformation in the fortunes of a people. So, Nigeria needs to insulate its 
CDA arrangement from this likely occurrence by erecting thresholds and 
setting out conditions for when the state may intervene to lighten burdens and 
broaden CDA-based opportunities. Alternatively, conditions could also be 
established which will permit a proponent, in appropriate cases, to claim 
CDA-related spending that exceeds a specified threshold in tax refunds or 
such other similar arrangements that a state considers more appropriate. For 
example, there could be some mechanism in the regulatory system to convert 
certain levels of expenditure arising from community agreements to 
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deductible expenses for tax purposes. This occurs where the cost of 
complying with CDA-based obligations disproportionately exceeds the 
demands of adequate consideration for local consent and support.  
 
3.6.1.2.3. The State 
The important point is that a state should not out-source the responsibility of 
governance to a private arrangement. As a system of local governance, any 
CDA arrangement that allows or encourages the out-sourcing local 
governance is a bad arrangement. Although, this author does not advocate 
that the state superintends the CDA process or to impose itself on the entire 
process (what some considers to be paternalism), but, it should never be 
completely isolated or insulate itself from the process. The state must be 
supportive and ready to compliment the process. Chapter Six deals with the 
role that the state should assume towards achieving the goal of structuring 
the CDA process as an instrument of local governance.302  
However, the state should endeavour to guard against or not permit matters 
of a political or constitutional nature to clutter the CDA process. An example, 
though isolated, exists in literature relating to Canada and Australia to 
buttress this point.303 That example relates to the fact that there have been 
cases where some First Nations have tried to use the CDA process to re-
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litigate some historical claims which they have against the state.304 The CDA 
process is not the forum for a community party to litigate any outstanding or 
unresolved land title or such other disputes against or with the state.305  
The reason for this submission is that the CDA process, which is substantially 
a private arrangement, is not the appropriate forum for addressing any 
historical, political, or constitutional problem between the state and the 
communities.306   
Thus, questions regarding self-government, self-determination and territorial 
jurisdiction claims are not CDA process questions and therefore constitute 
unnecessary clutter to the community agreements process.  
 
Therefore, governments need to seriously consider the need to articulate the 
ground rules for the CDA process through policies, guidelines, and legislation 
so as to strengthen the process, and eliminate loopholes. Also, governments 
need to be very clear as to what the state wants to achieve through the CDA 
process. They have to decide whether they view CDAs as strategies to cede 
governmental functions to the private sector, or as part of government policy 
to leverage resource development opportunities for community development, 
local capacity-building, and broadening socio-economic opportunities in rural 
areas. The latter option, if properly structured, will most likely secure 
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sustainability of communities socially and economically even after the life of a 
project.307  
Another issue the state has to consider is the status of the CDA process 
within the regulatory framework of the minerals sectors. In jurisdictions where 
CDA obligations have been imposed by law such as Nigeria, the language of 
the law suggests an intention to make the agreement-making process a 
condition precedent for certain project approvals. But the laws are not 
completely clear regarding matters such as: what kind of project-related 
approvals will be contingent on a CDA; the implications of any failure to reach 
an agreement; and how the CDA regime fits into the general regulatory 
environment. Important matters such as these must not be left to conjecture 
or speculation since they have the potential to exacerbate the problem of 
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3.7 CDA Best Practice Recommendations 
                                                      Procedural Best Practice Recommendations 
1.  Timing for community 
engagement/consultation 
 Begin early to gain community 
confidence 
2. Competent Community 
Representative with requisite skills 
and experience 
Capacity resourcing is vital for the process 
because: 
(i) It is necessary to the agreement 
negotiation process because a 
balanced negotiation process and a 
good and credible agreement 
depends on it; 
(ii) It will ensure that the parties make 
informed and quality choices  
3. Transparency-in terms of funding, 
royalties and other payments and 
accruals  
A good management structure for the CDA 
process is important. The body representing a 
community both in  agreement negotiation and 
benefit management must be accountable 
4. The community consent procedure 
must follow the traditional or 
customary decision-making process 
 Anthropologists could help to make this 
determination before the negotiators 
begin their work. They should assist in 
identifying the right people to talk to; 
 Every member of the community 
leadership who needs to be present 
must be present unless a good reason 
exists to justify absence; 
 Meeting notices should be issued and a 
long lead of time given before the date 
for meetings 
5. Proponents and their field staff 
should get adequate and continuing 
cultural awareness training from 
community representative bodies 
 To help them understand how to 
conduct themselves in communities; 
 To help understand get the best out of 
their relationship with communities 
6. Companies should establish 
regional offices to ensure a level of 
contact with their host 
 For accessibility in case of lodging a 
complaint, and meetings; 
 Reducing the need for communities to 
travel distances ; 
 Mode of communication with 
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communities should be simple and 
relevant to all. 
 7. Uniformity or equal treatment of 
clans, groups or communities by 
companies 
 It is important to avoid conducts that has 
the tendency to split groups. 
 No one in similar circumstance should 
get a better deal than the other-
reasonably equal return in appropriate 
cases; 
 Having and starting with a template 
would help 
8. Preparatory work should be kept  This is a record of preparatory 
proceeding leading up to a CDA 
including the negotiation record 
 This will help agreement interpretation 
and implementation 
9. Establishment of necessary 
conditions for CDA arrangements, 
including a Holistic or a complete 
policy guidance 
 To provide the minimum governing 
framework for the CDA process 
governance to guide pre-agreement and 
post agreement stages of the CDA 
process 
 It does not necessarily have to be 
enshrined in a legislation but this will 
help particularly in jurisdictions with 
weak institutions 
 To ensure procedural fairness 
 To provide a process for identifying who 
the right community  
 
 
                                   Substantive  Best Practice Recommendations 
10. A Thorough-going funding 
arrangement 
 A complete funding plan should be in 
place to service pre-agreement, and 
post agreement funding requirements. 
Experience has shown that parties 
default to a laid-back mode once a CDA 
is concluded. Without a firm post CDA 
stage funding arrangement, 
implementation and monitoring 
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processes in hindered 
11. Royalty payment and other cash 
receipt 
 Royalties and any other payments is 
linked to production or revenue from a 
project should be guided by a trigger 
and Threshold mechanism 
 The current practice is that parties prefer 
to resolve this through negotiation but at 
the same time, some local groups 
struggle to understand why royalties 
should not be shared 50-50 or 60-40 (in 
favour the proponent). 
12. BMS should be established. A 
minimum requirement should exist 
to ensure that it runs transparently 
and with accountability 
 To take care of benefit administrative 
 To administer financial and non-cash 
receipts 
 Establish trust instruments, i.e., a Direct 
Benefit Trust to service immediate 
needs, and an Investment Trust 
 Income distribution into the two Trusts 
should tilt in favour of the Investment 
Trust on a 20%/80% ratio  
13. Tax treatment of CDA financial 
benefits 
 Government should consider making a 
portion of receipts earmarked for the 
Investment Trust tax free in deserving 
cases 
14. Address capacity needs at the 
earliest opportunity 
 Government support the CDA process 
more actively by investing in building 
through relevant training and 
scholarship 
 The right approach is to be pre-empt the 
commencement of a project. This will 
ensure that locals with the requisite 
skills and training are in place before 
and soon after the comes on stream 
15. The legal character of the 
relationship should be defined 
 Although it was apparent from the 
clauses contained the CDAs used for 
this research that a legally binding 
relations were intended, how, parties 




 Also, where obligations are intended, 
the framers of the CDAs should express 
the parties intentions in clear and 
unambiguous language  
16. Incorporation of juristic person and 
community corporations 
 Juristic persons are regularly 
incorporated to act for or represent the 
entire group or community. 
 One of the advantages is to reduce the 
difficulty associated with dealing with a 
fluid group or having natural persons to 





In this Chapter, the phenomenon of contractual relations between the 
extractive industries’ companies and communities has been examined. In 
order to foster a better understanding of this phenomenon, useful examples 
were drawn from Canada and Australia to demonstrate how the process 
works. The CDA practice has been in existence in these two countries since 
the early 1990s. 
Also, this Chapter considered the nature of CDAs and explored the reasons 
why the practice has become proliferated, being practiced in many other 
countries, including Nigeria. The Chapter established that the reasons or the 
justification for the proliferation of this practice includes:  
 The increasing demand or pressure on the extractive industries’ 
corporations to become more responsible in the way the operate; 
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 The presence of resource development-based conflicts in many 
countries and the need to reduce or prevent their occurrence; 
 The desirability of greater community engagement between companies 
and community so as to build trust and to engender a greater level of 
cooperation between the parties; and 
  The mounting social and political pressure on states to acknowledge 
indigenous land rights. 
Additionally, this Chapter discussed or analysed the implications of entering 
into CDAs from the various stakeholders’ perspective. It emphasises that 
although this Thesis has tried to demonstrate the tremendous utility that 
exists within the CDA process, and the inherent potential for greater benefit, 
the risks of an unregulated CDA process identified in this and other Chapters 
make a strategic regulation of the process imperative. Establishing a ground 
rule for the process is the right thing to do. Also, it would be in the interest of 
both parties to the CDA process, as well as, the state to do that. Thus, to 
translate expectations to positive outcomes, to secure community 
sustainability and development, some policy and regulatory guidance are 
essential for the CDA process. 
On top of that, this Chapter notes the difficulty that is involved in attempting to 
benchmark or evaluate the performance of the CDA process. The reason for 
this difficulty is that the prevailing practice does not provide any coherent 
standards for such an assessment to be made. 
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Furthermore, this Chapter examined the more recently instituted CDA 
process in Nigeria, through the MMA. Thus, the provisions of the MMA for the 
Nigerian CDA model were critically examined, and many areas of 
improvement were highlighted for further reforms. The aim of evaluating the 
Nigerian CDA provisions is to ensure that the Nigerian mining industry avoids 
the inherent dangers of a poorly supervised CDA practice. 
The approach adopted in this Chapter in discussing the concept and practice 
of CDA was necessary because any country seeking to borrow or to import 
the CDA practice into its legal system has to understand the historical 
antecedents of the practice, as wells as, the complex issues that are involved 
in its implementation. In the case of Nigeria, this approach will assist the 
country to appreciate fully, the extent of the policy and regulatory guidance 
that is essential for the success of the CDA process as an instrument of local 










Chapter Four: Justification for CDAs and 














This Chapter is divided into two segments. The first segment examines the 
case made in literature to support the prevalence of CDAs. This is done by 
considering the common problems that industry, as well as, communities face 
in relation to extractive industries activities in mining and petroleum activities. 
The second segment is a comparative case study part that uses data or 
information received from the field study exercises of Australia and Canada. 
The purpose of the second part of this Chapter to foster, through the field 
information, a better understanding of the CDA process in those countries. 
This Chapter: 
  Identifies and evaluates the case made to support 
the proliferation of CDAs around the world 
 Identifies and discusses issues that have precipitated 
or encouraged the use of CDAs from the perspective 
of individual stakeholders 
 Summarises and analyses field information 
 Outlines the scope of field inquiry and the nature of 
questions asked 
 Identifies necessary lessons from the exercise and 
apply them to the rest of the research 
135 
 
Also, the approach to the discussions and analysis below is designed to 
identify and to discuss the various aspects of the current CDA practices in 
these jurisdictions. 
 
4.1 Overview of Legal Regime 
The CDA process in both Australia and Canada developed as an extractive 
industry-led process the purpose of which was (and still is) to build confidence 
and to create or to foster a better working relationship between the industry 
and indigenous people. The process has evolved and become a dominant 
mechanism through which the industry relates with indigenous people.  
Following the growing relevance of the CDA process in Canada and 
Australia, the Governments of these countries have formulated policies and 
enacted legislations designed to ensure that the right and interest of state in 
relation to the development of mineral resources is not hampered or 
truncated by the CDA process. Thus, while there is no particular legislation or 
policy document specifically prohibiting the negotiation of CDAs, legislation 
such as the NTA, Heritage Protection laws and numerous policy documents 
have been enacted or formulated to safeguard extant state interests in 
relation to minerals development. The detail of these regulatory regimes 
designed not really to facilitate the CDA process but to secure state interest in 







One of the aims of this segment is to carefully evaluate the case made for the 
emergence or the proliferations of the CDA phenomenon.308 From the 
literature, the case made in support of the CDA phenomenon points to the 
social and environmental challenges of resource project development, and 
the disaffection and/or instability which they breed, as one of the main causes 
of CDAs proliferation.309 Other causes of CDA proliferation is the emerging 
legal recognition of customary land rights, native title, and other land-based 
rights which a group have over the project area.310 The approach taken is to 
highlight these resource project-induced challenges and how these 
challenges often limit the resourcefulness or productivity of some essential 
local resource.  
Also, this Chapter aims to provide the link between specific challenges of 
resource extraction for society, particularly host communities, and the 
phenomenon of local conflict in resource projects’ development. This 
phenomenon is prevalent around the world and constitutes a major threat to 
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the continued viability of the extractive industries.311 The ensuing discussions 
are meant to further strengthen the analyses in Chapter Three, on the 
particular uses of CDAs312 to resource development activities.  
The second segment centres on field information analysis. This segment will 
broadly lay out the relevant issues of concern which informed the field inquiry 
and the nature of the questions made available to the field audiences.  Also, 
this segment will address the reasoning behind the design of the questions 
that were posed as part of the field studies undertaken for this work and the 
choice of audience.  
 
4.1.2 Preliminary Observations 
Just like any other business venture, the exploration and exploitation of 
minerals, particularly in mining and petroleum comes with attendant 
consequences.313 These consequences or impacts are often very noticeable 
around project areas.314 They exact social, economic and environmental 
pressure on people, communities and businesses adjoining or adjacent to 
                                                          
311
 Conflict and Resource Development in the Southern Highlands of Papua New Guinea, chap. 1; 
Bannon and Collier, ‘Natural Resources and Conflict: What We Can Do’, 4–6. 
312
 The word ‘Stakeholders’ is used in this work to refer to those people or entities which have 
some direct interest in a given energy project and who stand to be directly affected one way 
or another by the execution of or failure to execute that project. This description specifically 
contemplates three entities which are: (i) The State; (ii) A proponent or an energy company; 
and (iii) Individuals, groups or a community in whose territory or area an energy project is 
sited or proposed. The latter group is otherwise known as a host community. 
313






project sites and facilities.315 The presence of these challenges and the 
conflict that it creates between the industry and affected community are part 
of the reasons why CDAs are negotiated.316 It is essential to identify and 
underscore what the challenges are, so as to appreciate the utility of CDAs in 
the resolution of such challenges. 317 
 
4.2 Nature of Energy Projects 
Energy project development in sectors such as petroleum and mining come 
with their unique challenges, which adversely affect the places where these 
projects are sited.318 Some of these energy project-induced challenges range 
from environmental, economic and social constraints to impediments put in 
the way of predominantly indigent rural people. This work acknowledges that 
energy projects make important contributions to the world economy and 
provide a huge revenue base which supports national economies of exporting 
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nations.319 However, the greater part of these upsides tends to accrue outside 
the locations or communities where these projects are located.320 
Thus, except for the crumbs that sometimes made their way to the project 
areas (and which are often rarely planned to achieve an enduring legacy), the 
residents of those project zones are often left with mostly the negative effects 
arising from energy project development.321 
In addition to the foregoing, there are other issues such as the sequestration 
or the curtailment of land rights and/or access to farmland and the marine 
environment.322 Furthermore, at the base of these project-induced burdens is 
the problem of limited or lacking government presence in rural areas of most 
countries, including some developed economies.323 
Based on the foregoing, the following issues emerge as the prime challenges 
that energy projects exact on their immediate surroundings: 
i) Extant Poverty;  
ii) Real or perceived exclusion from resource revenue; 
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iii) Constriction of basic rights; 
iv) Diminution of peoples’ socio-economic rights or interests; and 




The foundational problem in most of the impacted communities is poverty.324 
The consequences of pervasive poverty and very limited economic and social 
opportunities in local areas cannot be overemphasised. While it is often the 
fact that most mineral projects may not have, in any way, contributed to the 
poverty problem, their presence sometimes exacerbate it.325 Poverty here 
could be described as a direct result of a lack of opportunity among the rural 
population necessary to compete in a dynamic world.326  
Experiences have shown that energy projects are, most often, initially greeted 
with huge excitement by the host communities because of the anticipation 
that they would benefit socially and economically.327 However, communities’ 
expectations do not often translate to substantial benefit, because the reality 
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may be that those expectations are unfounded or misplaced, considering the 
nature, size of individual projects, or even capacity shortage within 
communities themselves.328  
 
4.2.2 Real or Perceived Exclusion 
The concern here is to understand why communities sometimes feel strongly 
obligated to take control of their own affairs in relation to the above-listed 
concerns with energy project activities. A common trend seen in many 
countries is that communities do not trust their governments to protect and to 
defend their well-being, especially in cases of conflict between genuine 
concerns of local people and that of proponents.329 
Hence, communities tend to opt for direct engagement with proponents in the 
extractive industries in addressing issues that affect their lives and 
communities.330  Perceived exclusion may include exclusion from participating 
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or co-sharing in economic and other benefits accruing from energy projects 
for which they bear some direct adverse consequences.331  
 
4.2.2.1 Economic Exclusion  
The perception of communities, particularly, in many developing countries is 
often that of systematic exclusion of people that bear the negative impacts 
resource projects from meaningful participation in the sharing of resource 
revenue.332 Part of the argument often made in support of the perceived 
exclusion is that utilisation of resource revenue always occurs outside the 
project area.333 This is seen to benefit the urban areas as against those who 
bear all the adverse impact of such activities but get so little (if any) in terms 
of economic opportunities and physical development.334 Aside from the 
problem of corruption, the question of who gets what, in terms of revenue in 
any polity is highly political.335 Rarely does equity and fair distribution of 
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resource revenue on the basis of impact and benefit act as one of the 
criterion for resource revenue distribution.336 
Also, the usual trickle-down effect of some positives which local people 
normally expect from mining and petroleum activities do not always occur as 
anticipated.337 
As a result, host and/or impacted communities often agitate for greater 
participation in the sharing of resource revenue.338  However, the impediment 
to the success of such agitations has always been that revenue sharing in 
any polity is generally pre-determined by law.339 This makes it difficult for 
practical adjustments to be made so as to address specific problems affecting 
individual communities on a project-by-project basis.340 Consequently, 
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communities often take the alternative option of directly engaging with 
proponents to negotiate a benefit package using the CDA process.341  
 
4.2.2.2 Social Exclusion 
Social exclusion, whether real or perceived, ordinarily flows from economic 
exclusion.342 This could happen where accruing revenue does not reach local 
communities from the central government.343 It could also be attributable to a 
lack of local participation in economic opportunities available from particular 
projects.344  Such opportunities may include employment and contracting 
options for qualified community members.345 However, the reality in many 
places is that a lack of employable persons and suitably qualified contractors 
limits any chances of local participation in energy projects.346 One of the 
practical consequences is that prospects for community sustainability and 
local development are diminished.347 That is, while the stock and quality of 
resources available to communities are adversely affect, or even depleted, 
                                                          
341
 Shell Companies in Nigeria, ‘Shell in Nigeria: Global Memorandum of Understanding’, 1. 
342
 World Bank, ‘Social and Economic Impact’. 
343
 Ibid., 1; World Bank, ‘Mining and Local Economic Development’, 1. 
344
 World Bank, ‘Mining and Local Economic Development’, 1. 
345
 Kemp, ‘Mining and Community Development: Problems and Possibilities of Local-Level Practice’, 
203–204. 
346
 Cathleen Knotsch and Jacek Warda, ‘Impact Benefit Agreements: A Tool for Healthy Inuit 
Communities?’, National Report (Ottawa: National Aboriginal Health Organization, Canada, 2009), 
21–22, http://www.naho.ca/documents/it/2010_IBA_Report.pdf. 
347
 World Bank, ‘Mining and Local Economic Development’, 1. 
145 
 
the flow of revenue and project-related opportunities flowing into those 
communities may be limited, restricted or insignificant.348 
 
4.2.3 Constriction of Rights 
On the other hand, constriction of rights pertains to the potential for energy 
project activities to lead to acquisition of land useful for farming and other 
economic activities.349 Furthermore, access to water resources useful for 
irrigation and other uses may become limited or non-existent.350 Also, the 
quality of water sources may be degraded by polluting agents from petroleum 
or mining activity, rendering them unfit for purpose.351 In each of this 
situations, the effect on those that depends on this basic resource is that the 
capacity for self-sustenance will be constrained.352  
 
4.2.4 Diminution of Rights or Interests 
The following discussion is in relation to private/communal rights or access to 
privately/communally owned or used land or water sources.353 From a local or 




 Gambrell, ‘U.N. Reports Widespread Oil Damage in Nigeria Delta’; Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Has BP 
Really Cleaned up the Gulf Oil Spill?’, Guardian, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/apr/13/deepwater-horizon-gulf-mexico-oil-spill; 









 Parliament of Australia, Native Title Act 1993, sec. 10. 
146 
 
community perspective, the diminution of rights and/or interests in the course 
of an energy project development touches on two broad areas. The first point 
relates to land acquisition, curtailment of access to land, or the sequestration 
of a people’s right or access to land or water sources.  This is the situation 
frequently seen or experienced in energy projects. In that segment of society 
in which most dwellers or residents (the area in which most E & P activities 
occur) almost absolutely depend on land and streams/rivers for social and 
economic sustenance, meaningful existence is affected once these resources 
are negatively affected.  
The second point is that in addition to the first point, pollution and other 
environment-degrading consequences of energy projects which is common 
place in the extractive industries, further degrade whatever is left.354 This is 
particularly the situation in the case of Nigeria where the vast majority of 
lands not acquired for mineral activity has become nearly unusable due to 




                                                          
354
 The World Bank, ‘Mining and Environment’ (World Bank, 2011), 1, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/0,,contentMDK:20220969~menuP
K:509392~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336930~isCURL:Y,00.html; A.G.N. Kitula, ‘The 
Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts of Mining on Local Livelihoods in Tanzania: A Case Study 
of Geita District’ (Science Direct, 2006), 8–9, http://commdev.org/content/document/detail/2701/. 
355
 John Vidal, ‘Shell Accepts Liability for Two Oil Spills in Nigeria’, Guardian, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/aug/03/shell-liability-oil-spills-nigeria/print; Groves, 
‘Shell and Society: Securing the Niger Delta?’, chap. 2. 
147 
 
4.2.5 Governance Challenge 
The foregoing raises a major question concerning the role of government. 
That is, it could be argued that virtually every productive human venture 
comes with both upsides and downsides and as a result, the extractive 
industries are no different.356 While that may be correct in theory, it may also 
be asked: What is the primary duty of government if not to solve problems 
such as these? That also is correct. A government which earns revenues 
from mineral development ought to be upfront by instituting measures to 
ensure proper regulation of the sector so as to minimize or reduce incidences 
of unmitigated hazards of energy projects’ operations on vulnerable members 
of society.357 While the above reasoning is in order, the realities on the ground 
in many energy resources producing countries bear a completely different 
story altogether.358 
Similarly, it is the responsibility of government to ensure that appropriate 
measures are in place to maximize the positive gains of energy project 
development by expanding the limits of available opportunities for the benefit 
of all.359 That should be the essence of government.  
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4.2.5.1 Limited Government presence 
But, the reality in most countries is far removed from the ideal situation. 
Governments have not always lived up to their responsibilities, particularly in 
rural areas.360 Hence, any segment of society, host communities in this case, 
that feels disadvantaged.361 Hence, where the opportunities exist, some 
communities tend to resort to a variety of options in trying to make a case for 
themselves.362 The usual options range from violence to non-violent ones.363  
The CDA process is one of the enlightened or sophisticated ways that most 
indigenous and non-indigenous groups have used to negotiate their way 
through problems.364 Although the problems or issues are not new, the 
approach is relatively novel and highly sophisticated in the most part.  
This explains why the CDA process, which began in developed countries, has 
assumed the life it now has. One lesson that could be drawn is that the 
growing acceptance of CDA process may be an admission of the inabilities 
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on the part of governments to appropriately balance their binary role both as 
interested parties in the energy sector and as regulators.365  
Another lesson could be that the CDA process has emerged in recognition of 
the bottom-up approach to governance. As a result, members of society, 
especially those disproportionately affected by a project must be allowed to 
participate in matters which affect their wellbeing. Either way, the CDA 
process has become a well-liked and accepted instrument in managing these 
kinds of issues vis-a-vis the affected communities and the extractive 
industries.366  
Finally, the legal and constitutional changes in Canada and Australia in the 
1980s and the 1990s, leading to the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights 
and interests in relation to their ancestral territories, are also important for the 
current status of the CDA process.367 
 
 4.2.5.2 Social Tension 
Closely linked to the above situations is the social and economic tensions 
created within project impact zones occurring as direct and/or indirect results 
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of resource development activities.368 However, if properly regulated, planned 
and effectively implemented, resource development projects are also able to 
give rise to opportunities both nationally and locally.369  The CDA process 
provides a unique option for a stakeholder approach which benefits from a 
structure of shared concerns and a collective or mutual benefit.370 
 
Section Two: Field Information Analysis 
 
4.3. Background Information 
Section Two is the field information analysis section. It presents and analyses 
information received during field studies conducted in Canada and Australia. 
The information received during the exercises came through interviews, 
access to existing CDAs, documents from governments and extractive 
industry corporations, as well as, through observations of key CDA actors.   
The purpose of embarking on this field studies was to gain a better 
understanding of the community agreement processes in each of the country 
visited. In other words, it is to understand how and why CDAs are negotiated, 
the bases for their negotiation, and the structure and conditions under which 
they are implementation. Furthermore, it was important to understand what 
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the prospects, and more importantly, the challenges of the CDA process were 
in each of these countries.  The aim is to use the lessons learned from such a 
comparative analysis approach to structure the model CDA arrangement for 
Nigeria that will also function as a local governance instrument for strategic 
community development and sustainability of host communities.  
 
4.3.1. Scope of Field Exercise 
The span of this field exercise covers interviews and focused interaction with 
experts. Such experts include:  
i) Lawyers;  
ii) Anthropologists; 
iii) Negotiators;  
iv) Community representative bodies; and  
v) Strategic government institutions.  
 
Also, it involved seeking and gaining access to agreements, documents and 
other material which would otherwise not have been possible to access. The 
most profitable aspect of the field exercise was the opportunity to spend time 
with these key actors in the CDA process, observing and learning from their 
rich experiences. It afforded an opportunity to observe the actors in 
performing their work, to learn firsthand lessons, to ask pertinent questions 
and ultimately to gain helpful perceptions of the various practical issues 




4.3.2. Nature of Field Study 
The field exercise, among other things, took the form of interviews and 
focused discussions. Also, it involved seeking and gaining access to 
agreements, documents and reports, as well as knowledge accessed through 
personal observations.  
The interviews and discussions were conducted with predetermined interview 
questions371 designed to extract specific information from each class of actors 
and stakeholders named above. The questions were designed to extract 
detailed information rather than a “yes” or “no” answer, which was thought to 
be unsuitable for this type of research.  
The feedback received from the interview sessions was used to further enrich 
the author’s knowledge and to gain mastery of the important issues. Also, it 
was used to further buttress or verify data contained in existing, mostly non-
legal, reports commissioned by institutions such as the World Bank, the 
Public Policy Forum, multinational corporations, and academic and research 
bodies.372 
 
4.3.3. Reason for Field Study 
The main reason for choosing this research method was to enhance quality of 
output. The author of this work considers it crucial that this typical and 
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practical piece of work is written from an informed position, taking into 
account the perspectives of the critical stakeholders in the area. The 
importance of firsthand information was critical. It brought a balanced view of 




There are many but largely insignificant limitations associated with the field 
exercise. First, the number of the field study participants who actually 
participated in the interview sessions with respect to Canada was relatively 
smaller than what was initially envisaged. However, the impact of this 
constraint on the quality of this research is insignificant because of the 
availability of high-quality research material available in Canada produced by 
researchers who adopted or applied similar research methodology of 
gathering empirical data from key actors in the CDA process. Similarly, due to 
the constraint of time and budget, it was impossible to reach a wider range of 
interviewees across more states and Territories in the case study 
jurisdictions. Also, at least theoretically, this work could have benefited from 
reviewing more of the existing CDAs. However, it is submitted that the quality 
of this Thesis is not, in any way, diminished by any of these. 
 
4.3.4.1. Size of Field Audience/Interviewees 
For the Australian field exercise, there were at least thirty-five interviewees 
drawn from government departments, the Judiciary, Australian Institute for 
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Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS), Rio Tinto Iron Ore, 
Fountain Court Chambers, and Aboriginal Corporations/Native Title 
Representative Body, and Native Title service providers such as Yamatji 
Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation, NTSCorp Limited, Central Land Council, 
Goldfish Land and Sea Council, and Northern Land Council. These 
institutions are located in Western Australia, the Northern Territory, New 
South Wales and Canberra, Australian Capital Territory.373 
For Canada, where the structure is very different from that of Australia, 
interviewees were drawn from a smaller group. The interviewees were from 
academia, indigenous peoples’ lawyers and representatives of indigenous 
people, as well as, persons with many years of experience in community 
agreement-making. Canadian interviewees and/or participants mainly located 
two Provinces. That is the Provinces of British Columbia and Alberta. 
As indicated earlier, this research could, in theory, have benefited from a 
wider spectrum of audiences or participants, the size of participants were 
deliberately limited to the above sample size due to the constraining influence 
of time and funding. The quality of the interviewees, the breadth, and 
diversities of their experiences in the area of community agreements, 
indigenous peoples’ law and indigenous peoples’ rights more than 
compensated for the modest size of the field exercise participants.  
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 The List of Interview Participants is annexed to this Thesis as Appendix 2 
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4.3.4.2 Number of CDAs Accessed 
It is useful to mention the fact that access to most CDAs limited by 
confidentiality obligations is attached to them. That meant that this author was 
unable (even though not necessary) to study or review all existing CDAs in 
Australia, Canada, or even the Nigerian version, called the GMOUs. 
However, a good number of the existing CDAs in both Canada and Australia 
were accessed and reviewed and knowledge gained from such reviews 
applied in this research. Also, many commentaries are available from 
negotiators and from persons in the know of what those private agreements 
contain. Despite this limitation, more than sixty (60) agreements were 
reviewed for the purposes of this research. And considering that most CDAs 
are similar (except for variations warranted by project’s location or the nature 
of a project), the number of CDAs accessed is considered more than 
sufficient for the analysis that will follow in the next Chapters.  
Also, it is important to emphasize that only publicly available CDAs have been 
expressly referenced in this work. In other words, direct quotations and 
excerpts from individual agreements were drawn only from publicly available 
agreements. The reason lies in the need to satisfy the nondisclosure 







4.3.4.3. Overcoming Initial Suspicion  
Also, there were minor constraints around getting to the right people and 
getting them to agree to share their knowledge. At least initially, it was difficult 
to establish contacts or to get the right people to agree to talk about their 
experiences. While some immediately agreed to assist, many were 
unexpectedly unsure of what to make of the researcher’s interest in the topic 
of this research. Some found it rather curious that someone of this 
researcher’s background would have an interest in a practice that is 
essentially domiciled in countries with a significant population of indigenous 
people or that share a similar political history with countries such as Australia 
and Canada. Importantly, Mr John Southalan of Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal 
Corporation was tremendously helpful in breaking this barrier particularly as it 
related to Australia.  
 
4.4 Key Areas of Interest 
The field exercise that was undertaken sought to gain a better understanding 
of some specific or key aspects of the CDA process. It also sought to 
understand and/or to re-appraise available information in literature through 
personal interviews, discussion or interaction sessions with the different 






4.4.1. CDA Process and Procedure  
The field exercise was designed, among other things, to gain a better 
understanding of the CDA process through a focused interaction with CDA 
practitioners. Gaining the practitioners’ perspective was necessary because 
most of the discussions around this topic have been mostly general in nature 
and have involved an assessment of sundry issues around community 
agreements. However, considering that this research focuses on strategic 
integration of the CDA system into the formal mechanisms of community 
governance, it is then crucial that in addition having an agreement, the 
processes and procedures leading to the execution of a CDA is also 
important. In other words, a best practice approach must emphasis both the 
procedural and the substantive aspects of the CDA process. 
 
4.4.1.1 CDA Process: Australia 
The CDA process in Australia follow two basic routes.374 One is the Mining 
Agreement375 route and the other is the Indigenous Land Use Agreement 
                                                          
374
 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 
Perspective, 16 April 2013. AU Participant No.1 further added that in Western Australia, there is a 
preference for Mining Agreements due to their flexibility. Mining Agreements are also simple 
agreements and easy to conclude. 
375
 Ibid. Mining Agreements are less technical by nature and the State does not have to be involved 
before they can be negotiated. Thus, they are agreements between energy project proponents and 
the native title holders/claimant group in the area concerned. These agreements have the effect of 
being binding only as between the parties thereto. Also, creating a mining agreement would normally 
require that communities meetings are set up and a Working Group is selected. The Working Group 
serves as the negotiating team for its community in negotiations with the proponent. After 
negotiations, the agreement is taken to a community meeting for a clause by clause ratification.  If so 
ratified, the agreement is then signed off by the Working Group in its representative capacity, and 
thus binds the particular community that it represents. 
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(ILUA)376 route. The nature and features of these agreements have been 
exhaustively discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
4.4.1.2 An Area Agreement 
In negotiating community agreements/CDAs in Australia, there is an 
operational decision which is increasingly being made in appropriate cases. 
That decision relates to the question whether to negotiate individual project-
based agreements or to negotiate an Area Agreement.377 As the name 
suggests, an Area Agreement is an agreement for an entire area which may 
be a larger expanse of land, a community or a territory. For this to happen, a 
proponent must possess mineral title over the whole area covered by the 
                                                          
376
 Ibid. ILUAs are complex agreements. Apart from containing community beneficiation components, 
they constitute evidence of native title in favour of the Indigenous communities that negotiated 
them. Also, the State must be involved for ILUAs to be negotiated because of their potential to define 
and determine local boundaries. As a result, it is usually time consuming (takes average 15-20 years 
to conclude) to successfully conclude an ILUA agreement. By the operation of law, ILUAs serve as 
conclusive evidence of native title and binding as against the whole world. So, there is a requirement 
by section 29 of the NTA to issue a notice notifying the classes of people listed in section 29 (2) (any 
group(s) with registered claim over the area) that a ‘project act’ is proposed in relation to the area 
covered by the notice. Any interested group or persons whose interest or claim has been so 
registered on the Register of Claims may then present themselves, or file any objection for the 
purposes of section 28 right to negotiate procedure.  These agreements (ILUAs) also involves series of 
community meetings. Importantly, there is a statutory requirement to register all ILUA agreements. 
However, in practice, community beneficiation component is normally de-coupled from the main 
agreement due to the parties’ desire for confidentiality. An ILUA, once registered confirms the 
registered native title group(s) as the holder(s) of the native title over the area. The legal effect of 
registration is that the agreement binds the whole world including the State and could operate as 
estoppel against subsequent claims over the area to which it relates. Thus, the core purpose of ILUAs 
is to establish once and for all the holder of native title.  Finally, AU Participant No. 1 further observed 
that ‘...I am not sure why Mining Agreements are common in Western Australia but it might be 
because it is simpler to negotiate and the State do not have to be involved...The danger though is 





Area Agreement. Furthermore, the native title holders or claimants must hold 
or have a native title right or claim over that same area. Area Agreements 
have the unique advantage of obviating the need for the same parties to 
negotiate a CDA for each and every project.378 
 
4.4.2 Prescribed Body Corporate (PBC) 
A PBC, on the other hand, is a body corporate appointed by the Federal 
Court or nominated for appointment after a successful application for native 
title. The law is that claims to native title by an indigenous group must be 
established by adducing evidence of a historical connection to the claimed 
territory or area of land.379 Where a finding is made by the Federal Court that 
native title exists over the claimed area, the Court will then make “approved 
determination of native title”.380 The Native Title Act (NTA) requires the Court 
to additionally ask the successful applicant (also known as the common law 
holder of the body rights referred to as native title) whether they hold the 
rights by themselves or to nominate or incorporate a PBC.381 
 
 




 Parliament of Australia, Native Title Act 1993, sec. 86 and 87A. 
380
 Ibid., sec. 13. 
381
 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 
Perspective, 16 April 2013 Community meetings will be convened to take this decision. When this 
decision has been made by the common law holders, the ILUA is then signed. Usually, the State does 
not sign an ILUA with the successful applicant but their PBC. Furthermore, the Court will also 
determine if the PBC would act as trustee of the native title or as agent of the group. 
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4.4.3. Preliminary Agreements 
Mining Agreements and ILUAs are final agreements that are usually 
preceded by some preliminary or initial agreements. They include Heritage 
Protocols/Agreements, and Memoranda of Understanding, MOU. 
  
4.4.3.1 Heritage Protocols 
A Heritage Protocol is an initial agreement entered into in relation to resource 
exploration.382 It deals with Aboriginal heritage. Items that qualify as 
Aboriginal heritage are often recognised and protected by an Act of 
parliament.383 They usually would include sacred sites, burial sites and such 
other places designated as sacred or special in line with the religious and 
cultural beliefs of a given indigenous/Aboriginal community.384  
It is simply an agreement between a proponent and a community which sets 
out the conditions of land access, particularly as it relates to heritage issues 
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 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 
Perspective, 16 April 2013. 
383
 Alberta Culture, ‘Aboriginal Heritage (Alberta)’ (Alberta Provincial Government, 30 December 
2013), http://culture.alberta.ca/heritage/resourcemanagement/aboriginalconsultation/default.aspx; 
The Parliament of Victoria, Australia, Aboriginal Heritage Act, 2006, 
http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/PubStatbook.nsf/f932b66241ecf1b7ca
256e92000e23be/481F4F0770858034CA257169001D1F4A/$FILE/06-016a.pdf; Parliament of 




 Parliament of Western Australia, Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972, sec. 39–43; The Parliament of 
Victoria, Australia, Aboriginal Heritage Act, 24–31; Queensland Parliament, Aboriginal Cultural 
Heritage  Act, 2003, 19–24, http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/ACTS/2003/03AC079.pdf. 
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or articles of cultural, religious or traditional significance.385 If the resource 
activity to which it relates proceeds to development, the Protocol may then be 
reviewed, updated or graduated into a Heritage Agreement and made a 
Schedule to a CDA (Mining Agreement).386 They basically provide that the 
proponent shall be granted access to land subject to stated procedures such 
as procuring heritage surveys and monitoring of the proposed activity.387 
 
4.4.3.2 MOUs 
MOUs are the other kind of pre-CDA agreements. They are usually used to 
set the tone of the relationship. They cover issues such as identification of the 
agreement parties, list of items for negotiation, nomination of a working group 
or the negotiating team for each party, projected negotiation time and funding 
for meetings or negotiations. 
 
4.5 Judicial Determinations 
In both Australia and Canada, the determinations of courts in the exercise of 
their normal statutory functions often affect the CDA process.388 In both 
jurisdictions, the capacity to negotiate CDAs hinges on a special connection 
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 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 






 Parliament of Australia, Native Title Act 1993, sec. 81. 
162 
 
to land.389 This special connection is usually referred to as native title and 
aboriginal rights in Australia and Canada, respectively.390 Thus, judicial 
decisions addressing possession, legal ownership of land or territory will have 
implications regarding with which local group a proponent may validly 
conclude a CDA.  
 
4.5.1. The Federal Court 
The NTA requires proof of native title by any indigenous group or community 
that asserts that right over any part of Australia.391 The Federal Court has 
jurisdiction over any application for native title determination under the ILUA 
process.392 However, there does not necessarily need to be a determination 
by the Federal Court that native title exists before an ILUA can be made.393  
All that is needed is that the native title claim has been recognised and is 
registered on the Register of Native Title Claims (which registration is done by 
the NNTT).394 Thus, once there is that level of recognition of the claimed 
native title rights and interests, an ILUA can be made with that native title 
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 Ibid., sec. 86, 86D. 
390
 Ibid., sec. 10. 
391
 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 
Perspective, 16 April 2013. That is, the NTA requires that the Registrar of Native Title Claims must be 
satisfied that a prima facie evidence exist to support the claim of native title rights and interests 
before accepting the application for the registration of any claim. See sec. 190B for those specific 
requirements of the NTA. 
392
 Ibid. Such a determination by the High Court is otherwise known as “approved determination of 
native title.” See sec.13 (7) of the NTA. 
393





party.395 In other words, ILUAs396 are not contingent upon a holding by the 
Federal Court that native title exists in relation to the land or territory claimed 
by the applicants before it.397  
Furthermore, the current practice is that proponents, for practical reasons, 
may still agree to Mining Agreements even though the indigenous groups 
concerned are unable to prove native title.398 Such Mining Agreements usually 
contain a proviso that the proponent will be released from the contract in the 
case of an overlapping claim from different indigenous groups.399  
 
4.5.2. National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) 
The NTA established the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) and permitted 
States and Territories to establish their own arbitral bodies.400 Arbitral bodies 
have important functions in relation to Section 31(1) (b) or the “right to 
negotiate” (RN) procedure. Some examples of the functions of the NNTT 
                                                          
395
 Ibid. See also the provisions of secs. 24CB (C-D), 24DA, and 24DJ. Before a native title claim can 
qualify for registration on the Register of Native Title Claims, such a claim must satisfy the 
requirements specified in secs.24FE and 190B, respectively. 
396
 Ibid., sec. 253 of the NTA defines an ILUA as an agreement which meets the requirements of 
sections 24BA, 24CA and 24DA. 
397
 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 






 Parliament of Australia, Native Title Act 1993, sec. 27. 
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include that of mediation, and if that fails, to arbitrate disputes arising from the 
following:401 
a.) A challenge against the doing of an act which may affect native title; or  
b.) The conditions which may be attached to the doing of the act which 
may affect native title or conditions attached to obtaining indigenous 
consent and support for a project. 
Where a qualifying future act402 is done by the Commonwealth government, 
the arbitral body that has jurisdiction is the NNTT.403 If the act is done by a 
state or territory government which has established their own arbitral bodies 
pursuant to Section 27, the competent arbitral body is the body created by 
that state or territory.404 But where a state/territory is yet to or fails to establish 
one, the NNTT shall have jurisdiction.405 
The two very important functions406 of arbitral bodies are:  
                                                          
401
 Ibid. See sec.31(3) 
402
 Parliament of Australia, Native Title Act 1993, sec. 28; A future act means an act proposed by the 
State or a private entity to be done on a land which is subject to native title right or claim. It provides 
that a future act is invalid if done before negotiation, objection or appeal. 
403










(i) to mediate among the parties to assist them in obtaining an 
agreement, and if mediation fails, then to determine the dispute; 
and  
(ii) To receive objections filed against a notice for expedited procedure 
given by the state under section 31.  
The jurisdiction of the relevant arbitral body is triggered when an application 
for arbitral proceeding is made by one of the parties to a negotiation where at 
least 6 months has passed since the notice under section 29 was issued and 
parties were unable to obtain an agreement.407  
Similarly, a provision exists in the NTA which materially curtails the powers of 
the arbitral bodies granted under section 27. That limitation is                                                   
that arbitral bodies are prohibited from entertaining disputes pertaining to 
economic benefit demanded or offered by any party to a CDA such as 
financial payments, or profit sharing conditions.408 Under the NTA, arbitral 
bodies’ jurisdiction is restricted to making the following determination:  
(i) That the act must not be done;  
(ii) That the act may be done; or 
(iii) That the act may be done subject to stated conditions.409 
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 Ibid., sec. 35. 
408
 Ibid., sec. 38 (2). 
409
 Ibid., sec. 38 (1). 
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The practical effect of this restraining proviso is that the negotiating or 
bargaining capacity of an indigenous group is often significantly diminished.410  
 
4.5.3 Legal and Policy Underpinning  
One of the important interview questions during the field exercise was one 
that sought to understand:  
(i) If there was an underlying legal and policy foundation for the 
community agreement process in both Australia and Canada; 
(ii) If yes, to study or analyse them to see whether those frameworks 
are fit or adequate to deliver on the basic promises, aspirations or 
expectations regularly anticipated from the CDA process. 
 
4.5.4. Legal and Policy Foundation-Australia 
The finding from the field exercise is that there is no broad legal or policy 
foundation for the CDA process in Australia.411 In fact, most stakeholders 
(that is, community groups and their representatives, industry people and a 
few government officials) in both Australia and Canada are strongly opposed 
                                                          
410
 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 
Perspective, 16 April 2013 AU Participant No.1 observed that ‘...If the offer  is not accepted within 6 
months, the company or the group can then approach the NNTT and ask for a section 35 
determination-saying that we have negotiated in good faith. That is, we made them an offer and 
agreed to sign a Heritage Agreement. The NNTT would often say that the company has complied with 
the requirements of rights to negotiate provisions and we will therefore grant the tenement. Here, 
the native title claim group do not have a lot of leverage...The only leverage that they may have is to 
try to hold back heritage surveys or not participate in the ’heritage surveys unless compensation or 
certain conditions are satisfied...It [NTA] does not actually say you have to enter into a 
comprehensive agreement but only that parties must enter into good faith negotiation". 
411
 Ibid., 1. 
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to any state involvement either in agreement negotiation or in their 
implementation.412 Their main argument is that community agreements are 
private agreements in which the state has no business ‘interfering’.413 These 
stakeholders, while admitting the imperfection of the current CDA approach, 
perceive any attempt at regulating the process as unwarranted state 
interference and unnecessary paternalism.414 The popular view is that 
community groups should be allowed to learn from past failures and wrong 
judgement and to mature over time.415 However, this author argues that the 
CDA process could serve a broader purpose by providing communities 
around the world with a unique window of opportunity for sustainability and 
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 Robyn Sermon, General Manager Communities, Rio Tinto Iron Ore, Industry Perspective to 
Community Agreement: Rio Tinto Experience; AU Participant No.11, Is There a Role for Law in the 
Community Agreement Process Apart from Ancillary Provisions Under the Native Title Act?; AU 
Participant No.14, Regulatory Vacuum in Agreement-making and Implementation in Australia: A 
NTRB Perspective, Face to Face Oral Interview, Dundee, Scotland, 16 April 2014, (Interview Notes File 
with Author). 
413
 Robyn Sermon, General Manager Communities, Rio Tinto Iron Ore, Industry Perspective to 
Community Agreement: Rio Tinto Experience; AU Participant No.14, Regulatory Vacuum in 
Agreement-making and Implementation in Australia: A NTRB Perspective; AU Participant No.11, Is 
There a Role for Law in the Community Agreement Process Apart from Ancillary Provisions Under the 
Native Title Act? 
414
 AU Participant No.14, Regulatory Vacuum in Agreement-making and Implementation in Australia: 
A NTRB Perspective; Robyn Sermon, General Manager Communities, Rio Tinto Iron Ore, Industry 
Perspective to Community Agreement: Rio Tinto Experience; AU Participant No.11, Is There a Role for 
Law in the Community Agreement Process Apart from Ancillary Provisions Under the Native Title Act? 
415
 AU Participant No.11, Is There a Role for Law in the Community Agreement Process Apart from 
Ancillary Provisions Under the Native Title Act?; AU Participant No.14, Regulatory Vacuum in 
Agreement-making and Implementation in Australia: A NTRB Perspective; AU Participant No.15, 
Imperative of Regulatory Guidance to the Community Agreement Process: A Judicial Opinion, Face to 
Face Oral Interview, Perth, Australia, 8 April 2013, (Interview Notes File with Author). 
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strategic development under certain conditions.416 These condition shall be 
outlined in Chapter Six. Thus, the above views expressed by CDA actors, 
however well founded they may be, are insufficient to undermine the many 
potentials inherent in the CDA arrangement. Also, the apparent entrenched 
ideological differences of CDA stakeholders or actors constituting the most 
important reason why there seem to be no serious intent to establish a CDA 
regulatory framework in the case study jurisdictions. 
This conclusion stems from the following facts: 
(i) The Mining Agreement practice is not a legal or policy requirement 
of the NTA;417 
(ii) When the ILUA process option is taken, the main purpose for 
adopting this route is to ensure conclusive legal determination 
                                                          
416
 The Treasury, Australian Government, ‘Taxation of Native Title And Traditional Owner Benefits 




shx. The Mineral Council of Australia’s audited account for 2011-12 show that monies paid under the 
CDA process during the financial year was around $3 billion. If this level of community income is 
invested or administered within a framework of law and policy that focuses on long term 
sustainability and strategic community development, the social and economic fortunes of many 
communities will receive a dramatic improvement. But if the current approach is allowed to 
perpetuate, the danger is that this income stream will not endure forever. 
417
 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 
Perspective, 16 April 2013 In relation to any mineral activities, a State Deed, (an agreement between 
the State and a mining company which is the granting of the tenement) stating that the company has 
complied with all the requirement of extant provisions. Also, this agreement is usually signed after 
the Heritage Agreement or the Mining Agreement has been signed in case of exploration and actual 
mining activity respectively. When all these requirement have been met, the State draws up the deed 
on the grounds that all requirements have been complied with and that the company has negotiated 
in good faith with the relevant claim group. It is necessary to have signed a mining or native title 
agreement under the right to negotiate procedure. 
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(through the Federal Court) of native title.418 It neither  imposes nor 
recommends the practice of  CDA; 
(iii) The “right to negotiate” process of section 35 of NTA is a good faith 
consultation and consent procedure.419 It does not necessarily 
require a mining agreement or any other agreement to be entered 
into with the affected indigenous people.420 
 
4.5.4.1 Framework-backed CDA: Salient Features  
The issue of the existence or otherwise of a legal or policy foundation for the 
CDA or community agreement process is important for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the existence of a broad regulatory framework will reveal the stated 
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 Department of the Premier and Cabinet, Government of Western Australia, ‘Government Business 
Activities and the Extinguishment of Native Title’ (Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 




 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 
Perspective, 16 April 2013. 
420
 Ibid. During the interview sessions in Australia, one of the questions put forward to lawyers and 
Mining Agreements’ negotiators was: What is the legal basis for Mining Agreement negotiation in 
Australia? For clarity, a further question was asked: That is, is it a requirement of law or mere 
engagement practice chosen by the mining industry in Australia? The response was ‘...It is a bit of 
both I would think. Under the NTA, there is a right to negotiate. The Act provides that the proponent 
has to enter into a good faith negotiation with the title group. The practice then emerged that 
comprehensive mining agreement came out of those negotiations. Good faith negotiations are not 
often onerous. It does not mean that the company will spend several months or spend tonnes of 
money in meetings. It can be as little as notifying the group in writing, going to meeting with them, 
talking about heritage, how the land is going to be affected, possible compensation, and making 
offer. If the offer is not accepted within 6 months, the company or the group can then approach the 
NNTT and ask for a section 35 determination.’ That is, ‘that we have negotiated in good faith. We 
made them an offer and agreed to sign a heritage agreement.’ In previous cases, the NNTT has 
always determined that ‘the company has complied with the requirement of right to negotiate 
provisions and we will therefore grant the tenement.’ 
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objectives of the process. Secondly, the framework should outline 
comprehensive guidelines and safeguards to enable the process to deliver on 
the objectives. Thirdly, a framework-based CDA process may set out 
governing structures designed to enable the CDA process to achieve the pre-
determined objectives. Fourthly, the framework must additionally set out lucid 
criteria which must be present for the CDA process to be able to leverage 
government input or assistance. One of the purposes of such leveraging may 
be to deepen, expand or broaden CDA-based opportunities. This will prevent 
or significantly limit the less-than-ideal situation where a private entity 
inadvertently becomes a surrogate government or where project proponents 
are forced to commit themselves beyond the capacity of their project. 
With this combination of legal and policy infrastructure for the CDA process, it 
will be fairly easy or less onerous to test outcomes against initial objects or 
expectations. However, this cannot occur where: (I) a regime merely tacitly 
encourages the practice or (ii) a law simply imposes CDA obligation without 
setting out how those objectives could be realised, or without putting policy 
and institutional structures in place so as to guarantee the right results. 
 
4.5.4.2. Assessing the Australian Regime 
Most of the Australian examples are drawn from Western Australia. The 
reasons are two-fold. First, approximately 85 percent of the entire state is 
subject to either a native title claim or has already received native title 
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determination by the Federal Court.421 Second, Western Australia grants the 
highest number of land and mineral licences and titles in the whole of 
Australia.422  
As stated early in this Chapter, the community agreement process between 
indigenous communities and minerals sector evolved from an industry-led 
effort to foster a more harmonious relationship with landowners and to reduce 
poverty. As a result, there was no legal or policy guidance for the process at 
its commencement which defines the purpose, elements or requirements of 
the process. Nevertheless, this process has evolved over time to become an 
important relationship and/or engagement mechanism between indigenous 
people and the resource extraction industry.  
However, as seen in this Chapter, subsequent regulatory instruments have 
emerged which are not particularly directed at providing governance 
frameworks for the process both jurisdiction but to safeguard and secure the 
interest of the state from being undermined by the CDA process. 
In other words, to streamline the burgeoning influence the agreement making 
process, the Government has introduced legislations and policy document 
mainly to ensure that access to land for development is not impeded and that 
the authority of the state in relation to mineral resources and their exploration 
and production is not hamstringed by the CDA process.   
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Thus, the community agreement practice, though now entrenched, is not a 
legal requirement or a policy of either the Commonwealth government or the 
states, the only exception being the Northern Territory.423 Hence, there is no 
practical reason for providing policy or statutory guidance for a practice that is 
not actively backed by law.424 However, even in relation to Australia and 
Canada, this Thesis argues that some kind of legal and a broader policy 
framework remain a necessity for the following reasons: 
(i) The pervasive nature of community agreements in the extractive 
industries context and their commanding influence in indigenous 
communities; 
(ii) The ever rising cash component of CDAs in the absence of 
standard management systems; 
(iii) The tremendous potential in the CDA process for strategic and 
systematic community development and sustainability if properly 
galvanised.  
 
4.5.4.3. Focus of Current Framework 
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 But, even in the Northern Territory, there is no complete framework that ensures that the 
community agreements process actually delivers anticipated outcomes in a strategic and sustained 
manners. 
424
 Department of the Premier and Cabinet, Government of Western Australia, ‘Government Business 
Activities and the Extinguishment of Native Title’, 5 Note that under section 51 of the NTA, States and 
Territorial Governments are under legal obligation to pay compensation to common law holders for 
‘any loss, diminution, impairments or other effects of the act on their native title rights and interests.’ 
However, this does not necessarily amount to a CDA-specific legal or policy requirement but relates 
to the broad legal principle on compensation for extinguishment or impairment of extant rights or 
interests   . 
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Reading through the various provisions of the mammoth NTA and following 
information from the field exercise, the mission of the legislation was clearly 
and unmistakably articulated, the most important being to stabilize the land 
management system following the impacts of the Mabo (No.2) decision.425 
Furthermore, existing policy measures are also directed towards facilitating 
this central essence of the NTA.426 
Thus, a robust regulatory framework exists in the following areas: 
(i) Funding Native Title Representative Bodies (NTRB, also known as 
Rep Bodies) such as Aboriginal Corporations and Land Councils. 
These bodies receive funding support from the Commonwealth 
Government towards native title determination and other native title 
related dealings with the Government.427 
(ii) ILUA Policy Principles: There is a Commonwealth document known 
as the ILUA Policy Principles.428 It outlines 17 principles which 
“Commonwealth entities” should observe when they negotiate 
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 Parliament of Australia, Native Title Act 1993, pt. 1, see the Preamble to the NTA. 
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 Department of the Premier and Cabinet, Government of Western Australia, ‘Government Business 
Activities and the Extinguishment of Native Title’, 4–10; Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 
Government of Western Australia, ‘Guide to the Government Indigenous Land Use Agreement and 
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 Australian Government, ‘Guidelines for Basic Funding for Prescribed Bodies Corporate (PBCs)’ 
(Commonwealth Government, 2013), 3, 
http://www.nativetitle.org.au/documents/FaHCSIA_PBCBasicSupportGuidelines2013.PDF. 
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 Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Indigenous Land Use Agreement Policy 
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174 
 
ILUAs. As already stated, (although could contain community 
benefit component) ILUA agreements are agreements between 
government and indigenous native title claimants and may: (a) 
relate to areas where native title has, or has not yet been 
determined, and may be used regardless of whether there is a 
native title claim over the area or not; and (b) be a part of a native 
title determination, or it can form a parallel process to a native title 
determination process. 429 
To re-enforce the fact that its focus is not to guide the CDA process, the 
ILUA Policy Principles state that “…The ILUA Principles have been 
designed to meet the needs of Australia Government departments and are 
not intended as a guide for other non-Australian Government stakeholders 
involved in native title negotiations…” 430 
 
(iii) A number of states in Australia have some level of policy 
recommendations on specific aspects of government business that 
has some relevance for the CDA process.431 These policy 
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 See NNTT Webpage, “About Indigenous Land Use Agreements (ILUAs): 
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 Department of the Premier and Cabinet, Government of Western Australia, ‘Government Business 
Activities and the Extinguishment of Native Title’; Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 
Government of Western Australia, ‘Guide to the Government Indigenous Land Use Agreement and 
Standard Heritage Agreements’; Department of the Premier and Cabinet, Government of Western 
Australia, ‘Governance Principles for Native Title Agreements’ (Department of the Premier and 
Cabinet, Government of Western Australia, 18 January 2012), 
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recommendations are generally similar to the ILUA Policy 
Principles. For example, the Government of Western Australia has 
its own policy document known as the “Governance Principles for 
Native Title Agreements.”432 This document makes two policy 
recommendations. That is, to incorporate or nominate PBCs (to act 
in a representative capacity) to deal directly with Government in all 
matters pertaining to the people they represent.433 
 
One of the important lessons of the field exercise relates to the sharp 
ideological divide that exists in Australia and Canada on the usefulness or 
otherwise of the community agreement process.434 The bi-polar ideological 




 Department of the Premier and Cabinet, Government of Western Australia, ‘Governance 
Principles for Native Title Agreements’ Like the ILUA Policy Principles, this policy document relates to 
‘the negotiation and formation of agreements between the State of Western Australia (State) and 
determined native title claimants (both of which will be described in this document as a Native Title 
Party) under which the State agrees to provide certain benefits to the Native Title Party...’ This policy 
principles require the NTP to establish one or more corporate bodies to hold, manage and distribute 
native title benefits, and corporate bodies established should have appropriate corporate governance 
arrangements for responsible and sustainable management of benefits. Also, this document outlined 
8 principles which were derives from the initial two recommendations.  . 
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 Ibid., 3. 
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 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 
Perspective, 16 April 2013. In 1992, the Mabo No.2 decision reversed the historical 
disenfranchisement of Indigenous people in relation to traditional territories. The case affirmed the 
existence of a legal right known as Native Title. It is a legal right in relation to land and water in 
Indigenous territories which can only be held by Indigenous people themselves. However, this was 
not well received by some of the political elite and some segments of the Australian society. The 
main issue was the fear that mining companies and people who acquired lands and landed 
entitlements under the former order were going to lose their rights and interests. The reason was 
because most of the transactions failed the criteria established in that case for valid dealings in 
relation to lands subject to native title. The NTA which immediately followed with the aim of 
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divide is between those who consider the native title435 process a good thing 
for Australia, and those that see it as bad for Australia and bad for 
business.436 The native title process is the regime structure for the right to 
negotiate and indigenous consent framework relevant under the ILUA 
process enshrined in the NTA. The NTA is a Commonwealth legislation 
introduced to create a uniform (with few exceptions) procedure for access, by 
third parties, to indigenous land for development purposes across the 
states.437 However, there are divergent views on the usefulness of the NTA 
because the sentiment of some Australian states is that the NTA tended to 
fetter their liberty to deal with indigenous land matters as they consider 
appropriate.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
providing a way forward-setting out procedures for the exercise and enjoyment of native title. Many 
people consider the native title regime an unnecessary impediment to the mining industry in 
Australia that should be abolished. The import of this call would be to abolish the legal foot-hold 
which entitles Indigenous people to have a say in what happens on their traditional territories. This 
will be tantamount to removing the right to negotiate procedure and making the need for seeking 
and obtaining consent unnecessary. 
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 AU Participant No.2, The Procedural Stages in Community Agreement Process: A Legal Perspective, 
Face to Face Oral Interview, Perth, Australia, 22 April 2013, (Interview Notes File with Author). Native 
title is the cultural rights of Aboriginal people in Australia which cannot be sold or transferred to 
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437
 One of the institutions the States are to establish is a Native Title Tribunal (NTT) for each State. 
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4.5.4.4. Australia’s Northern Territory: A Unique Agreement-Making 
System  
The Northern Territory of Australia has a community agreement process that 
is different from the rest of Australia. The relevant legislation for the Northern 
Territory’s CDA process is the 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights Act (ALRA). This 
legislation has been described as the “strongest piece of Aboriginal land 
rights legislation anywhere in the world”. 438 This is because it provides the 
Traditional Aboriginal Owners with a veto right over any (mining, oil and gas, 
infrastructure, schools, leases, etc.) development on their land.439 This is the 
major difference between the ALRA and the NTA. While the NTA operates 
throughout the rest of Australia and on some land in the Northern Territory, 
the ALRA operates only in the Northern Territory.440 The following are some 
of the salient provisions of the ALRA: 
(i) Consent right: Section 40 of the ALRA stipulates that an 
exploration licence shall not be granted on Aboriginal land unless 
both the Land Council441 and the Northern Territory Minister442 
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 Charlotte Deans, The Community Agreement Procedure in the Northern Territory of Australia, 
Telephone Interview, Dundee, 8 August 2014, (Interview Notes File with Author). 
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 Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act, 1976, sec. 40, 42 (2), 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00123. 
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 Deans, The Community Agreement Procedure in the Northern Territory of Australia., these two 
pieces of legislation are Federal legislations or the enactments of the Commonwealth Government. 
Also, ALRA gives free hold right to land while the NTA does not. 
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 Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act, sec. 42(1). The ALRA split the Northern Territory 
into two and established two Land Councils for each. The two Land Councils are the Central Land 
Council and the Northern Land Council. 
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 Ibid., sec. 42 (8). 
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provide consent or unless the Governor General has, by 
Proclamation declared that the national interest requires that the 
licence be granted.443 In any of these situations, the Land Council 
and the grantee party must have entered into an agreement as to 
the terms and conditions regarding the grant of the title. The Land 
Councils have, as one of their main responsibilities, the duty to 
represent the Aboriginal traditional land owners in their dealings 
with the state or any private entity that proposes to engage in any 
activity on Aboriginal land.444 
(ii) Only one bite at the apple: The ALRA as amended in 1987 
preclude Land Councils from negotiating disjunctive agreements.445 
Disjunctive agreements are where there are separate agreements 
for the different stages of a given project. For instance, an 
exploration agreement would first be negotiated, and subsequently 
followed by a production agreement where a project progresses 
beyond the exploration stage. On the other hand, a conjunctive 
agreement is where all the terms and conditions negotiated at the 
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179 
 
exploration stages apply to the production stage of the same 
project.446 
 
The ALRA was enacted to address the consequences occasioned by Federal 
Court decision in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971), one of the earliest 
Australian case law on indigenous land rights was the. In that case, the 
Yolnga people instituted the action against the Defendant Corporation, the 
holder of a mining lease from the Commonwealth Government. The claimants 
claimed sovereign rights over the land area granted in the lease and sought 
declarations against what they perceived to be interference with their native 
title rights.447 The claim was dismissed on the grounds, inter alia, that the 
doctrine of communal title and communal interest in land was not recognised 
under Australian Law.448 As a result, the ALRA was promulgated for the 
Northern Territory.449  In addition to the two conditions specified above for the 
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 This reason for this amendment is to avoid a situation where consent was provided for exploration 
but refused for production at the time that the grantee would have incurred substantial costs. 
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grant of indigenous consent to proposed project, the Land Council and the 
grantee must enter into an agreement in relation to the terms and conditions 
that will be attached to the licence. After the enactment of the ALRA, most of 
the six states enacted their own versions of land rights statutes450 but the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
relate, see sections 5 & 6. Furthermore, section 21 (1) provides that “the Minister shall, on the 
commencement of this section, by notice published in the Gazette, divide the Northern Territory into 
at least 2 areas and establish an Aboriginal Land Council for each area.” The notice under section 21 
(1) shall set out the name of the Council and the boundaries of the area for which the Council is 
established. More or “new” Aboriginal Land Councils may, upon an application to the Minister by any 
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and persons acting judicially shall take notice of the common seal of a Land Council affixed to a 
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the Land Council with respect to any proposal relating to the use of that land; (v) to negotiate with 
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Aboriginals claiming to have a traditional land claim to an area of land within the area of the Land 
Council in pursuing the claim, in particular, by arranging for legal assistance for them at the expense 
of the Land Council.”; Southalan, “Australia Indigenous-Resource Developments: Martu People v 
Reward Minerals,” p673. 
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broader Australia’s legal system still did not recognise pre-existing indigenous 
rights and interests in land until 1992.451  A landmark decision by the High 
Court of Australia in case popularly known as the Mabo Case452 altered the 
legal landscape of Australia relating to indigenous peoples’ right to their 
ancestral land.453 The Court, while recognising indigenous peoples’ rights to 
hold land and to maintain interest in land (“native title”454 (NT)) pursuant to 
traditional/customary law of indigenous people, made a distinction between 
the Crown’s sovereignty over a territory and the Crown’s ownership of land in 
the territory.455 Furthermore, the court held that NT rights of indigenous 
people survived the acquisition of sovereignty and radical title and is effective 
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8044aa031%20authorised.pdf. The State of Victoria enacted Aboriginal Lands Act 1970 which, inter 
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as against the state and as against the whole world unless the state, in valid 
exercise of its legislative or executive power, extinguishes the title in issue.456  
In particular, the Court per Brennan J. held as follows: 
“If native title survives the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty as, in my view, it 
does…It is sufficient to state that, in my opinion, the common law of Australia 
rejects the notion that, when the Crown acquired sovereignty over territory 
which is now part of Australia it thereby acquired the absolute beneficial 
ownership457 of the land therein, and accepts that the antecedent rights and 
interests in land possessed by the indigenous inhabitants of the territory 
survived the change in sovereignty. Those antecedent rights and interests 
thus constitute a burden on the radical title of the Crown.”458 
Continuing, the Court further held that: 
“…Indeed, it is not possible to admit traditional usufructuary rights without 
admitting a traditional proprietary community title. There may be difficulties of 




 Mabo  & Others v Queensland (No 2) (‘Mabo case’) [1992], 23 HCA However, the proviso is that 
‘...when the tide of history has been washed away any real acknowledgement of traditional law and 
any real observance of traditional custom, the foundation of native title has disappeared...A native 
title which has ceased with the abandoning of laws and customs based on tradition cannot be revived 
for contemporary recognition...Once traditional native title expires, the Crown’s radical title expands 
to a full beneficial title, for then there is no other proprietor than the Crown. It follows that a rights or 
interest possessed as a native title cannot be acquired from an indigenous people by one who, not 
being a member of the indigenous people, does not acknowledge their laws and observe their 
customs; nor can such a right or interest be acquired by a clan, or group or member of the indigenous 
people unless the acquisition is consistent with the laws and customs of that people. Such a right or 





proof of boundaries or of membership of the community or of representatives 
of the community which was in exclusive possession, but those difficulties 
afford no reason for denying the existence of a proprietary community title 
capable of recognition by the common law. That being so, there is no 
impediment to the recognition of individual non-proprietary rights that are 
derived from the community's laws and customs and are dependent on the 
community title. A fortiori, there can be no impediment to the recognition of 
individual proprietary rights.”459  
 
4.6. CDA Cardinal Procedural and Substantive Aspects 
One of the important objectives of the field exercise was to understand: (I) 
how the key aspects of the agreement process functions and (ii) the post-
agreement-stage structure under which CDAs are implemented. As stated 
earlier, a negotiated agreement may be of little value if the post-agreement 
operating structure does not support the realisation of stated objectives. 
 
4.6.1 Funding Agreement Negotiation 
For easy implementation of the NTA, the Commonwealth Government divided 
Australia into 15 zones.460 Indigenous people in each zone were required to 
incorporate or nominate one or more PBCs or Land Councils (otherwise 
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known as NTRBs) as representatives towards the native title process.461 By 
this structure, Governments in Australia deal directly with NTRBs in all 
matters relating to native title.  
Also, the Commonwealth government provides grants to NTRBs for the work 
they do as representatives of indigenous people in relation to native title 
determination and not in relation to CDA advisory services or the actual 
participation in CDA negotiations.462 In other words, the said Commonwealth 
grants exclude funding commercial agreements between indigenous people 
and energy project proponents. As a result, proponents assume funding 
responsibility if they wish to enter into any agreement with native title 
holders.463  
 
4.6.2 Monitoring and Agreement Implementation 
Although not usually treated as such, but monitoring of agreement 
implementation is one of the most critical aspects of the CDA process. No 
matter how good or sophisticated any agreement may be, if the parties fail to 
institute a similarly sophisticated monitoring and implementation mechanism, 
then outcomes are most likely to disappoint expectations. A good CDA 
implementation system must be one which is able to anticipate and articulate 
the necessary factors or elements which can ensure that the promises of a 
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particular agreement are not truncated due to the inability to properly 
implement them. 
There is no one-size-fits-all prescription to agreement implementation. But it 
is necessary to appreciate that it is important to establish a basic operating 
framework to facilitate implementation. Such a framework must: (I) establish a 
competent implementation team; (ii) Designate responsibilities; (iii) ensure the 
existence of the appropriate capacity and training; (IV) Give priority to 
monitoring; and (v) Address funding.  
Monitoring of agreement implementation allows parties to re-evaluate 
progress, performance, expectations, or the responsibilities of each party on 
a continuing basis. And to additionally ensure that necessary improvement 
are made pursuant to, or as dictated by the findings of the re-evaluation 
process. Where this is done, it will promote good agreement implementation, 
governance, and importantly, the overall integrity of the particular contractual 
relations is preserved. 
In addition to these, there are other essential ingredients of a good 
implementation structure for this kind of agreements that must be subjectively 
identified. They include the following: 
(i) Understanding or articulating the various capacity needs of each party and 
ensuring that all material capacity needs are addressed ahead of 
implementation or as they arise; 
186 
 
(ii) A realistic assessment of the possible number of meetings required for a 
competent agreement implementation. Also, the arrangement should be 
flexible enough to meet the exigencies of individual circumstances; 
(iii) Adequate budgetary provision for agreement implementation. This should 
cover expenditure for meetings, transportation, lodging, allowances, 
training, resourcing, and contingencies; 
(iv) Who funds implementation? Nearly all CDAs provide that the proponent 
will fund agreement implementation.464 In the agreements made available 
for this Thesis, funding clauses are usually open ended.465 They leave the 
party with funding responsibility with unguarded discretion to pick and 
choose how funds are released, what to fund and when to make funds 
available.466 This usually has a coercive effect both on the other parties 
and the process itself. Thus, there are often frequent disagreements 
regarding what meetings or training or resourcing is necessary for proper 
                                                          
464
 AU Participant No.9, Features of Agreement Implementation in Western Australia: An 
Implementation Officer’s Perspective; Robyn Sermon, General Manager Communities, Rio Tinto Iron 
Ore, Industry Perspective to Community Agreement: Rio Tinto Experience. 
465
 AU Participant No.9, Features of Agreement Implementation in Western Australia: An 
Implementation Officer’s Perspective The interviewee is the Implementation Officer (IO) responsible 
for the implementation of CDAs in the Pilbara Region, Western Australia. In the course of the 
interview, he made the following observations ‘...At the present, agreement provisions are not 
always very explicit on funding implementation. As a result, proponents insist that the 
implementation committee or group should draw [money] from monetary component of agreement 
to fund implementation.’ Thus, this belies the challenges created by lack of a properly structured CDA 
process where no party should be left to second guess the extent of their responsibilities. Where 
little but very important detail such as this is left hanging in any agreement, agreement outcomes are 





implementation.467 All of these show the low priority that is given to this 
critical aspect of the process by the parties. The level of interest and 
vigour attached to securing agreements (herein referred to as agreement 
syndrome) becomes substantially diluted once an agreement is reached. 
Some of the common effects of this mode of agreement design include 
avoidable disagreements, lack of consensus among implementation 
committee members, and non-availability of funds for necessary or important 
activities.468 All these have often produced poorly implemented agreements. 
To correct this, arrangement should be made in the agreement to set aside or 
dedicate a certain percentage of the project income for implementation. Also, 
it may be necessary to set criteria, the existence of which may trigger things 
like training and any other aspects of capacity needs that may be required. 
Furthermore, the regularity of meetings should, based on point (ii) above, be 
stated in the agreement or in an implementation protocol. This can be 
scheduled periodically, monthly or quarterly, with a proviso to allow for 
committee members to vote towards confirming, rescheduling or cancelling a 
meeting proposal or appointment. 
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4.6.3 Benefit Management Structure 
Another vital but generally absent requirement for a result-oriented CDA 
process relates to the need for an agreement management system, structure 
or mechanism. That is a post-agreement stage management system that 
focuses on a deliberate and coordinated administration of agreement 
benefits.  
A BMS, where present, is concerned with ensuring that the many potentials of 
any agreement are realised, at least substantially. However, based on the 
findings from the field exercise, a workable BMS is generally non-existent in 
most of the agreements.469 As it relates to BMS, the current practice does not 
adequately appreciate that a decent benefit management structure is central 
to the realisation of expected outcomes.470 For instance, the current practice is 
substantially deficient in transparency and accountability.471 Also, it lack 
inherent governance tools necessary to ensure that CDA-based benefits, 
especially the financial component, is not liable to abuse. And as a result of 
that, benefit administration are often beset by challenges such as lack of 
transparency and accountability.472 
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In the face of this vacuum, Rio Tinto Iron Ore Australia is one of the very few 
companies that have shown interest in encouraging community parties to 
their recent agreements to take the issue of giving a formal structure to 
benefit administration seriously. So, they have taken the initiative to now 
insist that benefiting communities across Australia must establish a 
satisfactory BMS before monetary benefits are released.473  
On the basis of its importance to successful outcomes, this Thesis strongly 
views formal benefit administration systems as critical to the CDA process if it 
is to be used as a strategic instrument for local governance in energy project 
context. 
 
4.6.4. Capacity Building  
Capacity shortage is usually a major constraining factor to the maximization 
of CDA-based benefits.474 Lack of capacity often manifests itself in these main 
areas: (I) lack of skills or suitably qualified persons from the benefiting 
community to take up employment and other business opportunities; (ii) 
absence of competent professionals in the area; and (iii) lack of local 
knowledge by strategic officers and employees of proponents. 
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4.6.4.1. Lack of Skilled/Employable People 
From the views expressed by some participants in the field exercise, lack or 
insufficient capacity in the key areas relevant to the extractive industry 
operations including basic business administration skills pose significant 
challenge to how the local people could benefit from resource development 
under the CDA process. Almost all CDAs contain employment and business 
clauses.475 Employment and business clauses usually provide that the 
proponents shall recruit some of their technical or general staff from their host 
communities.476 Also, they normally will stipulate that low or mid-level 
contracting opportunities will be given to members of the benefiting 
communities.477 Nevertheless, the reality in every agreement is that suitably 
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qualified persons are normally in short supply in most cases, resulting in the 
benefiting communities not always able to exercise their rights under CDAs.478 
To address this challenge, support organisation exists in the case study 
jurisdictions especially Australia to help indigenous people to overcome this 
handicap. This is an area where Nigeria could learn lessons by facilitating 
similar arrangements that will provide needed support to host communities in 
the CDA process. The state must, working with agreement parties, initiate 
appropriate training and scholarship measures to ensure that the requisite 
skills are made available ahead or very early in the life of resource projects. 
 
4.6.4.2. Resourcing Capacity Shortage 
Similarly, participants also noted that another major area of capacity shortage 
is in the area of competent personnel. CDA practice is increasingly becoming 
a specialist area and requires sufficiently skill professionals to resource the 
various aspects of the process. Robyn Sermon, General Manager, Rio Tinto 
Iron Ore, identified competency or capacity shortage on the part of resource 
persons/communities advisers’ as a major drawback to positive outcomes.479 
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For, instance, one area where deficiency in resourcing has affected both the 
quality of CDA undertakings and potential outcomes is that of legal drafting. 
Most of the earlier CDAs contained some unenforceable clauses in key areas 
(the problem of best/reasonable endeavour clauses) which, according to 
practitioners interviewed, made implementation onerous in many cases.480  
 
Similarly, Kanaga Dharmananda SC, while emphasizing the need for what he 
called “…minimum conditions of work…” also observed the limiting effect of 
lack of capacity in agreement negotiators, expert advisers, and even 
communities which have to understand the process of negotiations and the 
sanctity of contract.481 Furthermore, he stated that much of the problem 
affecting the CDA process “…arises because people are working in 
darkness…” in terms of what the relevant legal and policy frameworks are.482 
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4.6.4.3. Industry Capacity Gap 
On the other hand, industry employees from outside the project areas usually 
require training to enable them to understand the culture of the area. The 
essence is usually to empower them with the skills and knowledge required to 
engage with their host effectively. This is known as “cultural awareness” 
training.483 This becomes necessary because relationships created under the 
CDA process flourish better under an atmosphere of mutual respect.484 
 
4.6.5. Agreement Governance Mechanism (AGM) 
Governance mechanisms relate to post-agreement schemes established 
either by a statute or inserted within CDAs themselves on how the promises 
or undertakings exchanged by parties are to be executed.485 In other words, 
agreement governance focuses on the management or administration of 
concluded CDAs, and is framed so as to achieve the desired results.  
The perspective of this Thesis is that CDAs may be worthless if unsupported 
by an appropriate governance structures. Suitable governance structures are 
vital to the success or failure of any CDA arrangement. An AGM is not limited 
to a BMS. It covers any governance system or mechanism that regulates or 
guides how important obligations (such as employment, scholarship, training, 
                                                          
483
 AU Participant No.9, Features of Agreement Implementation in Western Australia: An 




 Santiago De Silva, Community Agreement Administration: Practice in New South Wales, Face to 
Face Oral Interview, Sydney, Australia, 21 April 2013, (Interview Notes File with Author). 
194 
 
contracting and business development) within an agreement is implemented. 
Also, it covers how a community’s obligations (for instance, a covenant to 
support or not to oppose a project or any part thereof) are managed to ensure 
fulfilment or to avoid breaches or to provide remedies for a breach.  
It will be generally unhelpful to suggest a one-size-fits-all approach to 
administrating non-cash obligations. A lot will depend on the peculiarities of 
individual projects, the benefiting community, and the outcome expected. 
Historically, parties to CDA arrangements celebrated the fact that agreements 
had been reached.486 The reason for this seems to be that CDAs, where they 
existed, were seen as the gratuitous bequeath of kind-hearted corporations, 
as there was no reason in law or in fact to enter into one. But with judicial 
and/or statutory affirmation of communities’ land rights, the dynamics are 
changing rapidly. As a result, there is a progressive evolution in expectations, 
where mere agreements are no longer considered major achievements 
unless they deliver actual benefits.487  
 
4.6.6. Cash Benefit Management structure 
The current position in Canada and Australia is that community agreements 
are purely private arrangements.488 As a result there is yet to be any statutory 
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prescription on how the various monetary and non-monetary aspects of CDAs 
accruing to communities are to be managed.489 The implication of this is that 
there is no peremptory legal or policy guidance relating to the application of 
financial receipts.490 Communities then have absolute discretion to apply 
CDA-based income to whatever uses appeal to them. Attempts to dictate to 
communities what to do or how to spend their monies is often rejected.491 The 
propriety or otherwise of the current approach constitutes part of an on-going 
debate. 
However, following the conceptual proposition of this Thesis towards 
approaching the CDA process as a tool for local governance, the critical issue 
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will be whether the current approach aids or hinders the demands of 
sustainability and systematic community development. The view taken in this 
work is that a basic governing framework is essential if the CDA process is to 
deliver measurable and consistent outcomes.  
This position is supported by two recent events. First, the emerging approach 
championed by a few companies that include Rio Tinto Iron Ore and very few 
others in Australia. During field exercise, Robyn Sermon, the General 
Manager Communities, explained that her company now insists that the 
community party in any agreement must establish a satisfactory BMS prior to 
the release of the financial component to any agreement in which Rio Tinto is 
a party.492 This approach began as a result of past experiences of 
mismanaged benefits due to capacity issues- most Traditional Owners do not 
yet appreciate the value of internal governance and the importance of 
investing for the future.493 Another reason for this approach of Rio Tinto is that 
their CDA-based commitment from their eighteen mines in 2013 has grown to 
over A$100 million.494 As a result of this measure, eight trusts have been 
established. The trusts are usually in two parts: Direct Benefits Trust (which 
holds about 20% of any receipts) and an Investment Trust (which holds 
80%).495 Direct Trusts take care of any immediate financial needs of the 
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beneficiaries, while the Investment Trust is dedicated to investments, toward 
community sustainability.496 
The second recent event which highlights the clear need for some well stated 
BMS structure is the decision in Weribone on behalf of the Mandandanji 
People v. State of Queensland (2013) FCA 255. The main issue before the 
Federal Court of Queensland was who, among the competing applicants in a 
native title determination case, was the rightful applicant entitled to 
appropriate proceeds from a community agreement.497 The other issue before 
the court was the need to “…secure any or other entitlements that have been 
obtained …Those moneys and entitlements ought [to] be available or 
accounted for to the persons ultimately found to be entitled to the benefits of 
the determination of the native title in the proceedings…”498 
This decision is relevant to this work’s argument for some form of basic 
operating structure for CDA-based receipts and for their administration.  
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Under the NTA, claimant groups to native title determination cases approach 
the Court in a representative capacity.499 That is, they nominate some of their 
members to be applicants. The status of Applicant conferred on the nominees 
the right to represent the claim group in negotiations and to hold communal 
assets and entitlements for and on behalf of the claim group. In the course of 
holding and managing communal assets and entitlements in a non-juridical 
status, and in the absence of a governance framework, abuses of fiduciary 
duties occur. The Court captured some of the risks that such a scenario 
posed to society in the following words: 
“…Yet, the recent evidence has revealed very significant assets and rights of 
the native title claim group are involved, but not subject to proper control. 
Those assets and rights should be protected by the Court for the benefit of 
those who may constitute that group in a final determination of the 
proceedings…That was because the applicant was paralysed by its internal 
divisions and there were no persons outside that group who knew the details 
of dealings that members of the applicant has caused it to have, that were, or 
may have been, in need of protection by orders of the kind made on 1 March 
2013…Unless the Court took the initiative of imposing controls over what has 
now been shown to be the very substantial monetary entitlements and other 
rights that attach to the status of the applicant, as the representative party for 
those ultimately entitled to native title, there was a real risk that no proper 
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person would be able to control and protect those moneys and rights for the 
persons entitled.” 500 
Expectedly, this case generated a hugely diverse interest and triggered 
emotive debates around the community agreement process in Australia.501 To 
some, this case is an affirmation of a long-held view that the CDA process 
lacks transparency and accountability, requiring some action to be taken by 
government to streamline the process.502 To some others, the decision of the 
Court in this case is a testament that the CDA process is an unnecessary clog 
in the wheel of mineral development activities that should be discarded.503 For 
communities and their representatives, the facts of this case represent a 
random cliché that should be expected as part of the teething process for 
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indigenous people as they seek to adjust themselves to the demands of 
modernisation.504 
 Nevertheless, stakeholders to this process must realise that the window of 
opportunity for sustainability and development provided by resources 
development is constrained by time. The window closes once minerals are 
depleted by exploitation. Understandably, it has been argued that “it is unjust 
to make Aboriginal people trade their property rights for basic amenities that 
they are entitled to by virtue of being citizens.”505 While this position may be 
reasonable, it does not remove the reality of the deplorable state that most 
communities live in, and the apparent inability of Governments to invest 
adequately in local communities in many jurisdictions.506 As a result, it will not 
be unreasonable if these communities are encouraged to be forward-looking 
and to take advantage of the opportunities now available to them to secure 
more enduring social and economic status for themselves.507 
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4.6.6.1. Lessons from Australian Field Exercise 
Lessons from the field show that agreement governance is not taken with a 
level of seriousness similar to the one attached to securing an agreement. 
The following statement from Rares J. in the Mandandanji case sufficiently 
buttress this point: “…Yet, the recent evidence has revealed very significant 
assets and rights of the native title claim group are involved, but not subject 
to proper control. Those assets and rights should be protected by the Court 
for the benefit of those who may constitute that group in a final determination 
of these proceedings…Unless the Court took the initiative of imposing 
controls over what has now been shown to be the very substantial monetary 
entitlements and other rights…there was a real risk that no proper person 
would be able to control and protect those moneys and rights of the 
persons entitled.”508  
 From this excerpt, particularly the highlighted portions, and earlier discussion 
on this point, it is clear that the CDA governance mechanism must change 
from (I) proper-person-centeredness to incorporation of juridical persons to 
hold and administer benefits; (ii) such juridical persons must further be made 
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to function under very clear and precise legal frameworks; and (iii) the legal 
framework must identify linkages, options for leveraging CDA opportunities 
and ways in which the state could facilitate implementations and outcomes 
through strategic interventions. 
 
4.6.7. Community Party: How Identified in Australia 
In some ways, the Australian regime provides some direction on how the 
appropriate community for the purpose of a CDA may be identified. For 
instance, the division of the country in 15 zones and requiring each of the 15 
zones to have a NTRB as one of the conditions for initiating a native title 
determination proceeding with the state, is indicative of how to discern or 
narrow the search for the potential right holder or claims group.509 
However, even for established CDA jurisdictions such as Australia or Canada, 
there is no error-proof method to determine which community is the rightful 
community (except in the case of indigenous land which is already subject to 
an ILUA) to negotiate a CDA with a proponent in the case of rival claims to a 
territory. 
Also, the Australian native title system requires a system of proof for any 
claim group which applies to the Federal Court for recognition as the common 
law holder of native title to an area or territory under section 61 of the NTA. 
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Even in the case of competing claims, the Court has jurisdiction to, on the 
balance of evidence, conclusively determine the claim. Where this is the 
case, the commencement of a project is not necessarily impaired. 
Agreements are often negotiated with a proviso for an adjudged holder native 
title to substitute a subsisting but unsuccessful claimant.510  This approach 
seems very reasonable. The issue is always both typical and contentious in 
all jurisdictions and has to be addressed one way or another. The key is to 
ensure that whatever adjudicatory process that is employed determines the 
dispute judicially and judiciously so as to ensure that the interest of justice is 
served and that project activities are not unduly affected. 
 
4.6.8. Scope of CDAs 
The current practice is that parties are free to negotiate over anything that is 
of interest to them.511 Although not always stated, this wide scope must be 
subject to the principle that a party cannot undertake to give or offer what that 
party is not legal entitled to or possess under the law. Whether this approach 
is appropriate or not is still a subject of some debate. But what seems clear is 
that parties generally favour this freedom to negotiate on any subject.  
However, this freedom should normally be limited by the principle that the 
carrying capacity, nature or the size of a project must always delimit what can 
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be demanded or offered. This point is important for emerging CDA practicing 
jurisdiction particularly a developing country such as Nigeria. Government 
presence is particularly limited in rural areas coupled with the issue of 
endemic poverty and lack of opportunity among the people there. These two 
ingredients often conduce to an attitude which predisposes some community 
people to view the CDA arrangement as the solution to all local challenges 
notwithstanding the carrying capacity of a project.  
Additionally, in communities with uneducated or informed population, there 
might a need for guideline to ensure that the compensation or benefit 
package is consistent with sustainable development. 
Furthermore, there is a practice in many Australian states whereby State 
Governments created a template agreement for the ILUA agreements only.512 
However, these template agreements, where they exist, are mere 
recommendations as to scope which lack any force of law.513 
 
4.7. Level of State Involvement 
In Australia, the main role of governments, particularly state governments is 
that of facilitating the consent process under the native title determinations. 
The primary aim is to ensure that mineral activities comply with the legal 
procedures regarding native title and that the CDA process does not 
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unreasonably place a clog on the exercise of mineral title by proponents.  
Thus, to the extent that a state is interested in the orderly determination of 
native title and in freeing up lands for mining and other projects, some state 
governments (e.g. Western Australia) have clear policy documents which 
provide guidelines on their position on how proponents may engage with 
indigenous people in relation to access to land among other things. Also, 
some funding support is sometimes provided through the PBCs to facilitate or 
to assist indigenous to finance their participation in relation to native title 
determination. 
However, despite the issuing of different policy documents by states, for the 
vast majority of private-industry extractives operations, the Government 
largely leaves the arrangements between the parties. 
 The point being made here is that when the state is able or ready to 
appreciate the other utility of the community agreement process, only then will 
it take a more serious interest in post-agreement matters.514 
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4.8. Evaluating Outcomes  
Under the current system, outcomes assessment is difficult in the absence of 
any formal expectations. Mr Michael Meegan, the Principal Legal Officer for 
Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation (YMAC) summarised this point when 
he observed that “…it is difficult to talk about satisfaction of objectives in the 
absence of a formal or broad policy relating to the process…”515  However, 
there are some obvious gains. First, industry-community relations have 
significantly improved.516 Most projects can now proceed without significant 
community opposition. Second, indigenous peoples’ rights are afforded better 
recognition under the CDA process and significant financial benefits now 
accrue to communities for the curtailment or impairment of native title rights.517 
 
4.9. The Canadian CDA Regime  
The scenario for CDA practice in Canada is similar to that of Australia in the 
sense that it is a regime-based system. That is, although the process of 
community agreement-making is not specifically imposed by any statute, 
certain conditions exist which enable their emergence. Those legal conditions 
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include section 35 (1) of the 1982 Canadian Constitution and the legal 
requirement for consultation and accommodation of First Nations.518 
 
4.9.1 The 1982 Constitution Act 
Section 35 (1) provides that: “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal people of Canada are hereby recognised and affirmed.” 
What constitutes aboriginal and treaty rights was not defined in the 
constitution. Therefore, the Courts have had the task of construing the 
meaning of the phrase and some of the important cases have been 
addressed in Chapter Five 
One of the things that has emerged from judicial interpretation of this 
constitutional provision is that there is a duty on the Crown to consult, and 
where necessary, to accommodate the rights and interests of Aboriginal 
people.519 Therefore, whenever any activity is proposed on aboriginal land 
which is likely to affect the rights and interests protected by section 35 (1), the 
Crown must consult and accommodate the affected people.520 
Donovan521 noted that prior to 1982 and shortly after the Constitution came 
into force “…most of the early developments in BC were done on top of 
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indigenous objections or without aboriginal involvement.”522 Companies were 
not prepared to talk to Aboriginal people on anything pertaining to their rights 
nor interest outside their Indian Reserve.523 This led to several litigations 
requiring the courts’ interpretation of the constitution.524 However, that 
situation changed as case law around consultation and accommodation of 
indigenous people developed. In summary, from decided cases, the position 
of the law on this point is that where the state intends to make a decision that 
could affect treaty rights of indigenous people/First Nations (FN), then the 
state must consult and accommodate the affected FNs.525 In other words, the 
courts have decided that consultation and accommodation is a way of 
implementing section 35 (1).526 
Furthermore, in the Halfway River First Nation case, the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia clarified the nature of the duty to consult as follows: “…The 
Crown's duty to consult imposes on it a positive obligation to reasonably 
ensure that aboriginal peoples are provided with all necessary information in 
a timely way so that they have an opportunity to express their interests and 
concerns, and to ensure that their representations are seriously considered 
and, wherever possible, demonstrably integrated into the proposed plan of 
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action...There is a reciprocal duty on aboriginal peoples to express their 
interests and concerns once they have had an opportunity to consider the 
information provided by the Crown, and to consult in good faith by whatever 
means are available to them. They cannot frustrate the consultation process 
by refusing to meet or participate, or by imposing unreasonable 
conditions…”527  
Complying with this legal requirement is often accompanied a separate or 
parallel engagement process through which proponent seek and obtain the 
support of indigenous people which often end in community agreement.  
 
4.9.2 Assessing Canada’s CDA System 
Canada’s CDA process (otherwise known as Impact and Benefit Agreement, 
IBA) is similar to that of Australia in many respects. The IBA process as 
currently practiced is somewhat an unintended consequence of the legal duty 
imposed on the Crown/State to consult and where necessary, to 
accommodate the concerns and interests of FNs. This means that the IBA 
practice is also fraught with the similar problems associated with the absence 
of a CDA specific regulatory framework, and governance structure that 
includes a BMS. 
However, a distinguishing characteristic of Canada’s CDA regime is that it 
has an indirect constitutional connection or foundation.   
 





4.9.2.1 Indigenous People/State Treaty relationship 
Historically, the relationship between Canadian FNs and the settler state has 
been defined by treaties.528 Treaties were concluded between indigenous 
people (who were in de facto control and exercised authority over their 
territory) and the settlers who eventually became colonial emperors.529 The 
relationship was underlined in many historical treaties.530 In particular, several 
treaties where made to enable the settlers access land for farming, trade 
relations and for other purposes.531 This treaty-based relationship has 
continued to exist in some form in different parts of Canada and defines the 
relationship between the modern Canada and her FNs that are seen as the 
historical custodians of the Canadian state.532 Under some of these modern 
treaties, indigenous people have been granted mineral titles533 and fee simple 
rights over territory.534 Thus, it is these historical Treaty-based rights and 
interests that section 35 (1) recognised and affirmed together with rights 
under aboriginal law and custom. 
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4.9.2.2 Concept of Aboriginal Title 
Aboriginal rights are the other rights recognised and affirmed by section 35 
(1) of the Constitution Act. What constitutes an aboriginal right is not codified 
in any law, leading to so many questions under the Canadian legal system as 
what the nature and character of the right are. The case of Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia535 establishes the aboriginal rights and title as a bundle of 
rights which FNs have and arising from traditional law and custom and by 
virtue of their historical connection to Canada.536 Aboriginal rights and title 
under Canadian aboriginal jurisprudence is similar to the native title rights in 
Australia. 
 
4.9.2.3 Case Law 
The Canadian judicial system has been a very essential institution both in the 
interpretation of the meaning, scope and effect, and the application of the 
provision of section 35 (1) of the Constitution and the evolution of the concept 
of consultation and accommodation.537 For instance, the courts, through a 
number of judicial decisions, have developed principles and have laid down 
the basic framework for the duty of consultation and accommodation which is 
the precursor for the IBA process.538 
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So, unlike the Australia’s model of statutory enactment (the NTA), which 
created a number of institutions and responsibilities that have become useful 
to the native title process, Canada’s consultation and accommodation 
process heavily relies on the judicial system both for guidance and for orderly 
evolution. 
 
4.9.2.4 CDA Process: Drivers 
The context of CDA practice in Canada is similar to the Australian process. 
As a result, the issues and challenges are also similar. Two main drivers were 
identified from information received during the field exercise. The first driver 
can be described as the fear of a legal challenge of the state authorisation 
process.539 As stated earlier, case law principles developed through a number 
of cases have determined that the state has a legal duty to consult FNs 
where any proposed decision by government is likely to affected their section 
35 (1) rights.540 The procedural aspect of this duty is, in practice, usually 
delegated to proponents.541  
The second driver is the proponents’ desire to secure certainty for their 
commercial operations. 542 For instance, Bruce McIvor observed that: 
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“In Canada, there is no obligation under the law to make IBAs…There is no 
Federal policy on IBAs…When it comes to the negotiation of IBAs, generally, 
there is no legal obligation on company to negotiate but they run the risk of 
having their projects not approved or face delays because of resistance and 
litigation by indigenous people. Why most companies enter into negotiation 
and hopefully to reach an agreement is to obtain certainty in exchange for 
benefits. The main thing indigenous people give a company is certainty which 
is couched in ‘support clauses’.”543 
However, one significant difference is that some FNs of Canada have treaty-
based rights to self-government which allows them a certain degree of 
autonomy or self-determination.544 As a result, a number of Canadian FNs 
have a reasonably strong self-government and administrative system.545 
 
4.9.2.4.1 Nunavut Territory: An Exception 
There is one exception to the statement made before that there is no legal 
requirement for CDAs in Canada. Nunavut, a northernmost territory in 
Canada which was separated from the Northwest Territory in 1999 has a 
different rule pertaining to indigenous agreements.546 Nunavut is a self-
governing FN enclave established under the 1999 (as amended) Nunavut 
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Act.547 In 1993, the Territory also negotiated a modern Treaty of self-
government known as Nunavut Land Claims Agreement.548 Article 26 of the 
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement provides for Inuit Impact and Benefit 
Agreement (IIBA). The IIBA is mandatory for every project that qualifies as a 
Major Development Project549 proposed on any Nunavut owned land. Article 
26 prescribed minimal guidelines in relation to commencement of IIBA 
negotiation,550 parameters for negotiation,551 dispute resolution by 
arbitration,552 and filing of every negotiated IIBA with the Minister of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development.553 However, the Nunavut IIBA framework 
is not designed as an instrument of local governance and therefore did not 
have the critical elements of an effective CDA process which this work seeks 
to introduce. 
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4.9.2.5 CDA Process in Canada: Challenges 
Based on many practitioners’ perspective, the CDA process faces a number 
of challenges. Firstly, there is a need to provide a (relative) level playing field, 
both during and after negotiation, to ensure that the rights of all FNs 
communities are protected.554 Many of the interview participants observed 
that the current approach views aboriginal issues in terms of risk 
management.555 What this means is that where the community involved is 
poor, or small or is located in very remote areas, and does not have the 
resources to compete, the state or proponents tend to enforce their will 
irrespective of community objections.556 Secondly, the importance of a follow-
through agreement governance structure is relatively novel to the CDA 
process even in Canada.557 Allan Donovan captures the current practice as 
follows: 
“…There are a lot of settlements that have established trusts but I do not 
know of where a company insists on directing management systems. I have 
seen places where FNs favoured the establishment of trust and expressed 
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interest in ensuring that sustainable management of cash benefits both the 
current and future generations. Companies tend to be more interested in 
securing certainty and where they can get that, they are usually not bothered 
about how FNs spend or manage the large pay outs they receive-leaving it to 
the FNs to deal with management concerns…”558  
 
4.9.3 Indian Band and Concept of Community 
The Canadians do not have any specific methodology for identifying 
appropriate communities under the consultation and accommodation process. 
Also, they do not have the Australian styled representatives’ bodies such as 
the PBCs or Land Councils. Principally, the Canadians have approached this 
issue in two ways. First, proponents need to identify and “talk with the right 
people.”559 What this means is that proponents have to depend either on 
intuitions or on the judicial process to determine whom to consult or negotiate 
with. The second option is to consult the Indian Band in charge of the 
concerned area. Indian Bands are recognised under the Indian Act and are 
constituted as self-governing administrative systems for FNs. However, this is 
not without its own challenges because there can be disagreement within the 
Bands.560 
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This Chapter has explored generally, the reasons given in literature in order 
to justify the increasing popularity of CDAs in many jurisdictions. It has 
highlighted specific social, economic and environmental drivers which propel 
the CDA phenomenon. In particular, the drivers identified includes the facts 
that mineral E & P activities often affect communities and land owners more 
significantly, limiting a people’s ability to sustain themselves both socially and 
economically. The CDA process is therefore seen as a collaborative way of 
attempting to reduce or mitigate these consequences. 
Endemic poverty occasioned by the relative lack of access to social and 
economic opportunities, and the absence of governance and adequate 
government presence in those local areas were also identified as important 
drivers. 
Furthermore, this Chapter establishes that CDAs have also emerged due to 
the increasing recognition of community land rights, particularly in jurisdictions 
with indigenous population such as Canada and Australia. Additionally, the 
CDA practice exists in many more countries such as Nigeria and Papua New 
Guinea as an express stipulation of specific legislations.  
Similarly, the second part of this Chapter focused on the comparative analysis 
of the CDA practice in Australia and Canada using the information accessed 
during the field exercises conducted in those countries. The analysis 
established that for the CDA process to function as an instrument of local 
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governance towards a strategic community development and local 
sustainability, the structural gaps identified in this Chapter must be 
addressed. The Chapters following shall be devoted to what must be put in 
place so as to achieve this goal of a strategic, and more purposeful utilisation 
of the CDA process not only in Nigeria but in any other country that desires to 
engage with the process as an instrument of local governance.  
The comparative analysis further established the following: 
 The two case study jurisdictions provided ample test cases for 
understanding the basis and the general framework within which the 
CDA process operates; 
 General understanding of the unique drivers of the CDA processes in 
Canada and Australia was created to provide a platform for 
discussions that will follow in the subsequent Chapters; 
 The prospects and challenges of the current CDA systems were 
discussed using the invaluable insights provided through participants 
to the field exercises; and 
 There are holes in the current CDA process that must be plugged so 
as to unleash the rich potential embedded within the process in a 





Chapter Five: Legal Analysis of Selected 
Community Development Agreements 
 
5.0 Introduction  







This Chapter examines the key provisions from selected CDAs. The 
agreements used are all from the case-study jurisdictions i.e. Canada and 
Australia. The agreements were selected based on two main criteria. First, all 
the agreements examined are agreements from these case-study 
jurisdictions. Despite the best effort made to obtain some MoUs, the Nigerian 
version of a community agreement, this author was unable to obtain any copy 
or to sight any MoU. The second criterion used in selecting CDAs is 
availability. There are many CDAs in existence in these jurisdictions but which 
do not form part of this work. This is because of the inability to access them or 
to disclose their content due to the restricting effect of confidentiality 
provisions.  
This Chapter constitutes the legal analysis part of this work. It 
analyses the following: 
 The legal characterisation of Community Development 
Agreements; 
 The basic or common Components of CDAs; 
 Legal analysis of select clauses from past agreements; and 




Moreover, it is neither practicable nor helpful to analyse all negotiated CDAs 
from these jurisdictions even if they were publicly available, because that is 
unlikely to confer any additional benefit to the work given that most of the 
agreements contain similar clauses.  
Additionally, this Chapter discusses the legal character of CDAs and the 
exact nature of the relationship created through them. Also, this Chapter 
makes the ground-breaking effort to distil and to analyse principles which 
appear to underline the CDA process. The principles are herein referred as 
CDA Principles. 
5.1.1. CDA Principles 
The following principles have been distilled from this research. The principles 
are deduced from the concept and practice of community agreements. Some 
of these principles are both legal and non-legal in nature. 
 
5.1.2 Subsidiarity: Principle of Decentralized Governance  
Implicit in the CDA process is the principle of collective/decentralized 
governance akin or analogous to the subsidiarity principle.  In law, the 
Subsidiarity Principle (SP) is a principle of decentralization of governance and 
is used where  a case is made for some decisions to be taken at the lowest 
possible level, allowing the participation of those most likely to be affected by 
the decisions of others.  In other words, the SP is a “pluralist liberal principle 
that decisions should be made at a level as close as possible to those whom 
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they affect.”561 That is, SP is a preference for a lower level of decision-making 
in which citizens participate in the decision-making process.  The reasoning 
underlying SP seems to be that decisions are most appropriately made and 
executed when they are made closer to the location of the subject matter of 
those decisions and by those who best understand the issues involved. As a 
system of community governance and local development, the ideal of SP is at 
the core of the CDA mechanism. The CDA process provides a structured 
system for localized governance or decision-making within resource project 
context. By this structured system, those that are impacted directly and 
indirectly by resource development activities take an active part in matters 
that affect or could affect their existence and social and economic wellbeing.  
Thus, the CDA process permits affected local communities, landowners and 
holders of interest in land and Aboriginal native title holders to decide their 
own social and economic priorities as well as to provide direction towards 
their own development. Additionally, the CDA process provides a unique 
structure for decision-making on matters relating to the protection of 
communities’ social, environmental, and economic rights and objectives 
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through processes that are open and as closely connected to the affected 
communities as possible.562 
 
5.1.3 Principle of Public Participation 
Another principle embodied in the CDA practice is the principle of public 
participation563 at the level of local communities. Public participation is a legal 
principle frequently used in relation to citizens’ rights to participate in the law-
making process and in their own governance.564 Public participation functions 
around specific principles. Those principles include that of rights and 
responsibilities; access to information and clarity of information; continuity; 
coordination; transparency; openness and consideration, among others.565 
The Core Values of Public Participation are that:566 
 Public participation is based on the belief that those who are affected 
by a decision have a right to be involved in the decision-making 
process. 
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 Public participation includes the promise that the public's contribution 
will influence the decision. 
 Public participation promotes sustainable decisions by recognizing and 
communicating the needs and interests of all participants, including 
decision makers. 
 Public participation seeks out and facilitates the involvement of those 
potentially affected by or interested in a decision. 
 Public participation seeks input from participants in designing how they 
participate. 
 Public participation provides participants with the information they need 
to participate in a meaningful way. 
 Public participation communicates to participants how their input 
affected the decision. 
These core values of public participation have been absorbed into national 
legislations and international/regional treaties.567  In the jurisdictions that this 
work drew its sources and lessons from, public participation is implemented 
through minerals law, heritage protection laws, and land legislations. Public 
participation is a key element in mining and natural resources projects in 
different countries.568  
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Furthermore, the MMA provision on CDAs incorporates this principle of 
community participation in decision-making and in determining the direction of 
their own development. That is, section 116 of the Mining Act requires the 
participation of “Host Communities” likely to be affected by any mining 
project-related activity.569 Similarly, the Mineral laws of PNG and Mongolia 
amongst many other countries, require certain levels of community 
participation in resource development. Thus, public participation is a legal 
principle in these countries, which among other things entails access to 
information, participation in decision-making and access to justice.570 
Furthermore, public participation is a legal principle under the European legal 
system.571 Section 10 of the Lisbon Treaty   provides that “Every citizen shall 
have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall 
be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.” 572  Also, 
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international law pertaining to public participation draws its legal character 
from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,573 the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),574 the Racial Discrimination 
Convention,575 and the ILO Convention576 No.169.577  
Related to the principle of Public participation is the concept of free prior and 
informed consent (FPIC). FPIC is the principle that a people or community 
has the right to give or withhold its consent relating to a proposed project that 
may affect the lands they customarily own, occupy or otherwise use.578   
Under the United Nations declarations on the rights of indigenous Peoples, 
States are required to consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
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peoples concerned through their own representative institutions so as to 
obtain their FPIC prior to the adoption and implementation of legislative and 
administrative measures which could affect them.579 FPIC specifically applies 
to indigenous people while the principle of public particularly is available to 
both indigenous and non-indigenous people. 
 The CDA process is useful as one of the structured mechanisms for 
implementing public participation as well as FPIC within the resource project 
context.580 However, the counter-argument against public participation (as well 
as FPIC) includes the argument that it is ill-equipped to deal with technical 
matters, demands large amounts of time and administrative resources and 
hinders creativity in problem-solving.581                                                   
 
5.1.4 Self-determination  
Legal writers regard self-determination as one of the most contentious 
concept in the international community and international law.582 This work will 
not delve into the contending views but will try to extrapolate the meaning and 
its relevance to the concept of CDAs. Self-determination originated from UN 
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Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960583 (“all peoples have the right to 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development”) and was initially a post-World War I political or 
moral principle but which has transformed into a full legal right being a 
peremptory norm of international law.584 The first limb of self-determination 
relates to the right of a people to freely determine their political status, and is 
well outside the scope of this work and therefore will not be discussed. 
Rather, the focus is on the second limb which bothers on the right to pursue 
economic, social and cultural development as implemented through the CDA 
process. Self-determination is primarily concerned with the ability of an 
individual or a group to make choices free from the bounds of the institutional 
framework within which they live.585 In other words, self-determination 
recognises the right of peoples to choose the system of governance or 
administration that is suitable to their cultural and historical identity and 
secular aspirations.586 The principle of self-determination as used in this work 
refers to internal self-determination, in which a section of the population or a 
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minority group asserts the right to decision-making in peculiar circumstances 
and in limited aspects of their lives.587 
Among indigenous populations in some countries, self-determination is an 
important legal issue.588 In some others, it is a constitutional question.589 On 
the practical consequence of the assertion of self-determination, Michla 
Pomerance notes that self-determination for one group may mean the denial 
of a rival claim.590 That is, that a successful assertion of the right to self-
determination by a group equals a denial of another’s right to self-
determination. Within the CDA context, self-determination may mean the right 
of groups affected by the development of minerals to be involved in the areas 
of project planning and management, risk control and remediation, and 
decision-making in fashioning their own development or how they will benefit 
or be compensated.   
 
5.1.5 Impact and benefit principle 
The impact and benefit principle is a core element underlying the CDAs 
process. The principle is that those whose rights or interests are affected one 
way or another by resource project-related activity should also partake in the 
benefits accruing from that activity. The impact and benefit principle is 
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analogous to the legal principle which states that where there is a right there 
should be a remedy-ubi jus ibi remedium.  
Similarly, the maxim further states that the person whose right has been 
infringed has a right to seek a redress for the wrong through an action before 
a court. Thus, the CDA process recognises infringements and curtailment of 
land rights, temporary surrender of native title rights and interests for resource 
development purposes which must be mitigated and/or adequately 
redressed.591 Community benefit under the CDA process should not be seen 
or be treated as a trade-off for unmitigated rights infraction suffered by a 
community. In other words, the CDA process must be able to provide a 
structured and participatory system both for benefit sharing and for 
prevention, reduction or mitigation of adverse effect of resource projects.592 
5.1.6 Community Sustainability 
Sustainability concerns have been identified earlier in this work as one of the 
primary challenges which have concerned the minds of stakeholders in the 
extractive sector. It is also the conceptual and analytical framework 
underlying this research. One of the principal concerns of this principle relates 
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 ‘Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement-Indigenous Land Use Agreement’, see Recital and 
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to how one can ensure that natural resource development activities continue 
to thrive but with minimal harm to the physical and biophysical resources 
upon which a community’s livelihood depends. The other main concern of 
community sustainability is how a viable alternate source of sustenance for 
adversely impacted   people can be devised.  
 
5.2. Analysis of Selected Clauses 
CDAs generally appear in two forms and are negotiated in contemplation of 
future or existing mineral E & P activities.593 CDAs may relate to a specific 
mineral activity between a resource developer and a particular community 
group which possesses title or other interest in the land on which the stated 
act occurs or is expected to occur in the future.594  As a result, one or more 
resource developers could each negotiate a CDA relating to a specific 
resource exploration or development activity with one or more community 
groups exercising land rights in specific land areas.595  
Alternatively, a single agreement could be negotiated relating to present and 
future resource development activity by one resource developer over a large 
                                                          
593
 Rio Tinto Iron Ore and Pilbara Traditional Owners, ‘An Introduction to the Local Agreement 
between Your Native Title Group and Rio TInto Iron Ore’ (Rio Tinto Iron Ore/Yamatji Marlpa 
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area of land owned by one or more community groups.596 Here, the stated act 
or activity is not a particular or named resource project, but a set of present 
and future acts done or to be done within a defined land area by one resource 
developer. This type of CDA is known as an Area Agreement.597 This is the 
case where a resource developer obtains a mineral exploration and 
exploitation lease to explore and mine minerals over a large area of land and 
opts to negotiate an Area Agreement which covers all present and future 
resource development activities within the lease area. 
 
5.2.1. Parties to CDAs 
Every CDA commences by identifying the parties thereto and stating their 
respective interests. A resource developer is always easily identified because 
of its character as a pre-existing incorporated company. On the other hand, 
as discussed above, identifying the community party to an agreement is 
generally problematic due to the absence of prior distinct legal 
characterisation other than being an aggregation of people within a particular 
geographical location.598 This point has been comprehensively addressed in 
Chapter Four.  
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Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that the question: ‘who is the 
community’ in relation to a given agreement is always a germane question? 
And as already noted, there is no straightforward answer to this question.  
From all of the agreements examined for this Thesis, the common approach 
is to use heads of families to act for themselves and for the entire clan or 
community.599 An alternative approach used is establishing a corporate to 
represent the entire community.600 For example, the parties to the indigenous 
Land Use Agreement (ILUA) for the Argyle Diamond Mine project are Argyle 
Diamonds Limited and Argyle Diamond Mines Pty Limited; the Traditional 
Owners; and the Kimberley Land Council Aboriginal Corporation.601 The 
Traditional Owners (TOs) are the seven indigenous groups represented by 
named individuals that are parties for themselves and on behalf of their 
specific families. The common denominator connecting the TOs to the 
agreement is that they and their respective indigenous groups have 
Traditional Rights in the “Agreement Area”.602  




 The Honourable John Rau, Attorney-General et al., ‘Adnyamathanha Body Corporate Indigenous 
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Furthermore, some agreements additionally make provision for warranties in 
which the TOs assure the resource developer that the signatories to the CDA 
are the proper party and that nobody has been left out.603 Other parties to the 
agreement are entitled to rely on such a warranty. For example, Clause 15.1 
of the Argyle Diamond Mine ILUA provides that: 
“The TOs who sign this agreement represent and warrant that the TOs: 
(a) have reviewed the Ethnography and agree that the Ethnography 
correctly identifies: 
(1) all of the people who hold Traditional Rights in the 
Agreement Area; and 
(2) the nature and extent of those Traditional Rights 
(b) are the only people who hold Traditional Rights in relation to the 
Agreement Area under traditional Aboriginal laws and customs; 
(c) have authorised the TOs who sign this agreement to enter into this 
agreement on behalf of all of the TOs and that the TOs have the full 
power and authority to enter into and perform the TOs’ obligations 
under this agreement; 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and how the TOs will get country back. For instance, clause 2 of the Argyle ILUA states that ‘Here 
Argyle says to the Traditional Owners: ’We recognise you are the people for this country, and we 
recognise your rights‘. The Traditional Owners say to Argyle: ’We recognise your rights that come 
from the whitefella law‘. And the Traditional Owners say to each other: ’We all have rights in this 
country–we can’t push anyone out". 
603
 ‘Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement-Indigenous Land Use Agreement’ Clause 15. 
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(d) have received full and proper legal and financial advice during the 
Agreement Making Process and about the content and effect of this 
agreement; 
(e) are making this agreement on the basis of an informed 
understanding of its contents; 
(f) have authorised the TO Applicants as the applications to make the 
TO Claim and pursue the Consent Determination; and 
(g) Have authorised the KLC to do all things necessary to facilitate the 
making of the TO Claim and the Consent Determination.” 
Furthermore, this part of the CDA may contain a statement of warranty by the 
relevant local groups that they have the authority to speak for those who hold 
or may have native title or other forms of traditional rights in respect of the 
agreement area.604 Additionally, the community party may include in the 
warranty clause, a declaration that the community’s decision to support the 
proposed project was taken in accordance with their customary procedure for 
decision-making.605 
Such a warranty highlights the difficulty that often exists in formal 
relationships with communities where traditional rights of possession, use or 
other interests connected therewith are sometimes contested by rival 
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community groups. This situation is found to exist in all the jurisdictions 
relevant to this work- Australia, Canada and Nigeria.  
 
5.2.2 Definition of Object Clause  
A statement of the object of an agreement constitutes one of the relevant 
parts of modern CDAs.606 For instance, clause 3.1 of Argyle Diamond ILUA607 
provides as follows: 
 “Argyle and TOs agree that this agreement is a strong agreement that 
respects and protects the TOs’ interests in the Agreement Area, and provides 
substantial benefits to the TOs and Aboriginal people in the East Kimberly 
region. Argyle and the TOs agree that it is in the best interests of the parties if 
Argyle is able to continue to operate a commercially sound diamond mining 
business.”  
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 The Honourable Michael Atkinson, The Attorney-General et al., ‘Petroleum Conjunctive Indigenous 
Land Use Agreement’ (ATNS.NET.AU, 16 February 2007), 
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Good Neighbour Agreement. This was called the signatories payments…Here Argyle says: When we 
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agreement with all the right people …Everyone agrees that all these old arrangements, the Good 
Neighbour Agreement, the Good Neighbour Programme, and the Signatories Payments should finish 
up. This new agreement will take their place.”  
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The phrases “strong agreement that respects and protects” and “substantial 
benefits” are important for construing the agreement, and for understanding 
the peculiar context in which this agreement was negotiated. Although the 
Argyle Diamond ILUA was executed in 2004, the mine to which that 
agreement relates has a long and conflicted history. The Argyle Diamond 
Mine project started in 1980, with the first CDA known as the Good Neighbour 
Agreement.608 The Good Neighbour Agreement was negotiated at a time 
when Australian Aboriginals were in a more disadvantageous position, in that 
indigenous rights to their traditional land were not recognised then. Also, the 
extractive industry relationship with indigenous people was very poor and 
conflicted. These two factors adversely affected both the quality of the terms 
agreed and the commitment of the parties to the performance of the said 
agreement. Kim Doohan, in her book, describes the background to the Good 
Neighbour Agreement as follows:  
“There was no indication that at the time of the making of the Good 
Neighbour Agreement that the Company (Conzinc Riotinto Australia now 
RioTinto) was prepared to recognise indigenous land ownership. Rather, the 
decision to make this agreement was taken for pragmatic reasons. That is, it 
appeared to be a sound corporate decision which also broke the apparent 
stalemate with Aboriginal people connected to the mine site. The Good 
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Neighbour Agreement was made in the belief that the action would secure the 
mine in the face of indigenous and non-indigenous protest.”609  
As a result of these factors, the Argyle Diamond Mine project faced incessant 
conflict from aggrieved indigenous people until 2001, when a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) was signed to re-state negotiation between Rio Tinto 
and the affected indigenous groups.610  Thus, the 2004 ILUA was negotiated 
to resolve historical problems with the Good Neighbour Agreement and to 
begin a new relationship based on the recognition of the Kimberley 
indigenous peoples’ ownership rights according to traditional Aboriginal law 
and customs. 
Thus, Clause 2 of the Argyle Diamond Mine ILUA provides that: 
“2.1 Argyle recognises: (a) that the TOs are the traditional owners of 
the Agreement Area in accordance with traditional Aboriginal law and 
customs; and (b) the TOs Traditional Rights.” 
“2.2 The TOs recognise that: (a) the Granted Argyle Interests, the 
Diamond Act and the Diamond Agreement are valid, effective and 
enforceable; and (b) Argyle may exercise all rights conferred and 
comply with all obligations imposed under the Granted Argyle 
Interests, the Diamond Act and the Diamond Agreement subject only 
to the provisions of this agreement and the law.”  
                                                          
609
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In another agreement611 involving the Western Australian government, the 
recital states that the parties entered into the agreements in order to: 
“(I) give express to the native title rights and interests of the Yawuru 
Community;612 
(ii) Provide for the protection of Aboriginal heritage in particular Yawuru 
Aboriginal heritage;613  
(iv) provide a package to Yawuru RNTBC in consideration of and as full and 
final compensation for its agreement to the future acts contemplated by this 
Agreement and the Body Corporate Agreement and surrender of native title 
and in respect of impairment and extinguishment of native title;614 
(vi) Facilitate the future development of land in Broome for residential, 
infrastructural and industrial purposes, by both the Yawuru Community and by 
the state;615 
(vii) Establish conservation and marine parks in and around Broome…”616 
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5.2.3 Consent and Support Clause 
 
The purpose of a consent and support clause in a CDA is to allow the 
relevant community to give its consent and support for a project or activity to 
which an agreement relates.617 The Argyle Diamond Mine ILUA provided for 
consent to, and support for, existing or proposed operations, and for future 
mining and exploration activities.618  
In the case of an Area Agreement, the consent and support clause is usually 
vital for the resource developer. This is because it secures consent to and 
support for not only the existing operations but for future explorations, and the 
eventual development of yet-to-be-discovered mineral deposits within the 
area covered by the agreement.619 The consent and support clause for the 
Argyle Diamond Mine project states that the parties’ consent to, support, and 
undertake not to object to Argyle conducting the six activities listed as “the 
Argyle Operations.”620 Also, the parties consented to, supported and 
undertook not to object to the grant or renewal of each Argyle interest 
necessary or incidental to the conduct of the Argyle Operations.621 
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Additionally, the agreement further stipulates that the TOs agree to do all 
things, including executing any documents necessary to give effect to the 
obligation to give consent and support.622  
Furthermore, the community parties’ obligation to give consent to and support 
future mining activities and future exploration activities is made subject to 
Argyle’s compliance with (a) the law; (b) the ILUA agreement; and (c) “those 
Management Plans (or parts thereof) which relate to Future Mining Activities 
and Future Exploration Activities.”623 A sample consent and support clause is 
as follows: 
“The signatories agree that, if requested to do so by the Company, 
they will indicate to the Western Australian Museum and to interested 
Governmental authorities that they have no objection to the 
Company’s tenements nor to any possible subsequent mining 
development that may be undertaken within the Company’s tenements 
by the Company at a later date.”624 
Furthermore, in order to avoid future breach of the agreement by any 
community party, there is usually an indemnity provision which assigns 
liability for any such breach. For example, in one agreement, it was provided 
that: 
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“The Local Aboriginal Groups jointly and severally agree to indemnify 
the Exploration Company in respect of losses, expenses, damages or 
costs reasonably arising from:  
(a) any action, claim or proceeding by any member of the Local 
Aboriginal Groups which is inconsistent with any covenant or 
obligation incumbent upon the Local Aboriginal Groups pursuant to 
the provisions of this Agreement; 
(b) any dispute between any members of the Local Aboriginal Groups 
relating to the subject matter of this Agreement or the benefits 
provided by the Exploration Company under this Agreement; 
(c) …; 
(d)  Any person, other than the Local Aboriginal Groups: 
I. establishing that the he or she has Native Title in relation to 
any part of the Application Area and that he or she is entitled 
to payment of compensation from the Exploration Company 
directly or indirectly, whether under the Native Title Act, 
other legislation or at law as a consequence of his or her 




II. Establishing that he or she is entitled to damages against the 
Exploration Company on the basis of any derogation of the 
rights of the native title holder.”625  
 
5.2.4 Aboriginal Heritage Protection Clause 
The protection of Aboriginal heritage-religious, cultural and sacred sites is 
important for indigenous and religiously or culturally-sensitive non-indigenous 
communities.626 The heritage protection clauses typically identify sites 
considered by the indigenous people concerned as sacred, sensitive or of 
deep cultural or religious significance and makes arrangements for their 
protection if those places are likely to be affected by a contemplated 
project.627 
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Also, such clauses stipulate the procedure (the active participation of the 
relevant community would normally be required) which they must or should 
be followed towards heritage protection.628 Where present, heritage protection 
clauses are usually supplementary to heritage protection legislations.629 
Heritage laws make general provisions for heritage protection from the impact 
of mineral development.630 Also, they provide guidelines for the relocation, or 
the destruction of Aboriginal heritage and sites, where extremely necessary.631 
For example, a heritage protection clause would provide that: 
 “If at any time, in the course of carrying out the Project, the Exploration 
Company identifies any significant archaeological or historical site or object, 
or any site or object which the Exploration Company has reason to suspect is 
a Sacred Site or Sacred Object (not being a Sacred Site or Sacred Object 
previously advised to the Exploration Company), then it shall promptly report 
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the whereabouts of such Site or Object to the LAG Representative and 
comply with the requirements of this Clause 7.” 632       
 
5.2.5. Transfer and Novation Clause 
A transfer clause addresses whether or not all or any part of the obligations or 
interests of a party is transferable to third parties.633  Where it is allowed, the 
transfer clause prescribes the procedure to be followed by anyone desiring to 
transfer interests or obligations to a third party. A transfer of CDA-based 
obligations may be sought by a developer where it sells all or part of its 
operations to a third party. The resource developer is released from all its 
obligations where all of its interests are transferred. Conversely, communities 
may also seek to transfer their interests, rights and some of their obligations 
to a third party. For instance, there is a requirement in the NTA for the 
establishment of Prescribed Bodies Corporate (PBC) by an indigenous native 
title claimants in Australia. When established, the PBC may then hold the 
native title rights asserted by the indigenous community that they represent.  
Similarly, novation is a legal term reserved for situations where one 
agreement replaces another. That is, novation is concerned with the 
substitution of a new contract for an old one.634 This is usually the case where 
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a final agreement supersedes an earlier one such as a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) and Framework Agreements. In the case of the Argyle 
Diamond Mine, after the 1980 Good Neighbour Agreement failed, relations 
between the successor company (Argyle Diamond Mine Limited) and the TOs 
were reactivated by MoU. The MoU was superseded by the Framework 
Agreement, which remained in force until the ILUA was executed by the 
parties. 
 
5.2.6. Community Engagement Clause 
Clauses on community engagement are often the mirror through which the 
long term relationship between a resource developer and the host community 
may be understood. In other words, it reveals the level of importance 
attached to building and sustaining mutually beneficial relationships by the 
agreement parties. Generally, parties to CDA will normally covenant to make 
reasonable effort to manage disputes whenever they arise by making sure 
that channels of communication remain open for parties to air concerns or 
grievances.635 The flow of information and a genuine commitment to learning 
and appreciating alternate perspectives, in an atmosphere in which an 
aggrieved party is readily given audience is crucial to a constructive 
engagement.636 A healthy relationship created and sustained by proactive 
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and constructive engagement between agreement parties is an invaluable 
capital, especially in times of dispute.637 This is one of the core objectives of 
CDAs and a goal which the parties to those agreements must strive towards 
at every stage of their relationship. The following are sample community 
engagement clauses: 
“The parties agree that there will be regular community meetings on 
Country to keep the TOs and local Aboriginal communities fully 
informed of the process, nature and progress of Agreement Making 
towards the ILUA…”638 
Also, the preamble to the Good Neighbour Agreement provides that: 
“The Signatories have approached the Company with a view to 
establishing and maintaining cordial and friendly relationships and to 
avoid the possibility of frictions that might occur through 
misunderstanding on both sides.”639 
Furthermore, clause 3 provides that: 
“The Company and Signatories acknowledge that the proximity of the 
Company’s tenements to areas of traditional interest to the Signatories 
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warrant the establishment of regular communication between them and 
to this effect both parties agree that they will establish such 
communication on a regular basis.”640 
The need for sustained engagement between a mineral-mining leaseholder 
and the communities within and around the lease area is the most important 
aspect of all CDAs. All other components of CDAs depend on it.641 The 
expectation that the community should benefit from resource development 
can only be achieved if the proposed project went ahead and is allowed to 
succeed.642  This success will be achieved where the particular resource 
extraction project receives every necessary support, especially community 
consent and support in a way that ensures that all reasonable commercial 
and operational expectations of the resource developer are met.643 Hence, 
the seriousness with which this aspect of the relationship is articulated in an 
agreement and vigorously implemented by parties may determine the extent 
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5.2.7 Dispute Resolution Clause 
“…If we have an argument, first we will try and sort it out ourselves. If 
this doesn’t work, then together we will ask a mediator to help us –
someone separate from both sides. With some arguments we have to 
ask someone to judge which way to go. This person is called an 
arbitrator. If the mediator or the arbitrator can’t sort it out, and we still 
have argument, then we can go to court.”644     
The above quote, written in non-technical language, summarises the dispute 
resolution procedure in the Argyle Diamond Mine ILUA. The dispute 
resolution clause for this agreement stipulates a stepped grievance ventilation 
procedure which must be followed in resolving disputes between the 
parties.645 An aggrieved party must give written notice setting out the grounds 
for the dispute, and must give the other party an opportunity to seek amicable 
settlement of the dispute before requesting mediation or arbitration.646 Also, 
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5.2.8 Governing law and jurisdiction Clause 
The governing law and jurisdiction clause stipulates the law governing the 
agreement to which it relates. The clause will typically provide that the parties 
to an agreement agree to irrevocably submit to the governing law and to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts in the named jurisdiction.648 
 
5.2.9 Confidentiality Clause 
The purpose of confidentiality clauses is obviously to ensure that access to 
an agreement is restricted so that its content is not open to the public.649  A 
study of all the agreements examined for this work shows that confidentiality 
clauses are used in CDAs to achieve three objectives: (I) to specify that the 
content of the entire agreement is subject to confidentiality; (ii) to specify that 
only specific portions of the entire agreement will be kept confidentiality; or 
(iii) to specify that no part of the agreement is confidential.650 The main part of 
the Argyle Diamond Mine LIUA is not confidential, although the three 
                                                          
648
 Ibid. Clause 18.5. 
649
 Kimberley Land Council (KLC) et al., ‘Yawuru Area Agreement Indigenous Land Use Agreement- 
Broome’, clause 17. This agreement provides that no part of the agreement is confidential. From 
knowledge of many agreements entered in Australia in which the State is a party, it would seem that 
the general rule is that the State tends to lean towards making the agreement public. 
650
 The Honourable John Rau, Attorney-General et al., ‘Petroleum Conjunctive Indigenous Land Use 
Agreement’, clause 16. 
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agreements651 which preceded it were subject to confidentiality 
arrangements.652 The relevant clauses are as follows: 
Clause 18.21 of the Argyle Diamond Mine ILUA provides that: 
“Subject to clause 18.22, the existence and terms of this agreement 
are not subject to any confidentiality provisions.”   
Clause 18.22 further provides that: 
“The parties agree that the Genealogies and Schedule 20653 are 
confidential and that they will not disclose the Genealogies or 
                                                          
651
 They are The Good Neighbour Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding and the 
Framework Agreement.  
652
 Argyle Diamonds Mine Pty Limited, Perpetual Trustees (WA) and their Successors, and Kimberley 
Land Council Aboriginal Corporation, “Argyle Diamonds Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)” 
(Freehills Perth, September 27, 2001), 
http://www.atns.net.au/objects/Agreements/Argyle%20ILUA.pdf, p61 Clause 10.1 provides that 
“Both parties agree that the negotiations will be conducted in private and they will not discuss any 
information disclosed during the negotiations with any member of the public unless both parties 
agree in writing or unless required in writing or unless required by law to make the disclosure.”  But 
clause 10.2 permits disclosures to the State and statutory agencies, information relating to the 
“existence of these negotiations” subject to the consent of the other parties; Argyle Diamonds Mine 
Pty Limited and Kimberley Land Council Aboriginal Corporation (KLC), “Framework Agreement” 
(Freehills Perth, June 20, 2003), http://www.atns.net.au/objects/Agreements/Argyle%20ILUA.pdf, 
p79 Clause 8.1 provides that “All Parties agree that the agreement making  process will be conducted 
in private and they will not discuss any information disclosed during the agreement making process 
with any member of the public unless all parties agree in writing or unless required by law to make 
the disclosure...”; CRA Exploration Pty Limited and John Toby, George Dixon, Evelyn Hall and Peggy 
Patrick (“the Signatories”), members of the Gidja and Mirrwung tribes of the Kimberly region, “Good 
Neighbour Agreement” (Freehills Perth, July 1980), p145, 
http://www.atns.net.au/objects/Agreements/Argyle%20ILUA.pdf, This agreement made no clear 
provisions on confidentiality. The reason for this is not clear but the age of the agreement and the 
legal status of Indigenous people’s connection to their ancestral land prior to this agreement may 
provide some explanations for the lack of a confidentiality clause.  
653
 Schedule 20 is simply referred to in the list of supporting documents to the Argyle Diamond Mine 
ILUA as “confidentiality provisions”. The content of Schedule 20 is clearly confidential and not 
inferable from the provisions of the main agreement. 
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Schedules 20, or any information in the Genealogies or Schedules 20 
to any person, unless that disclosure or that information: 
(a) is at the material time in the public domain; 
(b) is required by the law to be communicated to a person who is 
authorised by law to receive it; 
(c) is necessarily made to a court, or mediator or to an arbitrator or to 
legal counsel in the course of proceedings; 
(d) is required to be disclosed to any Government Agency; 
(e) is to a servant, agent or contractor of the party, when that 
disclosure is reasonably necessary for the conduct, implementation 
and/or enforcement of this agreement or the Argyle Diamond Mine 
Participation Agreement- Management Plan Agreement; 
(f) with the exception of the Genealogies which remain confidential, is 
to a member of a Local Aboriginal Community; 
(g) was consented to in writing by the other party; or  
(h) Is required to be disclosed to a stock exchange.” 
The length of the exceptions to the confidentiality provision in Clause 18.22 is 
an indication of the clear intention to keep these portions of the Argyle 
Diamond Mine ILUA completely confidential. For example, members of the 
seven Local Aboriginal Communities (other than their representatives) who 
are party to this agreement do not have access to the Genealogies. Also, 
clause 18.22 (d) qualifies the circumstances under which a government 
agency in Western Australia may be allowed access to the confidential 
252 
 
portions of the agreements. In other words, unless required by law, the 
Government of Western Australia may be denied access to the confidential 
parts by the parties.  
 
5.2.10. Cessation of and Frustration of Agreement Clause  
A cessation clause stipulates when an agreement comes to an end or 
terminates. Parties are released from all obligations upon the occurrence of 
the event specified in the cessation clause as the event which brings the 
agreement to an end. In CDAs, the common operating events are: (I) when 
an existing agreement is superseded by a new one,654 (ii) when the activity to 
which it relates terminates, and (iii) a breach or repudiation by one of the 
parties. 
A CDA may be frustrated when an event specified in the agreement as a 
vitiating event occurs or where the subject matter of the agreement (in this 
case, a proposed project on the basis of which the CDA was agreed) is 
brought to an end.655 For instance, the proviso to clause 5 of the Good 
Neighbour Agreement provides that: 
“…Provided that if at any time because of the action of any third party 
the Company’s ability to operate within the Company’s tenements is 
                                                          
654
 ‘Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement-Indigenous Land Use Agreement’ clause 4.4. 
655
 CRA Exploration Pty Limited and John Toby, George Dixon, Evelyn Hall and Peggy Patrick (‘the 
Signatories’), members of the Gidja and Mirrwung tribes of the Kimberly region, ‘Good Neighbour 
Agreement’ clause 8. 
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restricted in whole or in part, or is prevented or curtailed, the 
Company’s obligation to provide assistance under this clause may be 
abated or adjusted as the Company shall reasonably and in good faith 
determine.” 
However, from the provisions of other CDAs it may be noted that it is not a 
general rule that a breach or repudiation of the agreement by one party 
nullifies or renders the agreement voidable. In one template agreement in 
South Australia relating to the exploration for and production of petroleum, it 
was provided that: 
 “subject to clauses 2.2 (on 5 yearly review of the agreement) and 6.3 
(a) (on removal of the agreement from ILUA register), no party is entitled to 
terminate this framework ILUA for any reason, including by reason of any 
breach or repudiation of this framework ILUA by any other party.”656  
A provision of this kind may be useful in perpetuating or ensuring the 
furtherance of the object of the agreement, but it can equally prove 
problematic if any of the parties decides to take advantage of it to violate 
express obligations. Nevertheless, as long as it does not preclude legal 
proceedings, an aggrieved party may then seek legal action for specific 
performance or for damages.  
                                                          
656
 The Honourable Attorney-General of South Australia et al., ‘(Native Title Claim Group) Minerals 





5.2.11. Land Management, Rehabilitation and Environmental Protection 
Land management and rehabilitation provisions are the other parts of CDAs 
which have community sustainability as one of their objectives.657 A land 
management provision usually provides that the parties will work together to 
address concerns which landowning communities may have relating to the 
long term impact of a specific resource project on land and marine life. The 
Argyle Management Plan 5 on land management provides that: 
 “This Management Plan says how Argyle and Traditional Owners will 
work together to make sure that Traditional Owners have no worries about 
how the mine is working. Traditional Owners will give Argyle ideas on how to 
shut parts of the mine down and fix up the Country when Argyle finishes with 
it.”  
Thus, the parties to the Management Plan Agreement for Argyle Diamond 
Mine agreed that the Company will grant a tour of the mine site during which 
the TOs may raise any concern which they may have with the project or the 
manner in which any activity is executed.658 Argyle further committed that if it 
decides to decommission a major infrastructure and/or undertakes major 
rehabilitation of any area connected with the “Argyle Operation”, the TOs will 
                                                          
657
 ‘Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement: Management Plan Agreement’, clause 2 of the 
Management Plan 5 which is annexed to the Management Plan Agreement. See pp131-132. 
658
 Ibid. clauses 2.1-2.3, of the Management Plan 5 annexed to the Management Plan Agreement. 
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be privy to the proposal relating to any of these actions. The aim is to allow 
the TOs to participate in decision-making regarding those matters.659  
Similarly, some CDAs insert clauses on environmental responsibilities of the 
proponent. Where present, such provisions are subsidiary to statutory 
obligations that may be attached to the mineral authorisation. The following is 
a sample provisions: 
“The Company will be required to comply with the environmental 
protection procedures required by all Applicable Law relevant to its 
activities in connection with an Authorised Licence.” 660                                                                                    
One of the arguments which this Thesis makes is that CDAs could promote or 
facilitate community sustainability around resource development areas. One 
of the agreements in Australia’s Northern Territory highlighted the objective of 
fostering community sustainability as a principal component of the agreement. 
The agreement provides that: 
 “ The Exploration Company agrees, as far as reasonably practicable 
having regard, inter alia, to what is cost effective, to conduct the Project and a 
Mining Operation so as to- 
(a) minimise Environmental Impact and Pollution, including the risk of 
Environmental Impact and Pollution; 
                                                          
659
 Ibid., clause 3, Management Plan 5-annexed to the Management Plan Agreement. see pp132-133. 
660
 The Honourable John Rau, Attorney-General et al., ‘Petroleum Conjunctive Indigenous Land Use 
Agreement’, clause 14. 
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(b) ensure the maintenance of the biological diversity of aquatic and 
terrestrial ecosystems of the Application Area and the region generally, 
including ecologies processes; 
(c) give effect to the principle of Environmentally Sustainable 
Development and the Precautionary Principle; and 
(d) Subject to the foregoing, accord with the Best Practicable 
Technology.”661 
 
5.2.12. Review and Amendment 
The Petroleum Conjunctive ILUA provides that any party to the agreement 
may request a review by giving notice to the other parties not more than 
twelve (12) months or not less than six (6) months before the expiration of 
each five-year period calculated from the registration date.662 Parties must 
then meet within 20 business days after the notice date to negotiate in good 
faith so as to reach an agreement in relation to any amendment proposed.663 
However, review or amendment clauses do not ordinarily provide a basis for 
renegotiating the whole agreement. But, clause 4.3 of the Petroleum 
Conjunctive ILUA provides that: 
                                                          
661
 Rio Tinto Exploration Pty Limited and Northern Land Council, ‘The “Top End”, Northern Territory 
Exploration & Mining: Memorandum of Understanding Between Rio Tinto Exploration Pty Limited 
and the Northern Land Council’, clause 9.1. 
662
 The Honourable Michael Atkinson, The Attorney-General et al., ‘Petroleum Conjunctive Indigenous 
Land Use Agreement’, clause 4.1. 
663
 Ibid., clause 4.2. 
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“If the Native Title Party becomes aware of a production payment rate 
being agreed with another native title claim group under a registered 
conjunctive petroleum Framework ILUA over native title in South 
Australia (excluding Aboriginal freehold lands) in excess of the rate 
agreed in this Framework ILUA, then notwithstanding the provisions of 
4.1, the Native Title Party may by notice in writing to the other Parties 
seek a review of the production payment. The Parties must meet within 
three (3) months of the date of [the] sic such notice and negotiate in 
good faith in relation to the quantum of the production payment 
pursuant to annexure C.”664      
 
5.2.13. Negotiation Principles and Assistance 
Preliminary agreements (where they exist) usually contain certain principles 
formulated or agreed by the parties, which then govern future relations. Some 
of the principles seen in some initial agreements include the principle of good 
faith and mutual respect, regular communication/exchange of information, 
and agency. Good faith requires or enjoins parties to do their utmost to 
secure final agreement and to ensure that the agreement succeeds.665 It 
demands the commitment of every party and respect for one another so as to 
                                                          
664
 Ibid., clause 4.3. 
665
 Western Australia v Dimer (2000) NNTTA, 290, "Issues and Contentions (n.d.); Mark Geritz, 
‘Negotiating under the Native Title Act and the Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act’, Institution, Clayton 





engender a relationship based on trust and goodwill.666 Similarly, parties may 
agree to regular communication (for example through community meetings) in 
order to keep the whole group fully informed of the processes and the 
progression of negotiations.667  Also, the parties may agree to nominate a 
Negotiation Group or Committee to act in a representative capacity for and on 
behalf of the affected group. The company usually appoints one or more of its 
officers to represent the company in the negotiation with authority to bind it.668 
 
5.3. Commercial Components of CDAs 
5.3.1. Community Benefit: Argyle Diamond Mine Example 
The Argyle Diamond Mine ILUA provides for at least three categories of 
community benefits.669 They are: (I) annual financial benefits to each of the 
                                                          
666
 Argyle Diamonds Mine Pty Limited, Perpetual Trustees (WA) and their Successors, and Kimberley 
Land Council Aboriginal Corporation, ‘Argyle Diamonds Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)’, 
para. 3; Western Australia v Taylor (1996) NNTTA 34, Austlii, 2.5. In the Taylor’s case, the Tribunal 
summarized what is required to show good faith. Some of those requirements are: (I) a duty to 
communicate with other parties within a reasonable time and a reciprocal duty to respond to 
communication received within a reasonable time. See Paragraph 2.5. (I), (iii), (iv), (v), (vii), (ix); (ii) A 
duty to put proposals forward for the consideration of the other parties towards achieving a 
consensus and a reciprocal duty on other side to respond either by offering counter-proposals or by 
way of comment or suggestion about the original proposal See Paragraph 2.5. (ii)(xv); (iii) An 
expectation that requests for clarifications or for further information to be provided by one party to 
the other and a duty to provide such information within a reasonable time, where that information is 
available. Paragraph 2.5. (viii). 
667
 Argyle Diamonds Mine Pty Limited, Perpetual Trustees (WA) and their Successors, and Kimberley 





 ‘Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement-Indigenous Land Use Agreement’ Clauses 5 & 6. 
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five communities670 which together constitute the indigenous communities in 
the Agreement Area; (ii) individual payments to TOs; and (ii) Trust Payments. 
Under this agreement, two trusts known as Special Purpose Trust and the 
Charitable Trust were established for the TOs.671 The Special Purpose Trust 
holds monies (the sum of which are not stated on the face of the agreement) 
to be shared among the seven family groups who are the TOs for the mine 
area. On the other hand, the Charitable Trust holds money for future 
generations and will assist in creating communal benefits in the East 
Kimberley.672 Thus, the agreement catered for the present and for the needs 
of the future generations. Some of the key clauses provide as follows: 
Clause 5.1- “Argyle intends to provide financial assistance to Local Aboriginal 
Communities. The arrangements with Local Aboriginal Communities…are set 
out in this agreement to ensure that there is transparency as to the benefits 
that Argyle will be providing to communities and the benefits to be provided 
by Argyle to TOs.”673 
                                                          
670
 The Mandangala Community-A$309,300; Woolah Community-A$116,610; Warmun Community-
A$295,726; Juwulinypany Community-A$45,000; and Crocodile Hole Community-A$25,000, to be 
paid annually with the first payment made at the commencement of the agreement. 
671




 ‘Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement-Indigenous Land Use Agreement’. 
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Clause 5.5- “The payment…will be made by depositing the annual sum in the 
bank account nominated by the community council of the relevant Local 
Aboriginal Community to Argyle in writing from time to time…” 674 
Clause 6- “…Argyle will pay money to the old people who signed the Good 
Neighbour Agreement or their kids if they have passed away. Argyle will also 
pay money to other senior Traditional Owners. If these old people pass away, 
Argyle will keep paying this money to their kids. Argyle will pay this money 
every year to these old people or their kids until mining finishes up…”675 
The money earmarked for each community will be disbursed to the two Trusts 
established in the ratio of 80% and 20% to the Charitable Trust and the 
Special Purpose Trust, respectively.676  
Other areas of community benefit are in business development and 
supporting indigenous people to own businesses.  The Management Plan 
Agreement for the Argyle Diamond Mine committed Argyle to helping TOs (for 
the first 3 years of the Management Plan) to: (a) develop business plans; (b) 
develop business skills; (c) pursue contracting and other business 






 ‘Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement-Indigenous Land Use Agreement’ Clause 6.26. 
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opportunities; and (d) implement appropriate corporate governance measures 
within TO businesses.677   
In the Management Plan Agreement, the company and the TOs adopted a 
pragmatic approach in which Argyle did not merely commit to employment, 
business and contracting opportunities, but the Agreement also included 
provisions addressing identifiable capacity deficiencies of the TOs. The 
provisions included indigenous training678 and education of TOs through the 





                                                          
677
 ‘Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement: Management Plan Agreement’, clause 5 of the 
Management Plan 7. To provide this support, the Company (Argyle) will employ a qualified business 
development facilitator for the first 3 years of the Management Plan, whose responsibilities will 
include the provision of business related assistance. See clause 5.2 of the Management Plan 7. 
678
  The Indigenous Training Programme was initiated to assist Aboriginal people with the skills and 
training they need to become employable in Argyle operation. The key aspect of this programme is 
that it is implemented in collaboration with the Western Australian Government. For instance, the 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWAR) committed to providing A$5.1 million 
part funding to employ and train 150 Indigenous employees during the period of 2003-2007 while 
Argyle committed over A$10 million. This programme is part of Argyle’s Aboriginal Employment 
Strategy to have a 40% Indigenous workforce by 2008 and beyond. See clause 1 of Schedule 2 
annexed to the Management Plan 2 and annexed to the Management Plan Agreement, at P110. 
However, many years after the 2008 target was set, there is no evidence to show whether this 
expectation was met or not. 
679
 Through programme, the TOs agreed that they try and keep their kids in school, so they can get 
good jobs when they grow up. The School Retention Rates clause provides that “the TOs agree that 
they will use their best endeavours to increase school retention rates among TO children living in East 
Kimberley. Argyle and the TOs will collaborate with Governmental Agencies to develop strategies for 
raising retention rates among TO children living in East Kimberley.” See clause 3 of the Management 




There is always an expectation on the part of community groups that the 
project proposed by the resource developer will generate employment for the 
members of that community.680 As already discussed in earlier Chapters, this 
expectation is often limited by factors such as lack of the requisite 
qualification, training, and skilled persons in the relevant local communities 
that are needed to fill the available positions. Nevertheless, resource 
developers often commit to providing employment. The following are some 
examples of employment clauses in CDAs. 
“Provided the activities of the Company shall not be commercially or 
operationally be disadvantaged, the Company shall use its best endeavours 
to provide employment for suitably qualified residents of…” 681 
Similarly, the ‘Management Plan 2’ annexed to the Management Plan 
Agreement provides an employment principle governing employment 
commitments under the Agreement. It provides that: 
 “…Argyle says that it wants four out of ten workers at the mine to be 
local Aboriginal people by the time Argyle starts underground mining… Argyle 
recognises that Aboriginal people want good careers at the same time as 
following their culture. Traditional Owners recognise that if they want a job at 
                                                          
680
 O’Faircheallaigh, ‘Evaluating Agreements between Indigenous Peoples and Resource Developers’, 
320–321. 
681
 CRA Exploration Pty Limited and John Toby, George Dixon, Evelyn Hall and Peggy Patrick (‘the 
Signatories’), members of the Gidja and Mirrwung tribes of the Kimberly region, ‘Good Neighbour 
Agreement’ clause 9. 
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Argyle they have to be good enough to do the job. Traditional Owners 
recognise too, that it is important to keep their kids in school…” 682      
Similarly, another employment, training and business opportunity clause 
provides that: 
“The Exploration Company shall, in the course of conducting the 
Project, maximise the employment, training and contracting, and 
opportunities of the members of the Local Aboriginal Groups and Local 
Aboriginal businesses, and shall ensure that as many members of the 
Local Aboriginal Groups and Local Aboriginal businesses as is 
practicable are employed or contracted where they are capable of 
carrying out in a satisfactory manner the particular work required.”683 
These clauses show the desire on the part of communities to benefit from 
resource development activities within their communities and the willingness 
of project proponents to provide employment, contracting and other business 
opportunities. Nevertheless, the prospective employees must have the 
requisite skills and training for the positions or business opportunities offered 
to them or members of their community.684 These skills and training are often 
                                                          
682
 ‘Argyle Diamond Mine Participation Agreement: Management Plan Agreement’ clause 2 of the 
Management Plan 2. The Management Plan 2 is annexed to the Management Plan Agreement- see 
pp101-102. 
683
 Rio Tinto Exploration Pty Limited and Northern Land Council, ‘The “Top End”, Northern Territory 
Exploration & Mining: Memorandum of Understanding Between Rio Tinto Exploration Pty Limited 
and the Northern Land Council’, clause 8.2. 
684
 O’Faircheallaigh, ‘Community Development Agreements in the Mining Industry: An Emerging 
Global Phenomenon’, 7. 
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lacking, and the resource developer usually insists on competent workforce 
and contractors. The cooperation and commitment of both the company and 
the relevant community groups is always necessary for the communities to 
actually benefit from these clauses. Hence, capacity related challenges are 
addressed by a further commitment to provide on-the-job training to 
employees from the local community who demonstrate a desire and capacity 
to be trained.685 Thus, the proponent then nominates and/or recruits an 
employee who will be responsible for identifying areas in which members of 
the community and local businesses could successfully be employed or 
contracted.686 Also, the nominated or recruited employee assists such local or 
indigenous employee or business in the preparation and submission of their 
application or tenders.687 
 
5.3.2. Education and Training 
As stated in the previous paragraph, because the capacity necessary to take 
up CDA-based opportunities is always not available, the company party and 
the proponent of the particular project additionally takes on the responsibility 
for providing scholarships and skill acquisition training to bridge the gap. In 
                                                          
685
 Rio Tinto Exploration Pty Limited and Northern Land Council, ‘The “Top End”, Northern Territory 
Exploration & Mining: Memorandum of Understanding Between Rio Tinto Exploration Pty Limited 
and the Northern Land Council’, clause 8.3 (a). 
686
 Ibid., clause 8.3 (b). 
687
 Ibid., clause 8.3 (b); some companies further commit to take all reasonable or practicable steps to 
ensure, and shall procure that its contractors and sub-contractors took steps to ensure that the 




some jurisdictions, the state sometimes facilitates or compliments private 
sector commitments.  
In the case study jurisdictions, both the industry and Aboriginal organisations 
highlight the need to closely coordinate the employment opportunity side with 
the capacity of the labour force to leverage extractive sector opportunities.688 
Therefore, the state may have to assume increased responsibility through 
proactive regional planning and coordination of public sector agencies 



















                                                          
688
 AU Participant No.11, Is There a Role for Law in the Community Agreement Process Apart from 
Ancillary Provisions Under the Native Title Act?; Robyn Sermon, General Manager Communities, Rio 
Tinto Iron Ore, Industry Perspective to Community Agreement: Rio Tinto Experience; Kanaga 
Dharmananda SC, Senior Counsel at Fountain Chambers, An Expert Assessment of the Community 
Agreement Process from Industry and Community Perspectives. 
689
 ‘Sharing in the Benefits of Resource Developments: A Study of First Nation-Industry Impact 
Benefits Agreements’, p22. 
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5.3.2.1 Summary of CDA standard Clauses 
 
1. Party identification Clause  Every CDA provides a clear 
identification of its parties 
 In the case of a community 
party represented by natural 
persons, it is always good to 
insert a warranties clause, as 
well as a duty to make 
restitution 
2. Object clause  This is to describe or explain 
the reason or purpose of the 
agreement 
3. Consent and Support clause  This clause is to commit the 
community party to lend its 
support or to refrain from 
opposing the permitting 
processes for the specified 
project 
4. Benefit Clause  This clause states the 
benefits that a community will 
receive for consenting to a 
project 
 The clause usually covers 
royalty payment and other 
financial receipts, 
employment, training, 
business development, and 
scholarships 
5. Review Clause  The essence of this clause is 
to provide for a periodic 
review of the agreement-
usually every 5 years 
6. Funding Clause  This clause specifies a list of 
items has to be funded 
 Also, it allocate funding 
responsibility to one or more 
of the parties 
7. Aboriginal heritage clause  This clause specifies how 
aboriginal sites and  sites of 
significance located within 
the project area are to be 
treated 
8.  Applicable law  That clause states the law 
that governs the agreement 
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9. Dispute resolution clause  This clause specifies the 
procedure for resolving 
dispute 
10. Confidentiality Clause  This clause states whether 
any part of the agreement will 
be confidential 
 Also, it sets the conditions for 
disclosing confidential 
information 
11. Terms and Conditions  This clause will states each 
party’s obligations, how each 
party should conduct itself 
and conducts that will 
constitute a breach of the 
agreement 
12. Interest and rights 
acknowledgement clause 
 This clause will normally 
state that community’s land 
rights or native title is 
acknowledged by the 
proponent. On the other 
hand, the community party 
acknowledges the rights 
under a licence that has been 




5.3.3 Negotiation Funding 
In practice, CDAs are preceded by preliminary agreements which set out the 
terms upon which the CDA (which is always the final agreement) will be 
negotiated. These preliminary agreements are also known as Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU), Initial Agreement or Framework Agreement. The 
preliminary agreement, among other things, names nominees for each 
negotiating party as well as the party that will fund the negotiation of the 
agreements. The resource developer usually bears the entire cost of the 
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negotiation process.690 Many community representatives note that this 
scenario sometimes tilts bargaining unfairly in favour of the funding party.691 
Community representatives’ observation is that the situation where one of the 
key parties’ funds negotiations sometimes weakens the community’s 
negotiating power.692 Ultimately, the quality of the final agreement will also be 
compromised if there was any coercive influences such as duress and undue 
influence as a result of the privileged position of the party with funding duty. 
 This subject is vital because in the case study jurisdictions, the state is 
usually not involved or interested in resourcing CDAs negotiations so long as 
the legal requirement for aboriginal consent and support is achieved. As a 
result, in Australia, the Commonwealth Government funding is directed 
towards native title determination and not CDA resourcing.693 Similarly, in 
Canada, the Federal and Provincial Governments only fund or facilitate the 
process of aboriginal consultation and accommodation.694 Such funding 
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 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 
Perspective, 16 April 2013, 1; Robyn Sermon, General Manager Communities, Rio Tinto Iron Ore, 
Industry Perspective to Community Agreement: Rio Tinto Experience. 
691
 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 
Perspective, 16 April 2013; AU Participant No.4, Legal and Policy Impediment to the Community 
Agreement Process; AU Participant No.9, Features of Agreement Implementation in Western 
Australia: An Implementation Officer’s Perspective; Morellato, A Legal Practitioner’s Perspective to 




 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 
Perspective, 16 April 2013, 1. 
694
 McIvor, Introduction to the IBA Process in Canada; Province of Alberta Parliament, Aboriginal 
Consultation Levy Act 2013, 2013, sec. 10, http://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/Acts/a01p2.pdf. 
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merely takes care of cost of legal representation, and services provided by 
other experts to indigenous people in the course of complying with the 
relevant statutory requirements.  
 
5.3.4. Revenue Sharing and Equity Participation 
Revenue sharing is increasingly becoming a part of CDAs in many countries 
and comes in two different forms.695 The first form of participation involves a 
community agreeing a specific percentage of the company’s profit.696 For 
example, the Ahafo community agreement contains a commitment by 
Newmont to contribute US$1 per ounce of gold sold and another 1% of 
annual profits to Ahafo Development Foundation.697 Similarly, in Canada, 
some agreements now grant to FNs, royalty and other forms of payments, 
pegged at a certain percentage per tonnage of the mineral produced.698  
                                                          
695
 Elizabeth Wall and Remi Pelon, ‘Sharing Mining Benefits in Developing Countries’ (Washington 
D.C.: World Bank, 2011), 12–16, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/06/14/000333037_2011061
4052552/Rendered/PDF/624980NWP0P1160ns00trusts0and0funds.pdf; Sarkar et al., ‘Mining 
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Royalty payments in relation oil and gas development are calculated 
differently.699 In fact, Professor, Darwin, a member of the Lytton FN and one 
of the interview participants noted that some Provincial Governments in 
Canada now have some royalty payment arrangements with FN in addition to 
benefits under the IBA process. 
 Furthermore, in Papua New Guinea (PNG), TOs of the areas around the 
Porgera and Lihir mine projects acquired an equity stake in the two projects 
which are large-scale mineral projects.700 Similarly, this approach has been 
followed in six out of seven large-scale mining and oil and gas operations in 
PNG.701  
 
5.4. Establishing Legal Basis for CDA Negotiation 
At the early stages of this research, a considerable number of people who 
were unfamiliar with the area of this research questioned the entire premise of 
this research and were curious to understand the legal or contractual basis 
why a corporate entity in E&P operation would enter into a contractual 
relations with a community group or entity.  Their major concern was about 
whether any legal basis existed, or the nature of the consideration which a 
community entity could furnish to ground a valid contract. In other words, the 
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foundation of this thinking seems to be that communities do not possess 
minerals title in most jurisdictions, including Nigeria, and therefore have no 
locus standi to demand or warrant such relations. In order to address this 
confusion, this section of this Chapter seeks to examine the exact legal 
characterisation of CDAs.  
 
5.4.1. CDA: Legal Characterisation  
The issue here is to (through the legal analysis of CDAs and the relationships 
created by them) determine the exact nature of the relations created under 
CDA arrangements. In other words, are CDAs binding contracts enforceable 
at law or are they informal instruments of social relations that have no legal 
validity? This inquiry would have been unnecessary but for the need to 
disabuse the minds of those who may be unsure of where to situate the 
nature of the relations created under a CDA arrangement.  
Some have assumed that commitments made in a CDA, particularly the 
commitments made by a proponent, to be mere gratuitous exchanges of 
promises which cannot be enforced.702  One of views that this author was 
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confronted by was one which argued that since the legal system in Nigeria 
and these other CDA practicing jurisdictions only allows for state ownership of 
minerals, any arrangement reached between industry and the communities in 
or around which industry projects are located must then be seen as mere 
corporate public relations tools.  
However, contrary to the assumptions underlying these views, this Thesis 
views CDAs as legally enforceable contracts backed by legal considerations 
unless vitiated by any of those elements that could vitiated an otherwise valid 
agreement. Additionally, some CDAs are now further bolstered by the force of 
enabling statutes such as the Nigerian MMA.  
 
5.4.2. Locus Standi Test 
The legal entitlement of communities to negotiate CDAs comes through two 
principal sources. The first source is based on communal land right, native 
title rights or indigenous right and title, while the second source is statutory. 
This analysis is useful because the legal character of benefits granted to the 
community is relevant to determining the validity and enforceability of CDAs. 
 
5.4.2.1. Land Rights, Native Title/Indigenous Rights and Title. 
The indigenous rights and title is a broad spectrum of legal rights which a 
group has over a specific land or territory under native law and customs 
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peculiar to that that group.703 In Australia, it is known as a native title. For a 
non- indigenous group such as communities in Nigeria, the relevant basis 
would be the communal land rights granted under the customary law. 
 
5.4.2.2. Legal Right Established under Statute or Case Law 
This is when a legislation imposes an obligation on the operators in the 
mining or the oil and gas industries to enter into CDAs with a defined class of 
people or group.704 This is exactly what Nigeria has done through the MMA. 
That legislation imposed a mandatory obligation on E & P companies in the 
mining sector to enter into as one of the conditions for commencement of 
“development activity”.705  
Thus, by this provision a legal right has been created by this statute 
entitlement affected communities to demand or to insist on such agreements 
being made. In other words, the MMA established a legal right on the basis of 
which legal proceedings may lie to enforce compliance.  
A related scenario is that which exist in Canada and Australia which have 
already been discussed in the earlier Chapters. This is where CDAs are 
negotiated not because they have been mandated by law but because the 
procedure for complying with a certain legal obligation creates the opportunity 
for such agreements to be made. Unlike the first example, this right is not 
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expressly created by any specific statute but it has emerged as a fortuitous 
consequence of acknowledging an existing duty on the state to consult and 
accommodate FNs.706  
 
5.4.2.3. Section 35 (1) Legal Right 
The point has been made earlier that the provision of section 35 (1) of the 
1982 Constitution Act of Canada recognised and affirmed certain indigenous 
rights. The holders of those rights must then be consulted and where 
necessary, be accommodated where an act by the state or authorised by the 
state appears likely to impair or adversely affect any of the protected rights. 
This procedure does not, in itself, create any entitlement to CDA negotiation, 
but it creates a forum for mutual engagement and negotiations which 
sometimes leads to the signing of a CDA.  
 
5.4.2.4 Native Title Rights 
In Australia, the Mabo Case (No.2) settled the disputation over indigenous 
peoples’ right to land within the Australian legal system. The Federal Court 
held in paragraph 83 that native title, a bundle of rights vested in indigenous 
Australians prior to the arrival of European settlers, survived the Crown’s 
acquisition of sovereignty and radical title.707 That case held that “…The rights 
and privileges conferred by native title were unaffected by the Crown’s 
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acquisition of radical title but the acquisition of sovereignty exposed native 
title to extinguishment by a valid exercise of sovereign power inconsistent 
with the continued rights to enjoy native title.”708  The acknowledgement of 
these “rights and privileges” in part necessitated the Commonwealth to enact 
the 1993 National Native Title Act, which, among other things, provided for 
the ‘right to negotiate’ procedure under which most mining agreements are 
negotiated.  
 
CDA: Contract Test Requirements 
Another way of looking at the legal character of CDAs is through the contract 
test. That is, consideration of provisions of CDAs to determine whether or not 
they meet the basic requirements of a valid contract. In addressing this point, 
this work adopts two approaches: (I) examining the context within which 
CDAs are negotiated, and (ii) testing the provisions of CDAs against the 
established principles or elements of a binding contract under the law of 
contracts. It may be that in reaching an agreement, the parties to a CDA may 
have given no thought at all to the enforceability of their agreement. But, one 
of the parties may in future seek to test the validity of specific covenants or 
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5.5. Parties’ Interests 
It has been established in the earlier Chapters of this work that the activities 
of the extractive industry companies occur within a context of rights and/or 
interests involving parties with divergent perspectives and aims. Corporations 
participate in mineral resources-related activities by investing capital, skills 
and technology in expectation of profit, while the state is often the owner and 
controller of mineral rights. The state issues mineral licenses in expectation of 
receipt of royalty and/or taxes. The aspect that is usually problematic is the 
identification and conceptualisation of the asset or interest of local groups or 
communities which qualifies them or entitles them to contractually share in 
the benefits and burdens connected to mineral development. In an Order of 
the Federal Court of Australia in support of the Argyle Diamond ILUA 
registration, the scenario was aptly described in paragraph 9 (b) and (c)   
As follows:  
“…in relation to the other interests to the extent that the other interests are 
inconsistent with the continued existence, enjoyment or exercise of the native 
title rights and interests, the native title continues to exist in its entirety, but 
the native title rights and interests have no effect in relation to the other 
interests to the extent of the inconsistency during the currency of those other 
interests. If those other interests are later removed or otherwise cease to 
operate, either wholly or partly, the native title rights and interests will again 
have full effect, wholly or partly as the case may be; and in relation to the 
other interests the doing of any activity required or permitted to be done by or 
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under the other interests, prevail over the native title rights and interests and 
any exercise of the native title rights and interests, but do not extinguish 
them, and the existence and exercise of the native title rights and interests 
does not prevent the doing of the activity.”709 
This Order recognised and sought to protect traditional rights and interests of 
communities around the agreement area; the leasehold or the authorised 
activity of the mineral company and the rights of the state to transfer mineral 
rights and interests on traditional land. So, in addition to the usual obligation 
to consent to and support the activity of the company, a community party, in 
agreeing to a CDA gives up or suspends the enjoyment and exercise of 
traditional rights during the pendency of the leasehold. The forbearance 
suffered by that community in consenting to the performing of an act 
authorised by the state could in contract law constitute a valid consideration. 
 
5.5.1 Definition of Contract 
“…If and when the law is invoked, it is not usually because some 
obscure or unintelligent rule or restriction has been broken, but much 
more probably and simply because contracting parties have not said 
what they meant, or meant what they said, or considered the 
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consequences of saying it. These are problems of their own making, 
and not the law’s…”710 
The term contract has been defined in the US Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts Law as a ‘promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the 
law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law recognise as a 
duty’.711 From this definition, a contract is different from promises made in a 
social, domestic or family context, which are generally non-binding and 
unenforceable by any of the parties.712 That is, in the eyes of the law, the 
promise must be one which the law recognises as a binding obligation and is 
additionally prepared to give a remedy in case of an unlawful breach of that 
promise. This is usually the case where the promisor or the person making 
the offer has full capacity, and the transaction is untainted by any form of 
illegality, fraud or other vitiating events.713 
Similarly, an agreement is defined as a manifestation of mutual assent on the 
part of two or more persons.714 Generally, where the word agreement is used, 
it does not contain any implication that legal consequences are or are not 
invoked. It may relate to transactions executed on one or both sides, 
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including those that are wholly executory. In other words, a meeting of the 
minds or mental agreement is not necessarily implied. But agreement is used 
in this work to describe that a binding contract is contemplated wherever the 
words appears. 
 
5.5.2 Elements of a Valid Contract 
Every formal contract consists of at least four terms, here referred to as 
elements of contract. These are: (I) offer, (ii) acceptance, (iii) the parties’ 
intention to be legally bound and/or certainty of terms, and (IV) the presence 
of a valuable consideration.  
An Offer is defined as the expression or manifestation of a willingness to 
enter into a bargain, made in a way which justifies another person in 
understanding that his/her acceptance of, or assent to, that bargain is invited 
and will conclude or tie it up.715 Although not specifically expressed as such in 
most CDAs, they usually contain some exchange of promises in which the 
corporate party offers a specific benefit package to the community party if the 
latter permits the former to gain access onto a defined piece of land and 
successfully carries out the specified operation or activity thereon. 
Conversely, the community party, in accepting the offer, commits to granting 
access to a traditional land which they own/possess, or to give up specified 
land rights, and to additionally secure that community’s consent and support 
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needed for the operation or for that specified activity of the corporate party to 
proceed unhindered by local opposition. 
Whenever a claim to the existence of a binding agreement has been made, 
one of the important questions that is usually asked is whether the parties 
intended to make a legally binding agreement, and if so, what purpose was 
intended to be achieved thereby.716 In order words, the parties must evince an 
intention to create enforceable legal relations, otherwise known as the 
meeting of the minds or consensus ad idem.717 From a study of existing 
agreements and from some of the clauses reproduced earlier in this Chapter, 
it seems clear that the parties to those agreements were fully aware of what 
their respective interests were and expressed their assent accordingly.718  
However, with the older CDAs, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain the 
intention of the parties from the language used in some agreements. This 
point was made earlier in this work concerning the problem of poorly-drafted 
clauses particularly in older CDA and the need for capacity development and 
resourcing of negotiators.719 That problem includes the use of phrases 
(commonly known as best/reasonable endeavour clauses) which failed to 
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clearly convey an intention to create enforceable obligations as between the 
parties. As such, it is very easy for any of the parties to avoid the performance 
of some obligations created under an agreement simply because of the 
inelegant drafting of some earlier agreements by insufficiently equipped 
practitioners.720  
Perhaps, using case law to demonstrate the nature of the problem created by 
inelegantly drafted covenants will be most effective. The one case which 
nearly fits into the above scenario is May and Butcher v The King.721 In that 
case, the agreement was for the Claimant to purchase “…the whole of the 
tentage which might become available in the United Kingdom…the price or 
prices to be paid, the date or dates on which payments are to be made by the 
purchasers to the Commission for such old tentage shall be agreed upon 
from time to time between the Commission and the purchasers as the 
quantities of the said old tentage become available for disposal…”722 
What fell to be determined in this case was whether or not the terms of the 
contract were sufficiently defined to constitute a binding agreement. The court 
held that there was never a concluded contract between the parties and 
reiterated the applicable principle of law according to which an agreement 
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between parties to enter into an agreement in which some critical parts of the 
contract matter are left undetermined is no contract at all.723 Furthermore, the 
court stated that “it is of course perfectly possible for two people to contract 
that they will sign a document which contains all the relevant terms, but it is 
not open to them to agree that they will, in the future, agree upon a matter 
which is vital to the arrangement between them but has not yet been 
determined”.724  The facts of May and Butcher v. The King presents an 
extreme situation in a contract for the sale of goods where the cardinal 
aspects of the arrangement, such as price, quantity and delivery date, were 
unspecified.  
However, the general lesson for CDA purposes is that while peculiar 
circumstances of one or more heads of a proposed arrangement may warrant 
that certain obligations are couched in liberal terms, it is crucial that the main 
obligations are drafted in lucid and unmistakeable terms so as to avoid 
uncertainties or ambiguities. For instance, it is common in CDAs to find 
clauses dealing with employment, job creation, training and business 
development drafted in loose or open ended clauses. That is, clauses to the 
effect that the company shall use its best endeavours or reasonable 
endeavour to provide jobs and training to as many community members as 
possible. To avoid terms which may become unenforceable in the future, it 







may be useful to define obligations in clearer terms or as accurately as 
possible.725 
Consideration: In the law of contract as developed under the English 
Common Law system, the concept of consideration726 states that a person 
cannot enforce a promise unless he or she has given (valuable) consideration 
for it.727 In other words, except for contracts under seal, and rights granted 
under a statute such as the one in the MMA, every contract is founded on the 
basic idea of mutuality or reciprocity in which something of economic value 
must move from, done by the promisee or some form of loss or forbearance 
suffered in return for the other’s promise.728  The obvious example of this 
general rule is that in the contract laws of most Continental European 
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 A promise or an offer without a corresponding promise from the promisee or offeree is called a 
bare promise (a nudum pactum)-that is, a promise unsupported by consideration, which is generally 
of no legal effect. Consideration has three classifications-executory, executed or past. As a rule, 
consideration must be executed or executory to be valid. Executed consideration is a return promise 
that is performed or fulfilled while executory consideration is a promise of future action. On the 
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countries there is no requirement to furnish consideration for a contract to be 
valid.729  
However, for the purpose of this work, which focuses on jurisdictions that 
have the Common Law system as part of their legal systems, the requirement 
of consideration has a major significance for CDAs.  
 
5.5.3 CDAs as legal contracts 
From the above analysis of the requirement of simple contract, this work 
argues that CDAs are legally enforceable contracts which may give rise to 
legal remedies or an order of specific performance by the court. Thus, unless 
vitiated by any of the special circumstances that can vitiate contractual 
obligations such as lack of capacity, duress, undue influence, frustration, and 
misrepresentation, legal proceedings may lie for the enforcement of CDA 
obligations. From the parts of existing CDAs analysed earlier in this Chapter, 
it is safe to conclude that parties to those agreements intended them to 
operate as formal agreements binding on all parties.730  
Although there is no known judicial proceeding or determination in which the 
enforceability of individual clauses of a CDA was challenged, such issues can 
be expected to arise in the near future. Thus, negotiators of CDAs must 
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endeavour to be lucid and unambiguous in their drafting and would be well-
advised to create a record of the CDA preparatory work.  
 
5.5.4 Potential Vitiating circumstance 
Theoretically, there are factors which may vitiate, or render voidable, an 
otherwise valid CDA. This section considers some of these factors. It is 
important for parties to bear these factors in mind, because as already 
established earlier, CDAs can be binding contracts and therefore legally 
enforceable by specific performance or judicial remedies, provided the four 
requirements are satisfied. However, it is perfectly possible that some existing 
agreement, particularly some earlier agreements, may have been executed 
without one or more of the parties adverting their minds to the true legal 
character of their agreement and the possibility of a legal challenge being 
mounted in the future. Some of the factors that could vitiate the entirety or 
parts of a CDA include: 
 Public policy grounds: Under the current CDA practice, parties enjoy 
near absolute freedom of contract and therefore are not limited in the 
items or elements that the agreements may contain.731 As a result, 
some agreements potentially could be unenforceable on grounds of 
public policy if any part thereof runs contrary to law, public good or 
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policy. An agreement or a term thereof may be unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy if it offends important values or norms of a 
state. Additionally, the public interest in enforcing binding commercial 
relations may, in specific instances, be outweighed by some public 
policy grounds inhibiting the enforcement of such terms.732 In other 
words, the decision of a court to deny enforcement to an agreement or 
a term thereof may be derived from a legislation relevant to such a 
policy, or the need to safeguard some aspects of public welfare.733 
 Inability to manifest assent: For a party to incur a contractual duty or 
forbearance, there must be a meeting of the minds between the 
parties. That is, there must be a mutual intention to bind themselves in 
a contract. This element may be become relevant where a mental or 
physical disability existed which prevented or rendered one of the 
parties incapable of giving the requisite assent. In the CDA process, 
this may occur where the corporate party was represented by a person 
who has no legal authority to so act, or involved persons who by 
reason of the operation of law or the company’s charter, cannot validly 
bind the company.734 On the other hand, there may be agreements 
entered with the wrong community representatives or irregularly 
obtained community assent, especially if the decision to enter into the 
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agreement did not follow the decision-making process prescribed 
under the customary legal jurisprudence of the relevant community 
group. Parties to relatively recent CDAs have tried to address this 
issue through warranty clauses.735 
 Misrepresentation, duress and Undue Influence: Having 
established that CDAs are not mere social relations mechanisms but 
that they constitute binding contracts, the parties must take precaution 
to ensure that events that may vitiate otherwise valid contracts are 
prevented from vitiating their agreements. Any of the parties to CDAs 
could both be guilty and be a victim of misrepresentation, duress or 
undue influence. Misrepresentation is any false assertion or statement 
(which may be oral, written or manifested by conduct) knowingly, 
ignorantly or carelessly made by the maker to another who innocently 
relies on that representation or statement to his or her detriment.736 
Misrepresentation may occur where, for example, the corporate party 
conceals or makes false, incomplete or inaccurate representations of 
the true nature of their business operation in an attempt to secure the 
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consent of the community party. Another example is where the 
community party falsely asserts traditional or native title rights to 
secure the conclusion of the agreement. On the other hand, duress 
and undue influence relate to an improper pressure in the process of 
bargaining, which compels a person to a cause of conduct that he/she 
would not have undertaken.737 Duress that could vitiate an agreement 
must consist of improper threat that leaves the victim with no 
reasonable alternative, inducing the victim to enter into the 
agreement.738 The effect of duress and undue influence on contractual 
relations is that they could vitiate assent or the voluntariness of 
bargains. This discussion is relevant in the light of the context in which 
most CDAs are negotiated. Governments of the jurisdictions which 
permit CDAs depend on income from resource development to fund 
public services and therefore tend favour or align itself with the 
investor. Sometimes, this alignment could occur regardless of the 
genuine concerns of the community. Also, the community party may be 
subject to intense pressure to cut a deal in order to allow the project to 
proceed. In this circumstance, there is always a risk of duress and 
undue influence in the agreement-making process against the 
community party who is often the weaker and most vulnerable party. 
The pressure could arise through policy decisions, active threats or 
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regulation. In Australia for instance, Section 29 of the NTA gives native 
title holders or claimants the right to negotiate (RTN) the terms of land 
access with the government or resource developers.739 However, these 
negotiations occur without necessarily allowing them much discretion 
to decide whether to give or refuse assent to the particular future act 
contemplated by the project company.740 The issue in individual cases 
is what effect the application of Section 29 of the NTA had on the 
freedom of contract in relation to the affected indigenous Australians. 
Does it not amount to duress and/or undue influence if the indigenous 
party is placed in a ‘take it or leave it’ situation (without a real choice), 
regardless of whether or not the terms being proposed by the 
developer met reasonable expectations?  Answers to this and many 
other similar questions may become clearer if some of the existing 
agreements are tested in courts. However, in the Australian context, 
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these questions are particularly important, because although the NNTT 
has arbitral jurisdiction under Section 38 where parties are unable to 
agree after 6 months of negotiation. However, this jurisdiction is 
statutorily-limited to the question of whether the proposed ‘future act’ 
should be done, not be done, or be done on conditions.741 In other 
words, the NNTT does not have the jurisdiction to inquire into the 
substantive issue of the negotiation (which is usually the conditions to 
a community’s consent) about which the parties are in dispute.742 
 
5.6 Summary 
The CDA practice is no more a mere voluntary arrangement that corporations 
invloved in the mining and petroleum E & P activities enter into simply to 
appease a disgruntled or a hostile host community. As this Chapter 
demonstrates, CDAs create legal relationships that are enforceable at law. 
This is because CDAs are valid contracts and therefore, they create 
enforceable legal rights and obligations. 
Also, this Chapter successfully distilled five principles, the CDA principles, 
which appear to underline the CDA arrangement and relationship created by 
them. These are the Subsidiarity principle, self-determination principle, public 
participation principle, impact and benefit princple, and community 
sustainability principle. Similarly, this Chapter identified and discussed the 







basic components of standard CDAs743 and made the following CDA best 
Practice recommendations.744 These compnonents constitute the key parts in 
most CDA arrangments. They include: the identification of who the community 
party should be in particular cases and the nature of their interests; 
commnuity beneficiation; and consent and support for the proposed mineral 
activity. 
Lastly, a significant portion if this Chapter was devoted to the analyses of 
selected clauses that are often found in most CDAs. The clauses treated are 
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 A summary of the standard clauses contain in most CDAs are annexed to this Thesis as Appendix 3. 
744
 The CDA Best Practice recommendations are annexed to this Thesis as Appendix 4. 
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Chapter Six: Application of Research 
Findings Towards Framing an Effective 
CDA Model for Nigeria 
 
6.0. Introduction 
                                           








This Chapter is devoted to answering the Research Question of this Thesis, 
and to the application of the lessons learned from the case studies towards 
framing an effective CDA process to function within the context of Nigeria’s 
legal structure and its extractive industries. As stated in Chapter One, Nigeria 
has established a legal regime for a CDA process through section 116 of the 
MMA whose main objectives are to ensure the transfer of social and 
economic benefits to host communities and to secure community 
The purposes of this Chapter are: 
 To apply the lessons from earlier Chapters to Nigeria’s CDA 
arrangement; 
 To answer the research question posed in this Thesis; 
 To conceptualise the CDA arrangement as a local 
governance framework (LGF); 
 To Propose or recommend a suitable framework for a CDA 
process, especially the Nigerian process, to function as an 




sustainability. The objective of this Chapter is to propose a suitable 
framework for the implementation of the MMA’s CDA purposes and 
objectives. In other words, the aim of this Chapter is to outline what the 
Nigerian government must do and what implementation framework to 
consider in order for the stated objectives of the CDA process to be realised. 
As established in Chapters Three and Four, the CDA process has been a 
mechanism for seeking and obtaining communities’ consent and support in 
relation to developments and projects on indigenous community land. But in 
the case of Nigeria, the government has enacted a legal framework through 
which it wishes to stretch or to further enlarge the uses of the CDA process. 
That is, to transfer social and economic benefits of natural resources 
development to host communities as well as ensure the sustainability of the 
affected communities. 
Having established that the provisions of the MMA and its Regulations as 
presently constituted will be unable to facilitate the realisation of these stated 
objectives or purposes of the CDA process. This Chapter will therefore 
consider the additional steps which must be taken to ensure the realisation of 
the stated purposes of the Nigerian CDA process. 
 
6.1. Structure Established under the MMA 
In order to properly project the issues, it will be useful to set out the CDA 
mandate under the MMA.  
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6.1.1. The MMA CDA Obligation  
Section 116 of the Minerals and Mining Act specifically provides that: 
“Subject to the provisions of this section, the Holder of a Mining Lease, Small 
Scale Mining Lease or Quarry Lease shall prior to the commencement of any 
development activity within the lease area, conclude with the host community 
where the operations are to be conducted an agreement referred to as a 
Community Development Agreement or other such agreement that will 
ensure the transfer of social and economic benefits to the community”.745  
From the above provision, the following elements or information can be 
distilled: 
a. A compulsory obligation to conclude a CDA is imposed; 
b. Parties to a CDA  are the proponent and the “host community where 
the operations are to be conducted; 
c. The timing of the agreement is prior to the commencement of 
development activity; and 
d. The key aims of CDAs are to ensure the transfer of social and 
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Section 116 (1) identifies persons who may be parties to a CDA as the 
licensee on the one hand, and the “host community where the operations are 
to be conducted”, on the other hand.746 Also, Paragraph 139 (2) (a) of the 
Minerals and Mining Regulation 2010 provides that:  
“For the purposes of the Community Development Agreement under Section 
116 of the Act, “the host community” shall in relation to any mineral title 
be…the community where the mineral title area is located or the community 
closest to it.”747 
This Regulation further provides that where the host community is for any 
reasons not readily ascertainable, the leaseholder shall make a report to that 
effect to the Minister for Minerals and Mines.748 Upon receiving the report, the 
Minister shall, in consultation with the relevant State Government and 
agencies, determine which community is the host community.749  
From what is already established from the experiences in Australia and 
Canada, one can easily conclude that the MMA proposed arrangement to 
identify community parties by their proximity to a resource project is not error-
free and therefore likely to present some challenges in the future. For 
                                                          
746
 The Nigerian National Assembly, Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act. 
747
 Nigerian Minister of Mine and Steel Development, Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2010 Made 
Under And Pursuant To the Nigerian Minerals And Mining Act, 2007, 2010, 
http://www.nigerianminers.org/sites/default/files/Mining_Regs_2010_Final_Draft.pdf. 
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instance, does “…community where the operations are to be conducted…” 
mean communities around the site of actual mining operations, or the place 
where processing equipment is located? Furthermore, will communities 
located along the transportation route be included or excluded?  Such a 
widely-cast description of the community participant in CDAs needs further 
clarification and/or a mechanism for resolving expected challenges 
associated with correctly identifying the appropriate host community for the 
purposes of CDAs. Similarly, the MMA seems to repose much confidence and 
responsibility on the Minister in such a way that might undermine the CDA 
process. The CDA process needs to be insulated from the whims of an 
individual like the Minister who is likely to be conflicted because of his/her 
executive or governmental duties. Also, a Minister is unlikely to have sufficient 
knowledge of the area in all cases, or be able to handle his/her CDA duties 
apolitically.  
The key point here is that it is crucial to ensure neutrality and reduce or 
prevent a situation of conflict of interest or where an officer of the government 
or an individual will be required to mediate in a matter in which he or she has 
an interest.  
For instance, the Minister of Solid Minerals Development is an agent of the 
executive whose primary duty is to facilitate investment in the sector in 
anticipation of taxes and revenue. One could argue that this role of the 
Minister may be in direct conflict with the interest of the communities, 
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particularly where protecting community-interest could lead to project 
suspension or delay. 
Therefore, the Courts are most suited for this responsibility because matters 
such as the one in issue should be handled both judicially and judiciously.  
 
6.1.3. Purpose of Agreement  
The MMA describes the essence of agreements negotiated under it as 
undertakings relating to social and economic contributions that a mineral 
project may make towards the “sustainability of such community.”750 However, 
it does not define what “sustainability” means in the context of adversely-
impacted communities and minerals exploration and production. Furthermore, 
the Act provides further particulars of what it termed “social and economic 
contributions” and they are generally categorised as follows:751 
i) Educational Scholarship and training; 
ii) Apprenticeship and employment opportunities; 
iii) Financial support towards infrastructural development;  
iv) Skills acquisition training, and business development support for 
small and micro enterprises; and 
v) Capacity-building assistance towards local governance and socio-
economic management. 
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 The Nigerian National Assembly, Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, sec. 116 (2). 
751
 Ibid., sec. 116 (3). 
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The stated beneficiaries (except with infrastructural development) are the 
“indigenes of the communities”. This phrase was not defined by the Act, but a 
literal interpretation may mean those that have the host communities as their 
ancestral home. The issue then is whether the group described in section 116 
as host community must additionally be “indigenes of the communities”?752 
Noting that it may not necessarily be expected of the MMA to envisage all 
issues so as to make exhaustive provisions, it must however have a well-
developed dispute management system that will be capable of dealing with 
likely issues. This work argues that the MMA grievance resolution framework 
is significantly inadequate and ill-equipped. The reason will be discussed later 
in this Chapter. 
 
6.1.4. Categorisation of Beneficiaries 
The above list of expected social and economic benefits which CDAs are 
expected to deliver may be grouped into two categories; communal benefits 
and individual benefits. This grouping suggests layers of community benefit 
for different categories of beneficiaries. Communal benefits could be 
described as benefits conferred under the CDA arrangement for the 
enjoyment of the entire community or residents of the relevant area. The 
specific heads of benefits which come under this heading could include public 
                                                          
752
 The Nigerian National Assembly, Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act. See sec.116 (3) (a). 
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infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, schools, sporting development 
facilities and other community services. 
Subject to the size of the project, individual benefits would be advantages 
conferred to members of the host community that have been specifically 
impacted by the project. Such benefits could include cash payments, 
education and training as part of consideration for giving up land or other 
property.753  
A regulated CDA arrangement such as the one contemplated by Nigeria 
under the Act should contain clear thresholds and triggers in relation to 
conferment of benefits to communities. Such thresholds and triggers should 
match expected benefits with project size and duration. This Thesis will not 
recommend any rigid trigger and threshold template. In a country like Nigeria 
where important social and economic opportunities are very limited or non-
existent in some cases, communities tend to view resource proponents as 
                                                          
753
 Ibid., sec. 107. Under this section, there is a requirement for an independent Valuer to make a 
valuation of the quantum of compensation that will be paid to an owner or occupier of any land that 
is subject to mineral license.  So, compensatory payment by a holder of mineral title must not be 
lower than the assessment of an independent Valuer. Furthermore, it states that compensation shall 
be made for two heads of liability: (i) for any disturbance of the surface rights or for any damage 
done to the surface of the land on which the exploration or mining is being or has been done; and (ii) 
payment to owners of any crop, economic trees, building damaged, removed or destroyed by the 
holder of the mining title or its agents. This provisions applies specifically to land held under State 
lease or the subject to statutory right of occupancy. Also, section 108 provides that the value of 
compensatory payment under the Act shall be determined by the Mining Cadastre Office ‘after 
consultation with the State Minerals Resources and Environmental Management Committee and a 
Government licensed Valuer.’ The language of section 108 suggests that section 107 valuation is 
subject to Ministerial assent. Additionally, Paragraph 12 of Minerals and Mining Regulations 2010 
added that the quantum of compensation payment shall be on the basis of the ‘extent to which the 
market value of the land upon which the damage occurred has been reduced by reason of the 
damage.’ See also Sec. 113 of the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007. 
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surrogate governments and therefore should take responsibility for providing 
necessary, but absent, amenities regardless of the economics of the 
particular project.  
However, what is important is that stakeholders appreciate that the nature of 
the proposed act, project size and the economics of particular projects may 
determine the content and scope of the CDA process. The carrying capacity 
of a project may only be able to fund the CDA process so as to secure 
community’s consent and support without any further undertaking to provide 
elaborate community benefit package, whilst other projects by virtue of their 
scale and project economics are able to provide some or all of the benefits 
listed in section 116 of the MMA.  
Thus, in the interest of both the proponent and the benefiting communities, 
community benefit profile should be proportionate to the nature, economics 
and the size of each project. But this is an area where the framers of the CDA 
process did not cover or address. 
 
6.1.5 Sequence of Title Holder’s Engagement with Host Community 
Paragraph 13 (“Social Obligations”) of the Minerals and Mining Regulation 
2010754, suggests two separate but related obligations. It provides that “as a 
precondition for proper interaction with the host community,” the mineral title 
holder “shall” comply with all compensation obligations to every person that is 
                                                          
754
 Nigerian Minister of Mine and Steel Development, Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2010 Made 
Under And Pursuant To the Nigerian Minerals And Mining Act, 2007. 
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so entitled in the community. Based on this Regulation, the first step will 
therefore be to compensate those whose land or other land based assets 
have been requisitioned for mineral activity under the Act. When this has 
been done, the title holder will then be expected to commence the process of 
“proper interaction” with the host community leading to the negotiation of a 
CDA.  
Lastly, failure to pay compensation to anyone so entitled may be a ground for 
the suspension of the mineral title, and its eventual revocation if 30 days have 
passed since the suspension by the Minister.755  
 
6.2. CDA Implementation Structure under the MMA 
This section examines the structure established under the MMA for CDA 
implementation. From the case studies, it has been demonstrated that 
definite governing pillars are necessary if expectations are to coincide with 
outcomes. The aim here is to identify what governing structure has been 
established under the Act, in contradistinction with what this work has found 
to be the basic minimum structure or governing pillars for any CDA process. 
 
6.2.1. Office of the Minister 
The MMA vested so much power in the Nigerian Minister responsible for 
Mines and Minerals. For instance, where a leaseholder is unable to identify 
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 The Nigerian National Assembly, Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, sec. 109. 
302 
 
who the community party is in relation to the CDA process, the MMA provides 
that the matter is to be referred to the Minister for resolution.756 Also, if there is 
failure or inability of the parties to agree, the dispute must be referred to the 
Minister for settlement.757 Furthermore, the Regulation provides that if any 
dispute or complaint arises “from community development agreement 
implementation”, it shall be referred to the Minister for settlement.758  
This author is not convinced that the Minister is the ideal institution to take on 
these responsibilities. The reasons are: 
a. The Minister is a member of the executive branch of the Federation 
who may be from a different part of the country and therefore may 
possess local knowledge required to objectively and dispassionately 
deal with the issues arising from his powers under the MMA; 
b. In the culture where parochial political considerations are allowed to 
cloud the judgement of public officers, a Federal Minister may allow 
politics to get in the way of public interest; 
c. The Minister is likely to be conflicted because the MMA makes the 
Minister a judge in matters in which he/she may be personally or 
officially interested; 
d. The Minister is a political appointee with no security of tenure; 
                                                          
756
 Nigerian Minister of Mine and Steel Development, Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2010 Made 
Under And Pursuant To the Nigerian Minerals And Mining Act, 2007, para. 139 (2) (b). 
757
 The Nigerian National Assembly, Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, sec. 116 (4). 
758
 Nigerian Minister of Mine and Steel Development, Minerals and Mining Regulations, 2010 Made 
Under And Pursuant To the Nigerian Minerals And Mining Act, 2007, para. 139 (1) (c). 
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e. The Minister is likely to be a politician and therefore may be pre-
occupied with so many things or be too busy to provide the kind of 
leadership necessary to drive the CDA process; 
f. The Minister may be an individual who does not have the requisite 
training to discharge quasi-judicial functions. 
g. The quality or integrity of the Minister’s decisions in dispute situations 
may be questioned due to the political nature of that office. 
While it has been consistently argued in this Thesis for favour a constructive 
and more strategic government involvement in the CDA process so as to 
enable it serve the purposes envisaged in Section 116 of the MMA, care must 
be taken to craft the nature of such state involvement. It is important to 
ensure that the nature of that involvement is such that facilitates the process 
rather than inhibit it.  
In the relation to the role assigned to the Minister in the MMA, the point being 
made here is that the role of the Minister for Solid Minerals Development is 
often driven by the revenue motives of the state through acts designed to 
stimulate investment. Following the experience on the field from the case-
study jurisdictions, the primary responsibility of the Minister which is to 
stimulate investors’ interest in the minerals sector often come in direct conflict 
with the interest and perspective of the community vis-a- vis the CDA process 
So, it will be counter-productive to put the Minister in a position in which 
he/she adjudicates on a matter in which he/she is officially (and sometimes 
personally) interested. That will be an inappropriate way to frame state 
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participation in the CDA process as such a design could create a situation in 
which the Minister’s executive functions will be conflicting with his/her quasi-
judicial functions under the CDA process. The best practice is that these 
matters should be the responsibilities of a judicial or quasi-judicial body. 
Alternatively, the Minister could be empowered to set up a committee drawn 
from the CDA parties, a representative of the government of the relevant 
State (not the Federal Government) or Local Government Area, and a 
representative of the traditional institution, to deal with the matters currently 
assigned to the Minister.  
In addition to the reasons given above (one of which is the likely violation of 
the principle of fair-hearing), assigning dispute-resolution to a judicial or 
quasi-judicial body would enhance the credibility of the process because such 
a body is more likely to be insulated from the cause of the disputes. 
Furthermore, there is an added opportunity to benefit from precedents 
established in the course of judicial functions. 
Experiences from Australia and Canada show that major disagreements 
occur with regularity. These disagreements occur around major issues like 
the quantum of cash payments and/or other benefits, and the funding of the 
agreement process, or the inability of the CDA parties to reach an agreement 
for any other reason. And in these jurisdictions, such disputes are 
appropriately assigned to special tribunals and the regular court. 
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Another reason why these omissions could prove fatal is that section 116 of 
the Act makes the conclusion of a CDA a condition to the commencement of 
development activity. Thus, having an appropriate dispute resolution 
mechanism is critical not only to the goal of gaining community benefit but to 
the process of mineral exploration and development. At the moment, Nigerian 
judicial process is generally very slow and expensive. Thus, legal 
proceedings could potentially be a frustrating experience both for the mineral 
leaseholder and for the objective of transferring social and economic benefits 
to host communities. So, there might be a need to create special tribunals 
and/or create special divisions within the regular courts to be manned by 
specially-trained judicial officers. 
 
6.2.2 Community Head 
Similarly, the MMA created a prominent role for certain individuals within the 
host community. For instance, Paragraph 139 (2) and (3) provide that: 
“The signatories to the Community Development Agreement shall be persons 
freely chosen by the generality of the Community to represent them. The 
head of the community shall, prior to the signing of the agreement, submit to 
the Ministry the full names and addresses of the representatives of the 
Community who shall not be less than (3) or more than seven (7).”  
It is clear from this provision that host communities will negotiate through 
appointed representatives. But, the criteria for such appointment of 
representatives are not stated in the MMA. There should be some common 
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sense criteria to ensure that the person appointing and those that are 
appointed are the actual leaders of their people, or are genuinely able to act 
in that capacity. Here, the best practice is to ensure that decisions are made 
in line with the traditional law and custom of the host community. Also, the 
MMA should additionally provide a process for ensuring that the decision-
making process is truly representative. Furthermore, there must be a 
requirement for adoption and ratification of a proposed CDA before it is 
executed. This will estop any member of that community from repudiating the 
agreement subject to the necessary exceptions.  
 
6.2.3. Mining Cadastre Office 
The Mining Cadastre Office has the responsibility to determine the amount of 
compensation which a mineral titleholder may pay to owners and occupiers of 
land acquired or affected by mineral exploration and production.759 This 
provision is likely to introduce some confusion into the CDA process. This is 
because it fails to state how this will work side-by-side with CDA negotiations 
since owners and occupiers of land impacted by a mineral project also qualify 
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 The Nigerian National Assembly, Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, sec. 108. 
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6.2.4. Legal Character of CDAs 
Although this may no longer be in doubt, the MMA provides that CDAs are 
statutory contracts the provisions of which are binding on all the parties 
thereto.760 Also, they are subject to five-yearly review.761 
 
6.2.5. Consultation and Monitoring Framework 
The Act stipulates that the parties to a CDA shall agree on appropriate 
consultative and monitoring frameworks for the agreement.762 This means that 
the parties are expected to include clauses in their CDAs stating the 
procedure and regularity of consultation between the leaseholder and the 
host community. Additionally, the parties must agree on a schedule to monitor 
agreement implementation and the framework for community participation in 
planning, implementation, management and monitoring of activities carried 
out under the agreement.763  Monitoring and agreement implementation are 
critical aspects of both the successful and the not-so-successful CDAs but 
they are arguably one of the least regarded parts of the process. From the 
case studies, this is one of the very problematic areas in nearly all existing 
agreements for the following reasons: 
a) Some CDA practitioners opined that early CDAs were said to be poorly 
drafted which hampers enforcement and implementation. Lawyers that 
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have been part of drafting some of the existing agreements in Canada 
and Australia agree that many, especially earlier CDAs were poorly or 
loosely couched.764  In fact, many Australian lawyers that participated in 
the case studies identified poorly drafted monitoring and 
implementation clauses to be one of the major causes of depressing 
outcomes from many CDAs.765 
b) The downstream effect. This is the problem of over prioritisation of 
concluding an agreement while neglecting other key factors which are 
critical to outcomes. The experience gathered from the field studies 
and studying over a hundred agreements shows that parties to some 
of these agreements were keen to have an agreement, without paying 
similar attention to how to ensure that agreements deliver on their 
promises. 
c) The MMA makes no provision for resourcing a host community to 
engage professionals to assist them with negotiations. Also, it does not 
provide for funding of any part of the agreement process. Furthermore, 
no funding arrangement was proposed. This omission exposes the 
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 AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of Community Agreement: A legal practitioners 
Perspective, 16 April 2013; AU Participant No.11, Is There a Role for Law in the Community 
Agreement Process Apart from Ancillary Provisions Under the Native Title Act?; AU Participant No.9, 
Features of Agreement Implementation in Western Australia: An Implementation Officer’s 
Perspective. 
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 AU Participant No.11, Is There a Role for Law in the Community Agreement Process Apart from 
Ancillary Provisions Under the Native Title Act?; AU Participant No.1, Process and Procedure of 
Community Agreement: A legal practitioners Perspective, 16 April 2013. 
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lack of awareness of the role that these key aspects play in 
determining outcomes. 
d) Similarly, the skill and training are necessary for communities to 
meaningfully participate in the monitoring and implementation 
processes. However, the MMA fails to state who or how this capacity 
gap will be closed.  
These factors show how monitoring and implementation related challenges 
could adversely affect or constrain CDA outcomes. Thus, it is concerning that 
the Act merely granted parties the right to agree on monitoring and 
implementation schedules without addressing these other issues which may 
impede the overall object of the CDA process. 
 
6.3. CDA Structures: Assessment  
From the foregoing, it is easy to understand the gap between the issues 
which the MMA was able to articulate, and make provisions for, and what is in 
fact necessary for a CDA process effectively to function as an instrument of 
local governance. Structuring a CDA as an instrument of local governance 
offers the best option for securing a CDA process with capacity to deliver 
strategic development and community sustainability. 
In other words, the structure established under the Act and the Regulations to 
ensure the “transfer of social and economic benefits to the community” is 




6.3.1. Conceptualisation of a Model CDA Framework for Nigeria 
The topic of this research considers the CDA process as an instrument for 
local governance, social and economic development and community 
sustainability. And the main research question is:  
How can the concept and practice of CDA in Nigerian mining and 
petroleum industries be a vehicle for fostering sustainability and 
development in project areas?  
For the Nigerian CDA arrangement to be able to ensure that social and 
economic benefits reach host communities in a meaningful way, it has to be a 
CDA system that is supported by the broader legal framework and guided by 
certain minimum legal and policy provisions. This thinking is grounded on the 
nature of what modern CDAs are covenanted to do in communities and 
supported by lessons drawn from the field study conducted for this 
research.766  
 
6.4. Framework Option for CDA Governance  
The framework necessary for the Nigerian CDA process to succeed include a 
policy, additional legal framework, capacity resourcing, as well as a key 
institutional framework established to address all the issues raised above.  
 
                                                          
766
 Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Indigenous Land Use Agreement Policy 
Principles (the ILUA Principles)’, 1–2; The Parliament, Mining Act 1992 (Consolidated to No 49 of 




Figure 3: CDA Governance framework 
 
 
6.4.1 CDA-based Policy Perspective 
In addition to the very clear purpose stated in section 116 of the MMA, there 
is a need for a broad policy framework stating why the state wants to transfer 
social and economic benefits to host communities through the CDA process. 
Also, the policy has to provide a perspective and context to community 
sustainability. Additionally, it is important that the policy document articulates 
how the public and private sector will work with host communities and 
identifying the roles and expectations of each stakeholder towards the 
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realisation of the policy objectives. Further, the policy document will have to 
state how the state will interface with as well as leverage the CDA process 
towards achieving the policy objectives. 
Thus, it is critical that the stakeholders realise that a clear policy perspective 
to back up the practice of CDAs is pivotal to successful outcomes. That is, the 
CDA process needs a precise policy foundation to anchor the enforcement or 
actualisation of set objectives. A policy perspective here means a blueprint or 
approach, strategically designed or developed to effectuate whatever object 
or goals that the particular CDA arrangement has been established to 
achieve. In the case of Nigeria, the expressed broad policy direction could 
also be to ‘ensuring that mineral exploration and production leads to the 
transfer of specific social and economic benefits,’ as the MMA puts it.   
If this could also be considered a policy statement, then there should 
additionally be a statement of the stratagem or a calculated plan to achieve 
this. The policy framework must feed into or detail how the CDA process is 
expected to work together with the broader legal process to achieve these 
CDA objectives. 
Thus, mere general statements or imprecise allusions to concepts such as 
sustainability, sustainable development of community, or local economic 
empowerment must be regarded as the first limb of the policy challenge and 
are therefore insufficient. The purpose or object of the CDA practice relates to 
what is intended to be achieved by instituting or encouraging the practice. On 
the other hand, a policy foundation relates to the philosophy or theory 
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supporting or backing up the object, and the steps to achieve the stated 
purposes of the CDA process. 
 
6.4.1.1. Indicative Policy Direction: Community Sustainability  
Although there are many potential policy perspectives on which a CDA 
practice may be anchored, section 116 clearly suggests local empowerment 
and community sustainability as the preferred policy direction.767 This also 
coincides with the analytical perspective of this research.  
Similarly, the preamble to “ILUA Policy Principles” produced by the Australian 
Commonwealth Government states that “…As participants in native title 
negotiations, Commonwealth entities can promote the negotiation of 
innovative native title agreements, building foundations for better functioning 
and more sustainable Indigenous communities by providing benefits which 
include social and economic development opportunities.”768 
 
6.4.1.2 Community Sustainability: Meaning 
The meaning of sustainable community or community sustainability was not 
defined in the two documents referred to above. But this issue has been fully 
addressed in the Analytical Framework Chapter. However, the principle 
                                                          
767
 The Nigerian National Assembly, Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, sec. 116 (2). 
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 Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Indigenous Land Use Agreement Policy 
Principles (the ILUA Principles)’. 
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and/or concept of community sustainability in the context of CDAs 
encapsulates the following: 
 Adverse impact prevention, reduction and mitigation 
 Conflict-free resource development 
 Local capacity building and empowerment 
 Strategic community beneficiation 
 
Thus, if the Nigerian CDA process must ensure community sustainability as 
envisaged by the MMA and as conceptualised by the analytical framework of 
this research, these elements must be present. Apparently, the presence of 
these elements must necessarily warrant that the CDA process (which is 
essential in a private arrangement) closely works collaboratively with key 
institutions of State. In reality, it will be practically impossible to achieve 
strategic local development that will be equally sustainable basically on the 
platform of private agreement. The current structure of the MMA fails to 
provide how the state and its institutions will support the CDA process in 
order to ensure that the purposes are realised. It merely assumed that 
agreement-making with a private company is the essential ingredient for 
successful outcomes. Thus, the state must play an additional role by working 






6.4.1.2.1. Adverse Project Impact Mitigation 
An example of strategic state role lies in strengthening the rules. One of the 
key pillars of community sustainability as conceptualised in the Analytical 
framework is to ensure that avoidable avertable social and environmental 
impacts of resource development are avoided. For Nigeria, instituting a 
community benefits system without equally ensuring that the essential fabrics 
of a society are not permanently damaged will only produce a superficial 
result. Thus, positive impacts through community benefits process alone 
cannot ensure community sustainability. The industry must additionally avoid, 
reduce and mitigate any substantial damage to the ecosystem through 
precautionary approach to resource development. Thus, for there to be a 
meaningful social and economic advancement in community and in other to 
secure sustainable development in communities, both of these ingredients 
must co-exist. 
 
6.4.1.2.2. The Concept of Community Sustainability 
The concept of community sustainability entails that the first point in any 
attempt to secure the future of communities must involve measures to 
prevent, reduce or mitigate the adverse impact of mineral-project-related 
activities. This would normally require the cooperation of both the state and 
the extractive industries corporations working with affected communities. To 
this end, workable environmental regulations must exist and be enforced.  
Also, corporations must commit to upholding the best industry practice 
relating to environmental responsibility, while those likely to be affected must 
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be brought on board in the decision-making and implementation processes. 
The collaborative input of these stakeholders to decision-making and 
implementation processes will ensure that community land and watercourses 
are preserved in their near-pristine states so as to continue to service the 
needs of those that depend on them. But the reality in many places is that 
governments and corporations often highlight or play up capital and other 
investments in host communities while disregarding the need to protect land 
and water sources from pollution. But for corporate social investments in 
communities to be meaningful, they must come in addition to responsible 
environmental practice.  
 
Furthermore, positive social and economic contributions (to communities) 
from energy projects through the CDA benefit process must be structured 
with community sustainability as its core. Thus, community benefit process 
should be designed and strategically applied in a way that addresses both the 
immediate and long term needs of communities. As it relates to addressing 
the immediate and future needs of community, the configuration of CDA-
based benefits must be in the right proportion. More attention should be 
focused on investing into the future of the benefiting community. 
Thus, for host communities to have any chance of sustainability, both 





6.4.2. CDA Policy Content: Levels of Policy Making 
This Thesis posits that CDA policy requirements may be grouped into two 
categories or levels of policy-making. They are the micro-level and the macro-
level CDA policy decisions which are needed for a properly anchored CDA 
application. Micro-level policy entails a clear statement relating to the specific 
goals which are expected to be achieved via the institution of the CDA 
process. Nigeria has decided to adopt a micro policy perspective of 
sustainable development through the transfer of social and economic 
benefits. Also, there has to be framework on how CDA benefits will be 
structured taking into account the present and long term needs of the 
communities. Communities must be properly guided on the demands of 
sustainable development and the needs to allocate CDA benefits towards 
meeting their present and future needs. For instance, one of the lessons on 
the field was the approach adopted by Rio Tinto in all its agreements. 
Communities are encouraged to allocate financial benefits in the ratio of 80 
percent and 20 percent to future and present needs, respectively. 
 
Additionally, there would be a need to develop a CDA policy around other 
heads of community benefits such as employment, contracting, 
entrepreneurial skill development, etc. Nigeria should therefore create a 
policy position relating to how develop the rights skill set to meet CDA 
employment and contracting requirements for communities. 
On the other hand, macro-level policy will require policymakers to address the 
question of how the intended objects or goals are to be achieved; for 
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instance, the extent of government involvement in the process, especially in 
relation to leveraging opportunities inherent in such projects so as to deepen 
and expand social and economic outcomes.  
Secondly, macro-level policy issues would encompass things like tax 
treatment of cash benefits. That is, whether the CDA-based cash receipts or 
any part thereof will be taxable or not. Thirdly, it includes adherence to the 
principle of non-subrogation of governmental duties. That is, the broad policy 
must recognise that the CDA process is no opportunity for turning proponents 
into surrogate or de facto governments. As a result, governments would be 
required to support, re-enforce, and leverage CDA-related opportunities and 
not undermine the process through conflicting policies.  The process will 
potentially be undermined where, for instance, the state withholds (either 
partially or completely) statutory or non- statutory financial support to a 
community on the account of substantial CDA- based cash benefits, or where 
investments in social services are scaled down for the same reason.  
 
6.4.2.1 CDA Policy: The Three  Way Test  
This Thesis proposes a ‘Three Way Test’ that CDA policy must embrace. The 
test requires that three questions must be asked- the why, how, and who 
questions.  
I) the first question is: Why have CDAs as an instrument of seeking to transfer 
social and economic benefits to communities? Or why the choice of the CDA 
practice as a means of facilitating sustainability in local communities within 
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the context of mineral exploration and development? The Nigerian Minerals 
and Mining Act and some documents from the Australian’ Commonwealth 
Government, (including some State Governments) generally alludes to this 
requirement. But there has to be a next step in the policy analysis of the why 
question. 
This further analysis has to do with the needs and peculiarities of the relevant 
community, region or state. For instance, it includes the question whether 
there are specific social, economic, or capacity issues which the CDA process 
is designed to address. Secondly, it could relate to whether there are context-
specific challenges associated with mineral exploration and production such 
as, land disputes, reduction/management of project induced conflict, social 
and environmental displacements, local empowerments, skills development, 
or bridging inequality gaps.  
Thirdly, the policy foundation could include using the CDA process to 
implement or enforce some legal or political rights which a narrow group or 
community of people have over a territory. In the case of Australia and 
Canada for instance, the CDA process has become an intrinsic, but largely 
unintended, part of the legal process for the recognition and enforcement of 
Aboriginal land rights and interests. Also, CDAs are now considered potential 
options towards efforts to bridging the glaring inequality gap which is evident 
among Aboriginal Australians. 
ii) The how question: the how question entails the use of statistical data for 
planning community intervention measures. Here, it is necessary to identify 
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capacity needs, availability of relevant skill set, training, as well as the 
financial needs for agreement negotiation and implementation. The reason is 
that complaints concerning the lack of qualified or skilled persons taking up 
contacted job and contracts opportunities are prevalent in varying degrees in 
all jurisdictions covered in this work.  
The other limb of the how question relates to funding agreements and 
implementation processes, enabling communities to enlist relevant experts to 
assist communities both at negotiation and implementation stages where 
necessary.  
In the case of Nigeria, there is an added need for those experts to additionally 
be CDA-literate or to have or acquire the requisite knowledge of the 
process.769 
In other words, competent professionals are needed to guide and correctly 
advise parties as to their respective options in the CDA process. These 
special skills presently are non-existent in Nigeria. Most people in the relevant 
regulatory agencies, including lawyers are unaware of the import of section 
116 of the 2007 Minerals and Mining Act. 
iii) Lastly, the who question relates to which state institutions and government 
agencies would be necessary partners, stakeholders or facilitators of the 
process, as well as detailing what each institution’s role is in the process. The 
only prominent role in the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act is the one 
                                                          
769
 Morellato, A Legal Practitioner’s Perspective to the IBA process; Kanaga Dharmananda SC, Senior 
Counsel at Fountain Chambers, An Expert Assessment of the Community Agreement Process from 
Industry and Community Perspectives. 
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reserved for the “Minister”. There needs to be an elaborate discussion around 
the role and responsibilities of tiers of governments, and governmental 
agencies, and a framework for how these institutions could work together to 
ensure that the CDA process meets expected outcomes. 
 
6.5. Legal Component 
This Thesis has sought to establish that some form of legal framework is 
critical to the successful outcomes in CDA practice. For Nigeria, this holds 
particularly true. Nigeria has elected to enact a practice that is new to her 
legal system and not particularly known to most Nigerians. Also, Nigerian 
legal and institutional structures are generally unfamiliar with the practical 
challenges which a mandatory CDA practice normally presents. Thus, without 
the help of the right regulatory framework, these institutions may not be able 
to support the process adequately. 
The question then is: What is the nature of the legal framework that this 
Thesis proposes in order to ensure that Nigeria’s CDA process becomes the 
vehicle or instrument for local development and community sustainability 
around energy project areas? Simply put, it is a legal framework which, in 
addition to imposing CDA obligations, provides a clear implementation 
structure that is able to process expectations into outcomes. Some key 





6.5.1 Areas of Legislative Inputs 
The MMA did well in espousing the purposes of the CDA process that it has 
instituted. But, it failed in the articulation of what is needed to make the 
process deliver on those purposes. The area calling for additional regulatory 
input covers the following broad areas: Dispute resolution framework; 
Funding and capacity resourcing; Implementation structure(s); and 
Institutional supports.   
 
6.5.2. Dispute Resolution Procedure (DRP) 
The common CDA disputes procedure covers the following: 
i. Inability to identify who the community is in a particular case; 
ii. Disputes within qualifying communities relating to whether to 
negotiate with, or to accept the offer made by a proponent; 
iii. Disagreements relating to agreement implementation; 
iv. Disputes relating to funding or resourcing of CDA negotiation and 
implementation;  
v. Disputes relating to non-implementation or breach of all or any part 
of an agreement; and 
vi. In the case of Nigeria, a breach of any of the provisions of the 
MMA. 
The problems with the DRP established under the MMA have been 
sufficiently address earlier in this Chapter. But it is worth reiterating the 
paramountcy of a proper DRP mechanism for the CDA process.  An 
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appropriate dispute resolution mechanism must be seen to be independent 
from governmental influence as well as be able to deliver impassionate 
decisions. Thus, a combination of mediation, tribunals and the court systems 
is more appropriate given the nature of potential CDA challenges. These 
options also accord with best practices. 
 
6.5.2.1. Mediation 
While a combination in DRP is recommended, allocation of functions should 
be done subject to the nature of the dispute and the unique character of each 
institution. Mediation may then be suitable for many of the pre-agreement 
disputes both within a community or communities and between the 
community and a proponent. This involves the use of a neutral party to try 
and get parties to come to an agreement. It has the advantage of not being 
adversarial in nature. 
 
6.5.2.2. Tribunals 
The DRP could potentially involve the use of a judicial or quasi-judicial 
Tribunal to adjudicate disputes which could not be resolved through 
mediation. In Australia, for instance, section 35 of the NTA permits any of the 
parties to approach the NNTT where parties are unable to reach an 
agreement after six months of negotiations. The vesting statute should set out 
conditions precedent to a party being able to validly invoke its jurisdiction. 
Such conditions may include a requirement that parties negotiate in good 
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faith. Also, the Tribunal should have jurisdiction to approve the 
commencement or suspension of a project where any of the parties has failed 
the good faith test. Also, the Tribunal could order parties back to the 
negotiation table upon conditions. Furthermore, the Tribunal should have the 
jurisdiction to inquire into and to decide the substantive dispute between the 
parties. That is, it should have the power of full judicial review. This will 
obviate situation like the one in Australia where the NNTT is stripped of 
jurisdiction to entertain disputes relating to any benefit package (commercial 
terms) demanded by a community. Any tribunal established for the Nigerian 
CDA process should be empowered to inquire and to determine questions 
bothering on commercial terms or quantum of benefits. This will be a more 
reasonable and fairer path to dispute resolution. Also, this approach will be 
necessary because the Nigerian CDA process makes the transfer of benefits 
to community one of the key objectives of the process. 
 
6.5.2.3. Court 
The Federal or the State High Court should have primary jurisdiction, inter 
alia, to determine CDA-related land disputes, breaches of contract, or other 
serious disputes between the parties or involving the state or an agency of 
the state. Appeals may also lie to the High Court from a tribunal’s decision. 
Special divisions may be created within these courts manned by Judges with 
special training in the law and practice of CDAs. Training should also be 
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given to them relating to contemporary CDA practices, best practice in the 
area, and the business perspective of CDA arrangements.  
One advantage of a properly structured DRP is that decisions will assist 
establishing case-tested ground rules for the process. The benefit of 
precedents will help towards capacity-building and the development CDA 
principles in a way that a Minister’s decision or opinion cannot achieve. As 
such, they will inject an element of certainty and predictability into the CDA 
process. 
 
6.5.3 Institutional Support 
The support of both government and non-government organisations (NGOs) 
will be critical for local development and community sustainability. For 
instance, one of the elements of sustainability as conceptualised in this work 
is that of the prevention, reduction and mitigation of adverse project impacts 
on the key infrastructures of communities. This cannot be achieved except 
through the CDA process and provided the environmental agencies and 
NGOs collaborate along areas of shared interests. Agreement monitoring and 
implementation groups under the CDA arrangement could work with 
environmental agencies who can benefit from local knowledge during 
environmental assessments and inspection.  
Furthermore, an institution similar to Australia’s NTRB will be useful to bridge 
the capacity gap which may exist in some host communities. During the early 
stages of the native title process in Australia, indigenous communities in each 
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of the fifteen zones were required to either appoint or establish their NTRBs. 
Their role was essentially to resource the native title process by assisting the 
group they represent in terms of the right professional skills in the 
communities engagement with third parties. This will be ensure that 
communities prejudiced in their engagement with more sophisticated parties.  
Also, the credibility of the CDA process is enhanced where the community 
parties are well resourced through the assistance of professionals. 
Additionally, encouraging communities to organize themselves in this way will 
make it easier to engage benefiting host communities including receiving 
assistance and donations from third parties.  
Others areas of collaboration may lie with governmental agencies responsible 
for example labour and productivity, employment, etc. These institutions could 
assist the CDA process in identifying areas of capacity or technical support in 
order to enable communities to maximize the many potentials of the CDA 
arrangement.  
 
6.5.4 Funding and Capacity Resourcing 
The MMA seems to have either carefully avoided legislating on funding or 
assumed that the proponent will be responsible for CDA-related funding 
issues. Funding is generally required for agreement negotiations, community 
meetings, and agreement monitoring and implementation. Even in Australia 
and Canada, where partial government funding exists to help CDA parties 
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comply with legal requirements concerning consultation and accommodation 
of Indigenous people, funding still remains an issue.  
The current practice in Australia and Canada is that the proponents fund 
agreement-making and implementation. However, this always subject to the 
discretion of the proponent who reserves the right to choose what to provide 
funding for regardless of the views of the community party.  
Also, once a proponent wins an agreement, and the project is underway, the 
incentive to continue to fund other aspects of the agreement diminishes. 
Thus, the implementation and monitoring elements of the relationship are the 
usual casualties. Community sustainability and actual benefits are extremely 
hard to realise if a critical aspect of the process is not properly covered.  
Thus, the MMA needs to be amended in order to make provision for funding 
support for strategic areas of the process such as capacity building, 
resourcing and implementation and monitoring. Communities may be required 
to set a legal entity similar  to Australia’s NTRBs so that communities can 
receive funding or other assistance for facilitate agreements, monitor them as 
well as to fund other CDA-related capacity resourcing activities for the 
community. 
Furthermore, where the issue relates to a boundary dispute or disputes over 
land ownership, the state should fund the resolution of such disputes in line 
with best practice. 
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Similarly, there is a need to invest in education, scholarship and skills 
development in communities in order to provide a sizeable pool of 
employable persons that would take advantage of CDA opportunities. Without 
proactive action in this direction, it usually takes up to a decades or more to 
develop local people for filling the vacancies. The danger is that the earliest 
opportunities often go to a competent ‘outsider’ who possess the necessary 
skills for available job opportunities. All these must be articulated and 
provided for through an appropriate policy framework. 
 
6.5.5. Agreement Implementation Structure 
The existence of a proper agreement structure represents the most critical 
aspect of any focused CDA process. No matter what the agreements contain 
or promise, the realisation of those promises will be impossible unless a 
suitable implementation structure is in place to midwife expectations to reality. 
Such is the importance of an agreement implementation structure. Thus, the 
Nigerian legal framework should consider enabling implementation structures 
in the following areas. 
 
6.5.5.1. Benefit Management System (BMS) 
A BMS relates to how CDA-based benefits, including cash benefits are 
received and administered by communities to CDA arrangements. The 
options are whether to administer such benefits through individuals 
(community chiefs), or to create a distinct juristic structure. This is another 
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principal determinant of whether a CDA process can be a tool for 
sustainability and local development. 
There is no best practice approach to this in any of the jurisdictions and this is 
why outcomes have been inconsistent. 
But this work argues that institutionalisation of BMSs is fundamental to the 
quest for community sustainability and strategic local development. 
Management of community benefits through village heads and chiefs 
generally produces unsustainable outcomes.770 Thus, the following options 
are available. 
 
6.5.5.1.1. Community Corporations 
One option may be to incorporate community corporations under the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act. The MMA will have to set the basic 
composition for these corporations and the rules to ensure corporate 
governance, due process and accountability. These Corporations will be 
juristic persons, with powers to hold and to acquire properties, and to sue and 
be sued. Also, they may act as representatives for the communities or the 
areas or regions that they represent. In other words, they will become the 
community for the purposes of CDAs. This makes it easier for community 
identification to take place. 
                                                          
770
 Federal Court of Australia, Weribone on behalf of the Mandandanji People v State of Queensland, 
FCA 255, 68,69,71, 88–90 (2013). 
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Other functions of these corporations may include receiving information, 
getting employment offers from proponents and acting as a liaison between 
proponents and suitable candidates. Also, they could serve as platforms for 
community capacity-building and trainings, and be a source of local 
knowledge for companies wishing to do business in those regions. 
Corporations may be established as regional corporations or one in each 
state. 
 
6.5.5.1.2. Incorporation of Trust 
A trust could also be incorporated or an existing one appointed to hold and 
invest incomes from CDAs on behalf of communities. The emerging industry 
led approach in Australia is to incorporate two trusts under each agreement: 
(I) Direct Benefit Trust; and (ii) the Investment Trust. A significant portion of 
the income goes to the Investment Trust account and is to be invested for the 
benefit of future generations and community sustainability. The Direct Benefit 
Trust usually attracts one-third of the income and is kept for short-term 
financial needs of the community or its members. 
 The establishment of these structures is fundamental to successful 
outcomes. This research’s findings from the field exercises support this 
conclusion. The point of disagreement was that governments should, through 
regulations, dictate to communities how to organise their own affairs. 
Nevertheless, the views expressed by Rares J in the Australian case of Leslie 
Weribone & Ors v. State of Queensland clearly indicates the direction in 
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which modern CDA practices should be heading.771 The relevant portions of 
this case have already been quoted in Chapter Four.  
Similarly, nearly every stakeholder interviewed for this work agrees that the 
current practice and some of the outcomes are less than desirable. The point 
of divergence merely relates to the appropriate person or authority that will 
introduce the needed reform. While this work favours targeted but limited 
state involvement through law and policy, many stakeholders in Canada and 
Australia insist on the rights of indigenous communities to self-determination- 
in this case, to wholly dictate the direction of their own development. 
For Nigeria, however, the circumstances are different. The CDA obligation 
confers a right to negotiate CDAs on communities solely on the grounds of 
section 116 of the mining law. So, it is legitimately expectant and accords with 
sound reasoning that necessarily operational structures be established in 
order to ensure that the objectives set out in the law are effectuated.  
 
6.6. Establishment of Essential Institutions 
For the CDA process to attain the proposed objective of aiding community 
sustainability through the transfer of the anticipated social and economic 
benefits, some essential institutions must be established. Some of the 
institutions that would be needed to assist in implementing CDA regulatory 





requirements as well as facilitating all aspect of the practice include the 
following. 
 
6.6.1 Community Development Bureau 
For easy implementation of the mandates of the CDA process as contained in 
the law and policy framework, there would be a need to establish a special 
bureau in the government department responsible for mines and minerals 
development or the Ministry of Petroleum Resources in the case of oil and 
gas. The Bureau may be styled ‘Community Development Bureau’ and its 
responsibilities are to include administrative duties, coordination of the 
governance framework, research and development, acting as liaison for other 
stakeholders, facilitating agreements, and hosting a functional CDA 
resourcing and information centre. 
A bureau is essential because experience from other practicing jurisdictions 
clearly shows that the CDA process is a tasking and highly specialised 
process. As a result, there is a need for a specialised department to 
coordinate these support systems designed to ensure that the process 
operates reasonably smoothly and efficiently. A similar arrangement does not 
exist in the current Nigerian framework. 
 
6.6.2 Community Development Fund 
Having dedicated funds available to service the funding needs of some 
essential aspects of the CDA process is crucial to achieving speedy 
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conclusion of agreements and their effective implementation. The Fund may 
be part of the annual budgeting process or a contributory fund with 
contributions drawn from both the public and the private sectors. In particular, 
government and other institutional assistances may be channelled through 
this body. The Fund will be used for resourcing agreements, training, 
scholarship, skills acquisition, resolving boundaries issues, or other areas of 
the CDA process which cannot be totally funded by the private sector. As 
stated earlier, a similar funding arrangement exists in Australia and Canada, 
which funds specific areas of interest to the state. 
 
6.6.3. CDA Register and Confidentiality 
Statistical information relating to existing agreements and the accruing 
outcomes would be a veritable resource for measuring the success or failure 
of specific CDA relationships. Community sustainability through the transfer of 
specific social and economic benefits is the projected outcome of the CDA 
process in Nigeria. This may require the establishment of a CDA Register and 
a provision to ensure that parties deposit a copy of every CDA with a 
designated authority (such as the Registrar of CDAs). Alternatively, a form 
could be created which contains all necessary information to be completed by 
parties at specific stages of the relationship. The aim would be to obtain 
useful data so as to enable both governments and stakeholders to compare 
projections with realities in individual CDAs with a view to determining 
whether set objectives are being realised or are likely to be realised. 
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6.6.4. Education and Training 
Education and training for community people aimed at development and 
increasing capacity to negotiate and to meaningfully participate in decision 
making and implementation of negotiated agreements would be central to 
outcomes. Furthermore, community people would require both training and 
sensitization to enable them to understand the aims and objectives of the 
CDA process. A good understanding of its purpose will reduce disputes and 
misuse of the process.  
Such a training and enlightenment drive is important for a country such as 
Nigeria where some segments of the population have in the past pushed for 
the right to control mineral resources within their states or regions. The CDA 
process will not be the appropriate forum for this kind of discussion due to the 
obvious constitutional import vis-a-vis the subject-matter. Also, companies 
operating in the extractives industries do not have the right to enter into such 
negotiations or to grant such demands. 
 
6.6.4.1. Establishment of Safeguards 
The MMA also could consider the introduction of what is here referred to as 
“Triggers and Thresholds”. Triggers and Threshold may be useful in a 
compulsory CDA such as has been imposed. They help to secure a project’s 
revenue capacity from potential overloading through CDA-based obligations. 
At least in theory, some communities’ beneficiation demand from a project 
could exceed the carrying capacity of that project. If, for example, a 
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community demands agreement on each of the items listed in section 116 
even where the nature or size of a proposed project may not sustain that level 
of demand, conflicts could arise in the absence of a Trigger and Threshold 
mechanism. In other words, a Trigger and Threshold mechanism ensures that 
quantum of community beneficiation is kept within the size of each project. 
However, this may be unnecessary depending on the level of sophistication 
of individual communities. On the other hand, projects should not under-
beneficiate. But, through better resourcing, competent community negotiators 
should be able to deal with this risk. 
 
6.6.5. Community Development, Resourcing and Sustainability 
What is community development? Within the context of this work, community 
development involves at least two areas of development: human capital 
development and physical development.  
Human capital development towards community sustainability will necessitate 
strategic investment in education, scholarship, training and entrepreneurship. 
The reasons for this are that CDAs normally contain clauses on employment, 
business development and contracting. However, the reality in many places is 
that available opportunities do not always coincide with the availability of 
requisite skilled labour in the communities.  
So, there has to be a deliberate, timely and strategic investment in human 
capital development. If this is done, present living conditions in those 
communities will improve significantly. Furthermore, any capacity gained 
during the subsistence of one project would be transferable and available to 
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drive subsequent projects. In other words, members of host communities 
would have acquired some transferable skills which can potentially secure 
sustainable income-generating capacity and ultimately contribute to a 
sustainable community. 
Secondly, physical development in communities, which ordinarily would not 
have existed but for the presence of a resource projects, additionally 
contributes to community sustainability. Project-induced physical 
development in rural communities normally arises either as part of 
governments overtures to facilitate certain investment opportunity or through 
the CDA process. 
If carefully planned and executed, these developments of physical 
infrastructure could lead to community sustainability. This will happen if they 
are able to create employment or broaden business opportunities options in 




This Chapter has addressed both the main and subsidiary questions of the 
research undertaken for this Thesis. It established that CDAs are potentially 
strategic of community sustainability, and social and economic development 
within communities in and around project areas. However, specific deliberate 
steps must be taken along the following avenues in order to ensure that 
expectations ultimately become reality: 
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 A clear policy framework which defines the tasks and procedures and 
options for achieving them; 
 A legal framework which strategically sets out the framework covering 
the critical aspects of the CDA process; 
 Establishment of critical institutional structures to drive the mission; 
and 
 A careful articulation of resourcing needs and resourcing areas of 
capacity needs. 
Furthermore, this Chapter concludes that the Nigerian CDA practice can be a 
tool for strategic community development sustainability if the proposals of this 















Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 





7.1 Summary of Findings, Contribution, Conclusion, and Further 
Research 
This concluding Chapter summarises the findings of this research, the 
research contribution, the final conclusion and provides direction for future 
research. 
 
7.2 Summary of Findings 
This Thesis establishes that CDAs serve two principal purposes. First, they 
are used for structuring community engagement towards the prevention, 
amelioration and the management of adverse impacts of resource 
development to host communities. Secondly, CDAs are useful in structuring 
community benefit programmes in resource development context. The 
provisions of sections 116 and 125 of Nigeria’s MMA analysed in this Thesis 
establish that the CDA process have been designed to serve these purposes.   
 
The purposes of this Chapter are: 
 To summarise the focus of this Thesis and to highlight some of 
the important findings; 
 To summarise this Thesis’ contribution to the knowledge; and 




Following the imposition of the CDA practice as a legal requirement in the 
Nigerian mining sector, and against the background of the increasing 
proliferation of the practice in other jurisdictions, this Thesis examined the 
CDA process as an instrument of local governance, sustainability and 
strategic community development within the context of energy project 
activities. The research undertaken by this Thesis has done a detailed 
exploration of the concept and practice of CDAs, the reasons why they are 
negotiated and in what circumstances CDAs are used in different 
jurisdictions.   
Also, field studies were conducted for this research to examine the concept 
and practice of CDAs in Canada and Australia which are the most established 
CDA jurisdictions. Some important lessons were learned relating to the utility 
of the practice, current challenges and what should be done to address the 
challenges so as to enable the CDA process to function effectively not only as 
a community engagement tool but also as an instrument of community 
sustainability and strategic social and economic development. 
This Thesis finds that the CDA process started or gained acceptance in 
Australia and Canada as a corporate-community engagement tool within the 
extractive industries. The initial focus of the practice was the prevention 
and/or the reduction of the conflict between community and mining/petroleum 
industry by seeking and obtaining community consent, and the 
acknowledgement of indigenous rights or interests in traditionally-held lands. 
As a result, the initial focus of the CDA process was industry-community 
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engagement as part of proponents’ CSR agenda.  This practice has since 
evolved, and now addresses a wide range of issues including providing social 
and economic benefits to communities. 
In addition to the commercial reason for concluding CDAs, this Thesis also 
finds that states are increasingly permitting or encouraging the CDA process 
for different reasons. In Australia and Canada for   example, the CDA process 
is essentially regarded as an important procedural part of how the state and 
the mineral industry engage with indigenous people in relation to activities on 
land that is subject to aboriginal claim or interest.  
On the other hand, states in developing countries see in the CDA process, an 
opportunity to address the underlying causes of energy project-induced 
conflicts such as poverty, and the lack of physical and economic development 
in the rural areas. Nigeria is one those countries that view the CDA process 
as an instrument social and economic engineering for host communities. This 
is clearly evident from the provisions of section 116 of the MMA. 
Another finding of this Thesis is that the CDA processes in Australia and 
Canada are essentially industry-led processes. In other words, they are not a 
creation of any law or policy in force in these states. Thus, as a result of the 
fortuitous emergence of the CDA processes in these two countries, and the 
largely unguided evolution, the entire CDA process is expectedly beset by a 
number of procedural and substantive challenges. This thesis demonstrates 
what these challenges are and how they have constrained the realisation of 
the CDAs’ multi-dimensional potentials.  
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These challenges have been discussed in great detail in Chapters Four and 
Five of this Thesis and can be categorised into procedural and substantive 
challenges. The procedural challenges include unequal capacity in 
negotiation, the lack of suitably skilled personnel in most communities, 
inadequate resourcing and funding, weak dispute resolution procedures, and 
flawed agreement implementation approaches. Conversely, substantive 
challenges includes the lack of a suitable legal and an underlying policy 
governance for CDA negotiation and implementation, inappropriate funding 
structure for agreement negotiation and implementation, the absence of a 
conceptual framework, the inability of governments to appropriately leverage 
CDA process, the absence of trigger and threshold mechanism in the CDA 
process, and the general lack of a fitting BMS for CDA benefit management.  
 
The caveat however is that for the CDA process to serve as an instrument of 
community sustainability and for the transfer of social and economic benefits 
from resource development as proposed by Nigeria, the Nigerian government 
must do more than just legislating a compulsory CDA process.  
To successfully deploy CDAs to take on more intricate purposes such as the 
ones contained in the Nigerian law, serious regulatory work must be done 
which will bridge the gaps identified in this Thesis. Also the right synergy must 
be built to align the CDA process (which is essentially a private process) with 
public sector ethos through a government policy designed to leverage the 
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benefits of the private sector propelled process to deepen and expand local 
development. 
 
Also, this Thesis finds that the CDA process as it is currently practiced in the 
case study jurisdictions, and as has been subsequently adopted by other 
countries (including Nigeria), lacks the requisite structure to enable it to 
process the parties’ expectations into successful outcomes. The basis for this 
conclusion can be found or distilled from the analysis carried out in Chapters 
Four and Five and from the evaluation of existing CDAs. Whilst individual 
stakeholder in the agreement process (i.e. the parties as well as the state 
which often maintains a passive interest) seems to have a clear 
understanding of what they want from the process, the current approach  to 
the CDA process give focuses more on securing immediate gains rather than 
a sustainable community benefit process.  
Furthermore, there is no minimum governing standard for the current CDA 
process. Most stakeholders in the CDA process do not consider it necessary 
to establish a minimum-standard to guide the process. The current approach 
largely serves the narrow interest of the key stakeholders i.e. to obtain 
community consent and extract a benefit package as part of the consent 
process. But for the CDA process to function or serve the purposes stated the 
in the MMA, establishing some minimum-standards (as already stated above) 




Furthermore, this thesis finds that the CDA process can be a critical tool for 
implementing the Ruggie’s Protect, Respect and Remedy framework (Ruggie 
Framework), particularly as it relates to the impact of businesses on the rights 
of those impacted by mining and petroleum E & P activities. The Ruggie 
Framework proceeded from the mandate given to Professor John Ruggie to 
“identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regards to 
human rights.”772 The Ruggie Framework comprises three main principles 
which are:  
(i) the state’s duty to protect against human rights abuses by third 
parties, including businesses;  
The CDA process will assist Nigeria to comply with her responsibility to 
protect against human right abuses through the inherent capability of 
CDAs to narrow interests of parties and to isolate potential rights 
infringement items for party’s attention. As a result, potential human 
right violations will be proactively managed minimized or prevented 
using the CDA process mechanisms. 
(ii) The corporate responsibility to respect human rights;  
Corporate responsibility to respect human rights begins with an 
accurate understanding of the scope of a community’s legal rights and 
interest. The intense and continuing community engagement 
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opportunity provided by the CDA process enables proponents to 
identify potential rights violation issues which may then be addressed. 
There is therefore the need for a more effective access to remedies 
procedure for rights’ breaches by third parties, including corporations.773 The 
CDA process has an effective dispute resolution mechanism which reduces a 
party’s tendency to resort to self-help, social unrest or other obstructive 
conduct. Also, where any established rights have been violated, the CDA 
process provides a procedure for the ventilation of grievances and for seeking 
redress by an aggrieved party.774   
Finally, this Thesis finds that the MMA provisions on CDA are well intended 
forward-looking piece of legislation that seeks to apply innovative solutions to 
established or historical anomalies within Nigeria’s rural communities which 
host extractive industry activities. However, it failed to appreciate that 
additional regulatory framework is essential before the CDA process can 
become adaptable to other uses beyond its original scope as a community 
engagement tool.   
Thus, the Nigerian CDA process instituted under the MMA is inchoate and 
therefore lacking the ability to ensure the transfer of social and economic 
benefits from mineral production projects to host communities. The grounds 
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for this conclusion have been elaborated in Chapter Six and therefore need 
not be reiterated here. The foregoing findings are important to the specific 
focus of the research undertaken for this thesis for the following reasons.  
 
Firstly, the CDA practice is increasingly being proliferated or being adopted in 
more jurisdictions without a rigorous interrogation of some of the basic 
assumptions underlying the practice.  In the case of Nigeria, the country 
seeks to expand the functionality of the CDA process to cover responsibilities 
and objects which are traditionally reserved for the state. 
 
Also, to effectively engage the CDA process for the advancement of 
community governance and sustainable development, an appropriate BMS is 
necessary to drive agreement implementation more effectively and for the 
realisation of the set goals.  
 
One of the main purposes of this concluding Chapter is to answer the 
research question or to reiterate the answer to the question that has been 
provided in Chapter Six. The main question posed in Chapter One and 
addressed in Chapter Six of this Thesis is: How can the concept and practice 
of CDA in the mining and petroleum industries be a vehicle for fostering 
sustainability and development in project area? This main research question 
is posed within the context of the Nigerian mining and petroleum industries. 
Furthermore, two lines of enquiries were raised in order to adequately 
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address the main question. The two lines of enquiries are: (1) how can 
sustainability and development be contextualized within the framework of 
mining and petroleum extraction activities? 
(2) How can or in what areas can law and policy facilitate the CDA practice as 
a tool for sustainability and development in energy project areas? 
 This Thesis establishes that the concept and practice of CDA can be a 
strategic instrument for fostering sustainability and local development in 
projects areas if it is constituted to function as an instrument for local 
governance. This means that the CDA process should be viewed, not just as 
a private arrangement between the industry party and the affected 
community, but as a process that must be strategically enabled, supported or 
more actively facilitated by the state. This is the only way that CDAs can 
achieve the noble objectives stipulated in the section 116 of the MMA.  
 
The essence of the state’s role is to enable or empower the process through 
legal and policy measures so as to deliver on the expectations of the parties, 
and to advance the cause of sustainability and strategic community 
development in project areas.  This is important because the promises and 
the good aspirations embodied in those private arrangements require the 
support of the state and its agencies before those promises and aspirations 
can materialise into successful and sustainable outcomes. The areas in which 
the state must intervene in the CDA process before it can become a vehicle 
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for fostering sustainable community development have been discussed in 
Chapter Six and therefore does not need to be restated here. 
Also, the concepts of sustainability and development were contextualised in 
this thesis in two critical ways. Firstly, for a community to be made 
sustainable within the context of CDAs, mineral development and it adverse 
impacts, two elements must be present: (I) energy project development must 
prevent, reduce or mitigate all the adverse impact of resource development; 
and (ii) community benefit programmes under the CDA arrangement must be 
strategic, focusing on addressing both the present challenges posed by 
energy projects, and the future needs of a community. In order words, the 
community benefit arrangement must, where applicable, ensure that 
communities have alternate source(s) of livelihood especially where it 
becomes difficult or impossible for them to continue or maintain their 
traditional means of livelihood as a result of E &P activities. Put simply, one of 
the operational and procedural conditions needed to enable the CDA process 
to function as a tool for community governance is that corporate social and 
environmental responsibility must co-exist with a strategic community benefit 
system. 
Secondly, community development must encompass human capital 
development and targeted physical development of communities. A 




To achieve the above, law and policy must play some role and that is where 
the state should be more actively engaged. It is not enough that a state 
supports or encourages proponents to enter into CDAs. There should be a 
conceptual perspective underlying the CDA process, and a holistic policy 
framework which demonstrates how the CDA process will be engaged to 
achieve specific purposes. Furthermore, this holistic policy approach needs to 
detail or specify how the state will interface with the CDA process so as to 
realise or to facilitate the realisation of those purposes through an appropriate 
regulatory framework such as the one proposed in Chapter Six. Thus, it is 
important that every CDA process should project a goal, vision or an ideal 
which all the stakeholders are able to subscribe to. The current practice 
seems to revolve around each party negotiating to secure a narrow or 
parochial interest. The analytical perspective of this thesis is an example of 
an overarching vision or goal which transcends the narrow interests of any of 
the parties to a CDA.   
 
This Thesis adopts the concept of community sustainability as the analytical 
framework or the prism through which the research undertaken for this Thesis 
may be viewed or understood. The concept of community sustainability is a 
concept drawn from the general principle of SD. The Chapter Two of this 
Thesis examines some of the various definitions or descriptions of SD that 
are seen in literature. These definitions perceive SD essentially from three 
perspectives i.e. the conservation perspective, the perspective of the 
349 
 
environment, and the social-economic perspective. From the analysis done in 
Chapter Two, this work concluded that most of these definitions engage or 
perceive SD as a principle whose main focus is intergenerational equity. 
Additionally, this work argues that in addition to intergenerational equity, SD 
similarly seeks to address the problem of intra-generational inequities brought 
about by social and economic development. 
 
Furthermore, Chapter Two of this Thesis went further to conceptualise and 
explain the concept of community sustainability. It stated that community 
sustainability is a concept that has socio-economic and environmental 
components, and entails the conservation and protection of the human 
environment and strategic community development. Thus, community 
sustainability requires that community development through the CDA 
beneficiation arrangements must be done after carefully articulating the 
specific challenges, the needs of particular communities and the nature of the 
aid or assistance that is needed.   
 
Similarly, Chapter Three of this Thesis examines the concept of CDA and 
tried to extract, from the prevailing CDA arrangements, the essence or the 
cardinal notion of the practice of CDA. This Chapter establishes that the 
central idea behind the CDA process is the recognition of pre-existing 
interests or rights, and the protection of those rights and interests whenever 
they appear to be in danger encroachment by the lawful act of another 
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person. Also, this Chapter discusses the broad content, scope, and features 
of these agreements. It notes that there are generally no boundaries to the 
scope of what CDAs usually content. Therefore, the parties to CDAs are at 
liberty to negotiate and agree on any issue that they deem appropriate within 
the context of individual projects and the circumstance of the benefiting 
community.  
Furthermore, Chapter Three establishes that the concept of community 
agreement evokes two fundamental principles. They are the impact and 
benefits principle, and the principle of respect or recognition of traditional land 
rights and the provision of remedy for any infraction on those rights. Also, this 
Chapter establishes that the CDA process do not yet have any established 
criteria for evaluating the outcomes. The main reason for this is the absence 
of policy position relating to why the CDA process is imposed or permitted by 
the state (beyond that of keeping community quiet) against which 
performance can be benchmarked.  
However, the Nigerian CDA approach under the MMA clearly sets out the 
transfer of social and economic benefit from resources projects to the 
communities as one of the main objectives of the process. As a result, 
measuring the performance of CDAs will be based on the criteria established 
in the MMA when the CDA process becomes fully operational. 
 
Chapter Four is divided into two parts. The first part addresses the reasons 
why the CDA process has become predominant in many petroleum and 
351 
 
mining jurisdictions. It identified certain social and environmental challenges 
induced by mineral development as one of the main contributors to the 
emergence of the CDA process as the dominant relationship instrument. 
These extractive industries-induced challenges affect the social and 
economic opportunities of those impacted by them. In the past, the failure to 
adequately manage the adverse impact of extractive industry projects 
constituted one of the main sources of tension between communities and the 
extractive industry companies.775 
Part Two specifically focused on the field exercise analysis. It explains the 
general criteria for the field exercises and the nature, scope number of 
participants. The Part Two of this Chapter critically examined the status of the 
CDA process in Australia and Canada using the information accessed during 
the field exercises. The Thesis establishes that CDA are used to negotiate 
terms for accessing indigenous people and to structure how they may benefit 
from any activity that occurs on their land. No specific legal or policy 
framework has been created or thought necessary for structuring community 
benefits to achieve any specific purpose. Conversely, this Thesis establishes 
that there are resulting challenges such poor benefit administration, capability 
shortage, need to provide funding for critical aspects of the benefit process, 
among others. This Thesis concludes that for the Nigerian CDA process to 
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achieve the set goals, government must take additional steps to address 
these lacunas and more. 
 
Chapter Five seeks to address two main issues. It distiled the five basic 
principles that underline the CDA process. The principles are the subsidiarity 
principle which is a pluralist liberal principle that states that decisions should 
be made at a level as close as possible to those whom they affect. The other 
princples establsihed in this Chapter are: the public participation princple; the 
self determination princple; the impact and benefit princples; and the 
sustainability principle. 
Secondly, this Chapter examines the legal characterisation of the 
relationships created by CDAs. It establishes that CDAs constitute legal 
contracts, and therefore create legally enforceable obligations. The exception 
to this general princple is the Nigerian GMoU arrangements which have been 
designed by the companies involved as documents embodying promises that 
cannot be enforced. 
The Chapter Six of this Thesis is the application section. It applies the lessons 
learned from the comparative study of the Canadian and the Australian CDA 
practice to formulate a CDA framework for Nigeria. The CDA framework 
developed in this Chapter addresses the deficiencies and the gaps identified 
in the existing CDA process. For instance, the addressed the regulatory gaps 
identified in the MMA through two fundamental avenues. Firstly, this Chapter 
addressed the policy vacuum in the Nigerian CDA process by demonstrating 
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what the policy-makers should consider in designing a Nigerian specific CDA 
policy framework to support the legislated purposes contained in the MMA, as 
well as, to provide the parties to the CDA process with a better understanding 
of not just the aims of the process but also how to achieve them. 
Furthermore, this Chapter identified two levels of CDA policy requirement: (I) 
the micro-level policy; and (ii) the macro-level policy; and also proposed a 
three-way CDA policy test. Secondly, the relevant legal issues that the MMA 
and the pending petroleum legislation must be address were discussed in 
detail. For the purposes of convenience, the issues discussed can be 
categorised into the procedural and substantive issues. The procedural 
issues discussed are pre-agreement essentials designed to ensure that the 
process leading up to a CDA is fair and equitable, and they include matters 
such as funding negotiations and agreement implementation and monitoring, 
capacity resourcing for host communities so as to be able to engage 
competent professionals, and a competent dispute resolution mechanism. 
The substantive issues relates to some institutions that must be established 
such as the court, tribunal, and administrative agencies within the 
apparatuses of the state. Another important institution recommended in 
Chapter Six is a management system for CDA implementation. The three 
mechanisms recommended to be included in the management system are a 
BMS, community corporation (similar to what Shell and Chevron have created 
for their GMoUs), and trust instruments for fund management. Furthermore, 
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the terms of CDAs must be lucidly and unambiguously drafted to reflect the 
actual and enforceable intentions of the parties. 
Lastly, it is necessary to stress that although the framework proposed in this 
Thesis may seem to be considerably bureaucratic. However, it is submitted 
that this framework is necessary to drive a CDA process which is designed to 
function as an instrument of local governance for the purposes of community 
sustainability and strategic local development. But in appropriate cases, some 
of the institutions recommended in this Thesis may be created or 
accommodated within the existing ones. For instance, courts and tribunals 
manned by specially trained officers may be created within the existing 
judicial system handle CDA-related disputes. Similarly, agencies or offices 
such as Community Development Bureau, Community Development Fund, 
and CDA Registry could be departments within existing institutions such as 
the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), Petroleum Host 
Community Fund proposed by the PIB, or a similar agency established for the 
mining sector. Thus, the operative requirement is performance or the 
functionality of the relevant institutions.  
 
7.3 Research Contribution 
The research undertaken for this Thesis makes significant contribution to the 
evolving practice of CDA by advancing the frontiers of existing knowledge in 
the following areas. 
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Firstly, the comparative approach adopted by this research by conducting 
detailed comparison of the CDA practices in Australia and Canada is 
particularly ground-breaking. Whilst there is a significant body of literature on 
the CDA practice in Canada, Australia, PNG, among others, most of the 
literature (apart from being mainly policy documents, institutional reports and 
other non-legal material) consists of a project or a country case study of the 
CDA process conducted from a non-legal perspective. None of these 
documents focuses on the nuanced legal and policy issues involved in CDA 
practice with such detail and rigour comparable to the work done in this 
Thesis. This Thesis’ analysis of the CDA practice in Australia and Canada 
extends beyond the usual statement that the CDA processes in these 
countries are “regime”-based. This Thesis dissects the relevant sections of 
the NTA and section 35 (1) of the 1982 Constitution Act of Canada with the 
help of landmark judicial authorities.  
Secondly, this Thesis benefits from detailed study of the concept and practice 
of CDA and identifies five important principles underlying the CDA practice, 
and herein referred to as the CDA Principles. Furthermore, using existing 
agreements and judicial decisions, this Thesis critically analyses the legal 
characterisation of CDAs and determined, based on two criteria, that CDAs 
are legally enforceable contracts. 
Thirdly, this Thesis contributes to the existing knowledge by considering the 
CDA process as a potential instrument for sustainability and strategic 
community development. Although, some existing government documents 
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and non-government reports allude to the fact that the CDA process could 
contribute to the sustainability of communities, none was able to 
conceptualise the content or ingredients of community sustainability within the 
context of energy projects as done in this thesis.  
Fourthly, this Thesis contributes to the emerging Nigerian regulatory 
framework on CDAs. This Thesis’ critical analysis of the MMA’s provisions 
relating to the Nigerian CDAs process is novel and the discussion and the 
recommendations made in this work will eventually form the authoritative 
focal point for advancing the practice in Nigeria. Furthermore, this Thesis 
provides a useful and adaptable template for structuring a legislated CDA 
process in other jurisdictions. 
Fifthly, this Thesis makes proposals for securing the integrity of the CDA 
arrangement and for the protection of the energy sector investment by 
proposing the inclusion of trigger and threshold mechanism into the CDA 
obligations. Also, this Thesis sets out a set of best practices which is annexed 
to this Thesis. 
Finally, this Thesis contributes to the on-going search for a benefit 
management system that is reasonably transparent and accountable through 
the framework proposed in Chapter six. 
 
7.4 Final Remark 
The main thrust of this Thesis is to make significant contribution to the 
emerging process that uses or engages the concept and practice of 
community agreements (otherwise known as CDAs) as an instrument for 
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creating a positive and more enduring legacy in host communities. That is, 
engaging the CDA arrangement to deepen and to expand local development 
and community sustainability through a closer collaboration and interaction 
between the private parties and the relevant state institutions.   
This Thesis has pushed vigorously for a careful and strategic regulation of the 
CDA process within the context of energy projects for community 
development and sustainability. The basis for this advocacy are clearly stated 
in the body of this Thesis.  
However, this work notes that enormous amount of financial and material 
resources are increasingly becoming available to more and more 
communities located around project areas. Potentially, this phenomenon 
portends a promising future for the benefiting communities and thus should 
be welcomed. This is provided that deliberate steps are taken to ensure that 
these resources are utilized for the development and sustainability of the 
beneficiaries.  
And in advocating for strategic regulatory of CDAs, this work considers it the 
primary responsibility of every government where this practice exists to 
support the process. This support may be provided through the creation or 
the establishment of enabling framework to facilitate, guide, or to co-
superintend the process towards the realisation of the stated goals or themes. 
This is what Nigeria must do if it truly desires to see social and economic 
benefits meaningfully and sustainably transferred to communities around 
project areas. This work has been able to demonstrate that good aspirations 
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and the willingness of industry participant to negotiate CDAs alone are not 
enough to actualise the desirable objective of local beneficiation and 
community sustainability.  
 
7.5 General Implications of the Research 
The broad implication for the research undertaken for this thesis is that the 
stakeholders to the CDA process should reconsider, or re-evaluate the 
fundamentals of their CDA practice in order to determine whether the 
operating structure for the negotiation and implementation of the CDAs is 
competent and therefore capable of assisting the parties to realise their 
expectations. 
Although the framework in Chapter Six is designed with the Nigerian unique 
environment and its legal system in mind, this Thesis provides the general 
template for a purposeful CDA process from which useful lessons may be 
drawn. As a result, other jurisdictions can readily take a cue from this work to 
develop a country-specific arrangement for CDA administration.  
Secondly, in the case of the Nigerian CDA process, one important implication 
is the need to review the provisions of the MMA pursuant to the framework 
developed in this work and to draft a new CDA legislation and a detailed 
policy framework to anchor the process. A new framework that incorporates 
the changes suggested in this Thesis is essential for the realisation of the 
well-stated objectives of the Nigerian CDA process. 
Finally, another implication of this research is that the CDA process has 
become a pivotal instrument for community-industry relations, particularly in 
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the resource E & P context. Therefore, companies in these sectors should be 
encouraged to make the CDA arrangement the cornerstone of their 
engagement with the host or indigenous communities for the reasons that 
have already been stated earlier in this thesis. Also, the mechanisms of the 
CDA process provide the best option for a more friendly relations occasioned 
by sustainable engagement between the industry and their host communities.  
 
7.6 Direction for Future Research 
This Thesis has approached the research from one analytical perspective, 
which is community sustainability. But, the CDA practice can be viewed from 
many other perspectives that suites the specific needs of each jurisdiction. 
So, opportunities exist to pursue similar or related research from other 
analytical perspectives.  
Also, there is an opportunity for future research relating to the design of a 
framework for evaluating or measuring agreement outcomes and 
performances. A benchmarking tool for assessing performances will become 
very important as the CDA practices in many jurisdictions mature and 
sufficient data made available for such evaluation to occur.  
Furthermore, there may be opportunities for future research which examines 
how the CDA process may advance the specific interests of other 
stakeholders such as the state and the extractive industry corporations. This 
Thesis has focused more on how the CDA process can advance or promote 
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the interests of indigenous, host or local communities in a resource 
development context.  
Additionally, there is a similar desire for community sustainability and 
strategic community development in indigenous communities of Australia and 
other jurisdictions. Thus, it will be good to see a research which examines 
how the CDA framework can be more constructively engaged towards 
addressing the unique challenges that exist within Aboriginal communities.  
Lastly, this Thesis has briefly discussed how the CDA process can promote 
the operationalisation of the Ruggie’s framework. It will be interesting to have 
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These questions have been formulated having regard to the professional or 
vocational grouping of the target audiences. The target audiences are as 
follows: 
a) Community/Indigenous Groups: 
1. Is the relationship between your community and the resource company 
operating in your community based on contract? Is it public?  
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2. What are the reasons why your community asked or accepted to 
negotiate a CDA type contract with the resource developer operating in 
your community? 
3. Is the contractual relationship meeting expectation of the parties? 
Please give reasons for your answer. 
4. How do you assess the impact of this agreement on your community 
based on the reasons in Question 2? (A) Highly satisfactory (B) 
Somewhat satisfactory (C) Somewhat unsatisfactory (D) Unsatisfactory 
5. How are negotiators/Representatives Selected? What are the relevant 
selection criteria? 
6. How are you able to organise yourselves as a community for the 
purpose of negotiating agreements with a resource company?  Who 
leads the negotiating team for your community and are you satisfied 
with the capacity of your negotiators 
7. How long does it take to negotiate and conclude a CDA, in your 
experience? Were negotiating records kept? 
8. How did you educate yourself on the content of CDAs 
9. Are there challenges that you faced in getting the relevant groups in 
your community to support negotiations? 
10. Who leads the negotiating team for your community and are you 
satisfied with the capacity of your negotiators? 
b) CDA practitioners: 
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1. What is your view on the scope/contents of CDAs in terms narrowing 
or expanding issues which these agreements may address? Please 
give reasons for your answer. 
2. Is there a legal or regulatory option for dealing with stalemates-where 
negotiation breaks down or where a community is divided on whether 
or not to negotiate or conclude or endorse a negotiated arrangement? 
3. How did you become a representative of the indigenous groups that 
you now represent? 
4. How you manage internal disagreements within a given group so as to 
present united front for the purpose of negotiation? 
5. Are the groups you represent or have worked been present at 
negotiation? And do they play any role during actual negotiation? 
6. Do you always have the mandate of an indigenous group regarding the 
items to be negotiated upon? 
7. Are they things you can identify as CDA best practices 
8. How long did it take to negotiate an agreement? Do you keep records 
of negotiations? 
 
c) Resource Developers: 




2. Do you use Community Development Agreements (CDAs) or similar 
arrangements? Are such arrangements typically contractual in nature 
or do you also use non-contractual types? 
3. What is your company’s perspective and approach to CDAs and have 
they had any impact on the relationship between your company and 
the host community and your operations? How would you rate that 
impact? (A) A very great impact (B) A considerable impact (C) Low 
impact (D) No impact 
4. Is there a legal or regulatory requirement mandating the negotiation of 
CDAs or similar agreements between resource developer and 
indigenous/ community interests? 
5. In the absence of legal or regulatory requirements, has your company 
entered into any CDAs or similar arrangements? What are the reasons 
for such agreements, and have they met expectations? What role, if 
any, does sustainable development, have in this content? 
6. What are the legal, regulatory or policy challenges to the CDA process 
that you have faced? How are they met? 
7. How can the CDA process be reformed to work better and what, if any, 
role does the State have to play in this? Do you welcome regulation 
and, if any, in what form? 
8. What is your view on the scope/contents of CDAs in terms narrowing 
or expanding issues which these agreements may address? 
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9. What is your view on the scope/contents of CDAs in terms of 
narrowing or expanding issues which these agreements may address? 
10. Can you identify CDA best practices 
 
d) Lawyers: Experts/experienced in CDA negotiation, 
administration/implementation 
1. What is the connection or impact of the Native Title Act to the 
agreement-making process between indigenous people and resource 
developers? 
2. Are they policy or regulatory challenges that you have experienced in 
agreement negotiation or implementation stages 
3. What role can or should the public sector play in the CDA process? 
4. What is your view on the scope/contents of CDAs in terms of 
narrowing or expanding issues which these agreements may address? 
5. Based on your experience with negotiated CDAs, and their on-going 
implementation, to what extend has specific clauses in those 
agreements aided or adversely affected their implementation and 
enforcement? 
6. How are obligations in CDAs captured in the agreements you have 
negotiated? Are ‘best endeavour’ obligation clauses enforceable or 
implementable?  




8. Who bears agreement implementation and monitoring costs and how 
is the obligation enforced?  
9. What is the role of CDAs in the regulatory approvals process or what 
regulatory approvals are subject to the negotiation of CDA? 
10. What is the foundation or basis for a community’s negotiation of CDA-
(A) Connection with or interest in land (B) Based on First Nations 
status (C) likelihood of being impacted? 
11. Can you identify CDA best practices? 
 
e) Judicial Officers and Land/Native Title Tribunal Members: 
1. What is the connection or impact of the Native Title Act to the 
agreement-making process between indigenous people and resource 
developers? 
2. What role if any, does the Judiciary have in the agreement-making 
process between communities and resource developers? 
3. Has a case been brought before your lordship relating to issues such 
as validity, breach or enforcement of CDA obligations? 
4. Can you share your experiences relating to community agreements-
benefits and challenges inherent in them? 
5. Have you been called upon to pronounce upon the validity, breach or 
enforceability of community agreements? 
6. Are there any changes that you would like to see in the way the 
agreement process works? Can you identify any CDA best practices 
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7. What role can or should the public sector play in the CDA process? 
 
f) Regulators 
1. What is the connection or impact of the Native Title Act to the 
agreement-making process between indigenous people and resource 
developers? 
2. What is the legal basis for the indigenous/community agreements with 
resource developers in your jurisdiction? 
3. What are the challenges you have faced as a regulator relating to your 
regulatory functions and the community agreements process? 
4. How would you describe the regulatory and policy framework for 
community agreements in your jurisdiction? 
5. Are there areas of the process that require greater regulatory and 
policy direction or attention? 
6. Are confidentiality clauses good or bad for the community agreements 
process? In the context of CDAs, what is your view on transparency? 
7. What is your view on the scope/contents of CDAs in terms of 
narrowing or expanding issues which these agreements may address? 
8. Is there a legal or regulatory option for dealing with stalemates-where 
negotiation breaks down or where a community is divided on whether 
or not to negotiate? 
9. What is the role of CDAs in the regulatory approvals process or what 
regulatory approvals are subject to the negotiation of CDA? 
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10. What role, if any, does the principle of sustainable development have 
to play in this context? 
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